Rodriguez v. United States
| Decision Date | 12 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:12-cv-42 (SRU),3:12-cv-42 (SRU) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | JOSÉ LUIS RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
On January 9, 2012, petitioner José Luis Rodriguez, currently imprisoned at Federal Correctional Institution Fort Dix in Fort Dix, New Jersey, timely filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence ("habeas petition"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After his indictment, a jury convicted Rodriguez of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. On December 19, 2008, I sentenced Rodriguez to the statutory mandatory-minimum sentence for his crime—120 months' imprisonment. Rodriguez's habeas petition avers that his co-defendant, José Adames, "will provide testimony which is exculpatory" and will demonstrate Rodriguez's actual innocence. Habeas Pet. 1. For the following reasons, Rodriguez's petition is denied.
Section 2255 provides a prisoner in federal custody a limited opportunity to challenge the legality of the sentence imposed upon him. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979). In order to prevail, the petitioner must show either (1) that his sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) that the sentencing courtlacked jurisdiction to impose such a sentence; (3) that the sentence exceeded the maximum detention authorized by law; or (4) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Johnson v. United States, 313 F.3d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 2002). Collateral relief is only available for a constitutional error that constitutes a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). The petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. See Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1995).
Section 2255 "may not be employed to relitigate questions which were raised and considered on direct appeal." Cabrera v. United States, 972 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Reese v. United States, 329 F. App'x 324, 326 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Sanin, 252 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)). If a petitioner fails to raise an issue upon direct appeal, that issue will be deemed procedurally defaulted and unreviewable, absent a demonstration of ineffective assistance of counsel, an "intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." United States v. Becker, 502 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).
The Second Circuit has held that "[a]n independent category of cases" exists regarding circumstances "in which petitioners may suffer miscarriages of justice if they are procedurally barred from filing habeas petitions" when those petitioners "claim that they are actually innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). In the context of a habeas petition,the phrase "actual innocence" refers to factual innocence, not the alleged legal insufficiency of evidence presented in the underlying criminal proceeding. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)). Thus, to establish actual innocence, the petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995)); see also Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729, 732, 734 (2d Cir. 1998). A petitioner's claim that he is actually innocent is "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise" procedurally-defaulted constitutional claim "considered on the merits." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993)).
Because credible claims of innocence are extremely rare, a petitioner must support his claim "with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial" before he may take advantage of the "gateway" that his actual-innocence claim provides. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). Accordingly, a habeas court must determine "whether the new evidence is trustworthy" on the evidence's own merits and in light of the pre-existing evidence in the record. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28. Only after a court has determined that the purportedly new evidence is reliable may the court consider the petitioner's claim. Cf. Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 162 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28). A reviewing court may make its own evaluation of the evidence, including determinations of credibility, and "[o]nly after examining all evidence is the court able to determine whether new evidence truly throws the petitioner's conviction into doubt, or whether it is so overwhelmed by the weight of other evidence that it isinsufficient to raise a question" regarding the petitioner's factual innocence. Doe, 391 F.3d at 162 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328, 330).
A district court is typically required to hold a hearing on the petitioner's claims "unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, a petitioner is not automatically entitled to a hearing where the allegations in his habeas petition are "vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible." In order to warrant a hearing, the habeas petition must set forth "specific facts supported by competent evidence, raising detailed and controverted issues of fact that, if proved at a hearing, would entitle him to relief." Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (); Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) ().
On September 21, 2005, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Rodriguez and twenty-two co-defendants with multiple criminal violations, including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute, cocaine and crack. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 3:05-cr-58-21 (SRU) (D. Conn.) (doc. 419). On May 25, 2006, a federal jury convicted Rodriguez of conspiracy to possess with intent todistribute, and conspiracy to distribute, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base ("crack"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Verdict (Rodriguez, doc. 673). Rodriguez then moved for acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial, which I denied on the merits. Def.'s Mot. for Dismissal or Judgment of Acquittal ; Order & Ruling denying Def.'s Mot. for New Trial/Acquittal (Rodriguez, doc. 1189).1 On December 19, 2008, I sentenced Rodriguez to the statutory mandatory-minimum sentence for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)—120 months' imprisonment. Judgment, (Rodriguez, doc. 1272).
Rodriguez appealed directly to the Second Circuit, which upheld my determinations in substantial part and affirmed Rodriguez's conviction and sentence. United States v. Arcadio Ramirez, 609 F.3d 495 (2d Cir. 2010). After the Second Circuit's ruling, Rodriguez petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied his petition for a writ of certiorari on January 10, 2011. Rodriguez v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 956 (2011). On January 9, 2012—one day before the expiration of the statute of limitations—Rodriguez petitioned the district court to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Rodriguez was alleged to be a member of a conspiracy to transport large quantities ofcocaine and crack from Brooklyn, New York to Danbury, Connecticut for distribution in both states. Ramirez, 609 F.3d at 497. Rodriguez's co-conspirator, José Adames, was the architect of the trafficking operation and supplied Alex Luna, the lead seller in Danbury, with large, weekly deliveries of cocaine for resale. Id. From 2002 to 2005, Rodriguez was alleged to have been Adames's driver for many of Adames's deliveries to Danbury. Id.
At trial, the government offered testimony from three of Rodriguez's co-conspirators, each of whom testified regarding Rodriguez's involvement with Adames, including Rodriguez's alleged involvement in the cocaine transactions between Adames and Luna. Id. at 498. Rodriguez's co-conspirators testified that Rodriguez had delivered cocaine to Luna by himself and with Adames, and that Rodriguez had received money from Luna in exchange for the cocaine. Id. at 501. They also testified that Rodriguez would "retrieve cocaine from the vehicle" that he drove...
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