Rodriguez v. State

• Citation: 172 So.3d 540
• Decision Date: 14 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 5D14–41.,5D14–41.
• Parties: Jason RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

172 So.3d 540

Jason RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D14–41.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Aug. 14, 2015.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Kevin R. Holtz, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion

LAMBERT, J.

Jason Rodriguez appeals his convictions for one count of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted first-degree murder following a jury trial. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the State's request to instruct the jury on the insanity-hallucinations defense set forth in Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.6(b). We reverse because this instruction was not applicable in Rodriguez's case, Rodriguez properly objected to its use, and its use was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

On November 6, 2009, Rodriguez, a former employee of the Orlando offices of Reynolds, Smith and Hills (“RSH”), entered RSH and shot several employees, killing one and wounding five others. He was indicted for first-degree murder and five counts of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm.

At trial, Rodriguez pleaded insanity as his sole defense. Rodriguez called seven expert witnesses who collectively testified that Rodriguez was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and was experiencing delusions and audio hallucinations “regarding an imaginary entity, Sharp Tooth or blue tooth, that issued threats of others were to humililate [sic], degrade and eventually kill Rodriguez.” In its opening statement, the State conceded that Rodriguez suffered from a mental disease or defect and was diagnosed post-shooting as a paranoid schizophrenic. All seven of Rodriguez's experts testified that Rodriguez was insane under the “M'Naghten Rule”¹ because he did not know the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offenses. The State did not call an expert witness at trial, but argued that Rodriguez had been angry at RSH for terminating his employment and that he knew what he was doing was wrong when he shot the RSH employees.

At the charge conference, Rodriguez requested, without objection, that the court instruct the jury with the standard insanity instruction, which provides in relevant part:

An issue in this case is whether (defendant) was insane when the crime allegedly was committed.

A person is considered to be insane when:

1. [He] [She] had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect.

2. Because of this condition

a. [he] [she] did not know what [he] [she] was doing or its consequences or

b. although [he] [she] knew what [he] [she] was doing and its consequences, [he][she] did not know it was wrong.

....

All persons are presumed to be sane. The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is precise, explicit, lacking in confusion, and of such weight that it produces a firm belief, without hesitation, about the matter in issue.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(a) (2009) (bold font omitted). This instruction is consistent with the M'Naghten Rule, which has long been the legal test in Florida for determining insanity in criminal cases. See Patton v. State, 878 So.2d 368, 374 (Fla.2004). “Under M'Naghten, an accused is not criminally responsible if, at the time of the alleged crime, the defendant, by reason of a mental disease or defect, (1) does not know of the nature or consequences of his or her act; or (2) is unable to distinguish right from wrong.” Id. at 375.

Effective June 19, 2000, the M'Naghten Rule was codified in section 775.027, Florida Statutes, which provides:

(1) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—All persons are presumed to be sane. It is an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant was insane. Insanity is established when:

(a) The defendant had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect; and

(b) Because of this condition, the defendant:

1. Did not know what he or she was doing or its consequences; or

2. Although the defendant knew what he or she was doing and its consequences, the defendant did not know that what he or she was doing was wrong.

Mental infirmity, disease, or defect does not constitute a defense of insanity except as provided in this subsection.

(2) BURDEN OF PROOF—The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.

§ 775.027, Fla. Stat. (2009). Pursuant to section 775.027, any issue of insanity is to be determined solely under the M'Naghten Rule. See id. (“Mental infirmity, disease, or defect does not constitute a defense of insanity except as provided in this subsection.”). Section 775.027 also transferred the burden of proving insanity to the defendant.² See id.

In addition to the standard insanity instruction, the State requested that the trial court separately instruct the jury as to the insanity—hallucinations defense set forth in Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.6(b). Further, the State requested that this instruction be modified to place the burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence upon Rodriguez. Preliminarily, the standard hallucinations instruction provides a cautionary notice that it is to be given only for offenses occurring before June 19, 2000, the date that section 775.027 became effective.³ Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(b) (citing § 775.027, Fla. Stat.). The instruction thereafter reads in pertinent part:

An issue in this case is whether (defendant) was insane when the crime allegedly was committed.

A person is considered to be insane when:

1. The person had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect.

2. Because of this condition, the person had hallucinations or delusions which caused the person to honestly believe to be facts things that are not true or real.

The guilt or innocence of a person suffering from such hallucinations or delusions is to be determined just as though the hallucinations or delusions were actual facts. If the act of the person would have been lawful had the hallucinations or delusions been the actual facts, the person is not guilty of the crime.

All persons are presumed to be sane. However, if the evidence causes you to have a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's sanity, then the presumption of sanity vanishes and the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane.

Id. (bold font omitted). Because this instruction requires the jury to find that the “act of the person would have been lawful had the hallucinations or delusions been the actual facts” for the defendant to be not guilty by reason of insanity, its use often, although not always, is accompanied by an instruction on the law of self-defense. See, e.g., Congleton v. Sansom, 664 So.2d 276, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“In the law, there are many situations in which a person may intentionally injure or kill another and not be subject to criminal punishment. For example, an individual may kill in self-defense.”); Boswell v. State, 610 So.2d 670, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“Boswell takes the position that he hallucinated the initial shot and that he believed that he was firing in self defense.”).

Rodriguez objected to the State's requested instruction, arguing that the hallucinations instruction was inapplicable because his alleged crimes occurred in 2009, that the instruction would be confusing to the jury, and that by using the instruction, he would essentially be forced into raising an affirmative defense of self-defense, which he never intended to do. The trial court overruled Rodriguez's objection and instructed the jury on both the standard insanity instruction and the modified hallucinations instruction.⁴ However, the jury was instructed not to consider the hallucinations instruction unless it found Rodriguez sane under the standard insanity instruction. In other words, if the jury found Rodriguez insane under the M'Naghten instruction, it was not to consider the hallucinations instruction.

A trial court's decision to give or withhold a proposed jury instruction is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review. Truett v. State, 105 So.3d 656, 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Langston v. State, 789 So.2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ). In support of its decision to ignore the prefatory, qualifying language in the hallucinations instruction, which stated that the instruction should only be given for offenses that allegedly occurred before June 19, 2000, the trial court relied on three cases: (1) Cruse v. State, 588 So.2d 983 (Fla.1991) ; (2) Turner v. State, 809 So.2d 59 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ; and (3) Wallace v. State, 766 So.2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). In each of those cases, the trial court gave a hallucinations instruction similar to the one in the instant case. Cruse, 588 So.2d at 989 ; Turner, 809 So.2d at 61 ; Wallace, 766 So.2d at 368.

However, the offenses in each of those cases occurred prior to June 19, 2000. Cruse, 588 So.2d at 986 (1987 offense) ; Turner, 809 So.2d at 59 (1998 offense) ; Wallace, 766 So.2d at 366 (1997 offense).

The trial court also relied on Martin v. State, 110 So.3d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), in which the court instructed the jury on the standard insanity defense but refused, over Martin's objection, to also instruct the jury on the law of self-defense. Id. at 938. At trial, Martin presented testimony that his state of delirium

could have caused him to act to protect himself because he believed his life was in danger. Id. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the trial court erred in excluding testimony related to self-defense and in denying Martin's request for a self-defense jury instruction because he presented “ample evidence” to support his request. Id. at 939–40. However, in Martin, there is no indication that a hallucinations instruction...