Rodriguez v. State, 13-96-399-CV
| Decision Date | 18 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-96-399-CV,13-96-399-CV |
| Citation | 960 S.W.2d 355 |
| Parties | Maria Louisa RODRIGUEZ, et al., Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas and The City of Corpus Christi, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
William Robert Anderson, III, Sorrell, Anderson & Lehrman, Corpus Christi, for Appellants.
Linda Flores Resendez, Asst. City Atty., James R. Bray, Jr., City Atty., Corpus Christi, Mark Heidenheimer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Highway Division, Laquita A. Hamilton, Deputy Atty. Gen. for Litigation, Jorge Vega, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Grady Click, Asst. Atty. Gen., Highway Division, Austin, for Appellees.
Before DORSEY, FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., and RODRIGUEZ, JJ.
This is a suit for damages for the wrongful death of Juan Garcia Rodriguez. Appellants sued appellees, the State of Texas and the City of Corpus Christi, for negligence after Rodriguez's tractor-trailer rig hit a bridge abutment located on a detour at a highway-interchange construction site. The trial court granted summary judgment for appellees, and appellants appeal by six points of error. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
On December 13, 1990, Juan Garcia Rodriguez was driving a tractor-trailer rig north on U.S. Highway 77. A new interchange was being constructed at the intersection of U.S. 77 and Interstate Highway 37 in Corpus Christi, and a massive construction project was underway. All traffic on U.S. 77 north was detoured around a large excavation. While following that detour, Mr. Rodriguez's truck hit a bridge abutment and rolled over, causing his death.
Appellants alleged his injuries and death were caused by the negligence of the State of Texas and the City of Corpus Christi in that an unreasonably dangerous condition existed at the detour. They alleged the excavation and detour constituted a special defect causing unusual traffic conditions that are not normally encountered by motorists: a sharp right turn; decreasing highway speeds; an incline with blind or limited sight; confusing directions; and other similar conditions. They claim the State failed to provide adequate warning of these conditions created by the excavation.
The State moved for summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds making two arguments. First, that it was performing a discretionary act and was thus exempted from the Tort Claims Act, under section 101.056, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 1 Second, because the engineer employed by the State who designed the detour and placement of associated warning signs was immune from suit under the doctrine of official immunity, the State is also immune from suit, for under the Tort Claims Act, the State is only liable when a private individual would be. The State contended a governmental entity is entitled to assert and have considered a motion for summary judgment based on official immunity of an employee, even if the employee is not a party to the lawsuit or the negligence of that particular employee is alleged.
The State's summary judgment proof included the affidavits of William Coltharp and Patrick Norrell. Coltharp, an engineer with Coltharp Engineering Associates, described the detour and the site of the accident, the speed limit, and warning signs. He concluded the fifteen-mile-per-hour speed limit was reasonable, that there were adequate warnings of the sharp left turn where the accident occurred, and that Mr. Rodriguez's truck "could have safely traversed the sharp left turn at a speed of 15 miles per hour."
Patrick Norrell was the Corpus Christi area engineer for the Texas Department of Transportation. He was responsible for all the design, construction, and maintenance within the location where this accident occurred. This included designing the plan for traffic traveling on the highway while the construction was in progress. His affidavit stated, in part:
The traffic control, including signs, signals and traffic control devices, shown on the diagram [attached to the affidavit of Mr. Coltharp] are the ones I had determined to be appropriate in my engineering judgment. The roadway design and warnings shown on the Coltharp drawing are exactly what I intended to have in place on December 13, 1990, based upon my best engineering judgment. The detour design and warnings met all legal requirements.
He also stated that after Mr. Rodriguez's accident, he and other engineers from the Corpus Christi District office of the Department of Transportation made "follow up investigations of the detour warnings" and determined the warnings in place were appropriate and no changes or additions were needed.
