Rodriguez v. Testa

• Decision Date: 04 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18389.,18389.
• Citation: 993 A.2d 955,296 Conn. 1
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Nilsa RODRIGUEZ v. Mark J. TESTA et al.

993 A.2d 955

296 Conn. 1

Nilsa RODRIGUEZ v. Mark J. TESTA et al.

No. 18389.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 10, 2009.

Decided May 4, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andre M. Mura, Washington, DC, pro hac vice, with whom was Lori D. McHugh, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Cesar A. Noble, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Yelena Akim, for the appellee (defendant Daimler Chrysler Financial Service America Trust).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether 49 U.S.C. § 30106,¹ also known as the Graves Amendment,² preempts state law imposing vicarious liability on the lessor of an uninsured motor vehicle for damages caused by the negligent acts of the lessee or an agent thereof. The plaintiff, Nilsa Rodriguez, claims that the trial court improperly granted the summary judgment motion of the defendant Daimler Chrysler Financial Service America Trust (Daimler Chrysler) because the Amendment does not preempt General Statutes § 14-154a³ under the circumstances of this case. The plaintiff also claims that the Amendment is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power under the commerce clause of the United States constitution. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Daimler Chrysler responds that the trial court properly granted its summary judgment motion because the Amendment is constitutional and a lessor's failure to insure a vehicle in accordance with § 14-154a (b)(1) does not trigger the Amendment's savings clause, which excludes from preemption state laws imposing liability on lessors for, inter alia, failure to meet "financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements...." 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) (2006).⁴ We agree with Daimler Chrysler that the Amendment preempts § 14-154a under the facts of this case and that the Amendment is constitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts⁵ and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On July 9, 2006, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which a vehicle operated by the named defendant, Mark J. Testa, struck her vehicle. Testa's company, Bright Lighting, Inc., had leased the vehicle from Daimler Chrysler for a term of thirty-nine months, but the vehicle was not insured by Daimler Chrysler at the time of the accident.

Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against Testa, Daimler Chrysler and three other defendants.⁶ In her amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged in part that Daimler Chrysler, as owner and lessor of the vehicle, was liable for Testa's negligent operation of the vehicle under the theory of vicarious liability set forth in § 14-154a. Daimler Chrysler filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the state law was preempted by the Graves Amendment, and the trial court granted the motion. Relying in part on Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 543-44 n. 9, 923 A.2d 673 (2007), and Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668 n. 1, 911 A.2d 315 (2006), the court concluded that "the law on the question of the effect of the Amendment is well settled. Connecticut can no longer impose vicarious liability on the owner of a rented or leased vehicle." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further concluded that the Amendment was constitutional, as there was "a clear, self-evident relation between interstate commerce and the leasing of motor vehicles." The court thus determined that, because there was no genuine issue of material fact and the plaintiff did not allege negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of Daimler Chrysler to bring her claim outside the scope of the Amendment; see 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2) (2006); Daimler Chrysler had met its burden of establishing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

On January 9, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation of the trial court's ruling. In its response, the court explained that examples of negligence or criminal wrongdoing that would establish Daimler Chrysler's liability under state law would be the leasing of a vehicle "with bald tires, faulty brakes, a sticky gas pedal or any other known mechanical defect" that was "the proximate cause of the accident." The court further explained that, because "leased vehicles may be driven across state lines," Congress has authority under the commerce clause of the United States constitution to adopt laws regulating such vehicles. This appeal followed.⁷

We begin with the applicable standard of review. "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant Daimler Chrysler's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193, 198-99, 931 A.2d 916 (2007). Issues of statutory construction and constitutional interpretation are also matters of law subject to our plenary review. See, e.g., Honulik v. Greenwich, 293 Conn. 641, 668, 980 A.2d 845 (2009) (constitutional interpretation); Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Amaro, 293 Conn. 1, 8, 976 A.2d 668 (2009) (statutory construction).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly granted Daimler Chrysler's summary judgment motion because the Graves Amendment does not preempt her state law claim. The plaintiff contends that the two cases on which the trial court relied did not address the preemptive scope of the Amendment in relation to Connecticut law. She also contends that the trial court improperly construed the Amendment's savings clause, which excludes from preemption those state laws that impose liability on motor vehicle lessors for failure to comply with state financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements. The plaintiff claims that § 14-154a (b)(1) is such a law because it provides that a long-term lessor⁸ that obtains bodily injury liability insurance of not less than $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence may avoid vicarious liability for the lessee's negligent conduct, thus encouraging such lessors to provide the specified coverage for their vehicles. Daimler Chrysler replies that the trial court properly granted its summary judgment motion because § 14-154a is not the type of financial responsibility or liability insurance law that qualifies for exemption from preemption under the savings clause. We agree with Daimler Chrysler.

"The question of preemption is one of federal law, arising under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hackett v. J.L. G. Properties, LLC, 285 Conn. 498, 504, 940 A.2d 769 (2008). The supremacy clause of the United States constitution provides in relevant part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. "State law is pre-empted under the supremacy clause... in three circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law.... Preemption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent ... and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one."

"Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it, or where an act of Congress touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.... Where ... the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the states, congressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest...."

"Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); see also Hackett v. J.L.G. Properties, LLC, supra, 285 Conn. at 504, 940 A.2d 769.

The Graves Amendment was enacted by Congress on August 10, 2005,⁹ as part of a comprehensive transportation bill entitled the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (act), Pub.L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). "The act deals generally with motor vehicle safety, primarily providing billions of dollars in funding allocations for transportation projects." Meyer v. Nwokedi, 777 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn. 2010). The Amendment was included in the act as a tort reform measure intended to bar recovery against car rental and leasing companies on the...