The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the road construction where the accident happened was a State project, and the City was not involved in any construction planning or design decisions. State engineers designed the detour roadway and curve in question, including the warnings associated with the curve. David Seiler, traffic engineer for the City, so stated in his affidavit.
Appellants responded to the motion and attached the affidavit of Gary Nelson, Ph.D., a technical consultant in the fields of safety engineering, safety management, human factors engineering, and occupational health engineering. In arriving at the opinions expressed in his affidavit, he reviewed the depositions of Patrick Norrell and William Coltharp, among other items. 2
In his affidavit, Dr. Nelson named certain characteristics of the detour that made it dangerous and were not normally encountered by motorists. He included an abrupt decrease in the speed, from forty miles-per-hour to fifteen miles-per-hour, a relatively steep incline, a sharp ninety-degree turn, obscured vision of the roadway, and an immediate potential lane change after cresting the top of the hill. These special conditions were caused by the excavation and construction of an overpass, because the excavation was an obstruction in the normal area of travel. Dr. Nelson found the existing warnings to be inadequate in several particulars:
(a) There was no "REDUCED SPEED AHEAD" sign when the speed was reduced from 40 MPH to 15 MPH. A "REDUCED SPEED AHEAD" sign ... to prepare motorists for an otherwise sudden and significant reduction of speed such as a reduction of 40 MPH to 15 MPH.
* * * * *
(b) There was no "ROADWAY INCLINE" signage. "ROADWAY INCLINE" signage "W7-1" or "W7-1b" ... a pictorial sign with a truck on an incline ... to warn motorists, and especially large truck traffic, of the existence of an incline within an already obscured roadway area.
* * * * *
(a) As motorists begin to descend the incline in this matter, an unmarked right turn is encountered, requiring a possible lane change. There is no detour signage prior to the crest of the incline notifying motorists "SH-77 and U.S.-37 [sic] DETOUR--LEFT LANE or MERGE LEFT."
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(b) At the location of the 90-degree left turn in this matter, according to photographs taken while the truck was still turned over, it appears that only two "CHEVRON" ( signs (CW1-8)* were utilized to denote the location of the sharp left turn. In the alternative, multiple "LEFT ARROW" (CW1-6)* signs, including "LEFT ARROW DETOUR" (M4-10L)* signs, should have been used at this location in combination with additional "15 MPH" signs. There was no such signage.
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(c) Given the unusual combination of hazards encountered by motorists in this matter (and given the understood history of accidents "in this area"), one or more signs indicating "DANGEROUS ROADWAY AHEAD" should have been used in combination with "OBSCURED VISION," "HIGHWAY INCLINE," "90-TURN TO THE LEFT," AND "15 MPH" signs to present advanced notice of the full nature [of] the dangerous conditions ahead. There were no such signs. Further, given the combination of hazards presented to motorists and the critical need for motorists to understand the dangerous nature of such multiple hazards, redundant "DANGEROUS ROADWAY AHEAD" signage would also be warranted.
The trial court granted summary judgment for appellees without specifying the ground or grounds on which it relied.
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, a movant must establish that no genuine issue about any material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1995) (per curiam). A defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or who conclusively establishes all of the elements of an affirmative defense is entitled to a summary judgment. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex.1993); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984). In reviewing a summary judgment, we must accept as true evidence in favor of the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, an appellate court will affirm a summary judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1989).
By points one, three, and five, appellants assert the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment that was based on its sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity protects governmental entities from liability, Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.1994), but the State has waived that immunity from suit in particular circumstances through the Texas Tort Claims Act. That act must be examined to determine if the State has waived its immunity, and if the conditions of waiver have been met, the suit may proceed.
The Tort Claims Act provides the State is liable for "personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of ... real...
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State v. Rodriguez
...under the Texas Tort Claims Act; and (2) governmental employees' official immunity did not confer sovereign immunity on the State. 960 S.W.2d 355. We conclude that the State was entitled to judgment based on sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and rend......