Rodriguez Velazquez v. Autoridad Metropolitana

• Decision Date: 19 April 2007
• Docket Number: Civil No. 03-2331 (RLA).
• Parties: Gilberto RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AUTORIDAD METROPOLITANA DE AUTOBUSES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

502 F.Supp.2d 200

Gilberto RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AUTORIDAD METROPOLITANA DE AUTOBUSES, Defendant.

Civil No. 03-2331 (RLA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 19, 2007.

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Alexis Fuentes-Hernandez, Charles A. Cuprill PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Juan M. Rivera-Gonzalez, Sanchez Betances Sifre Munoz Noya & Rivera Law Offices, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ACOSTA, District Judge.

Defendant, AUTORIDAD METROPOLITANA DE AUTOBUSES ("AMA"), has moved the court to enter summary judgment dismissing the instant complaint on various grounds. The court having reviewed the arguments of the parties together with the documents submitted in support of defendant's request hereby finds that dismissal of the federal causes of action is warranted based on timeliness grounds as well as plaintiffs failure to exhaust the requisite administrative remedies. Accordingly, there is no need to address the alternate grounds advanced by defendant in support of its petition for dismissal.

THE FACTS

The following facts are not disputed.

1. Plaintiff, GILBERTO RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ, commenced working with AMA on August 8, 1988.

2. On May 2, 1994, RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ suffered a work-related accident and reported to the STATE INSURANCE FUND ("SIF") for treatment.

3. RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ returned to work in May 1995.

4. Upon his return to work in May 1995, RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ could not perform his prior duties as a skilled mechanic without reasonable accommodation.

5. In December 1995, RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ requested a disabled-person parking space..

6. In January 1996, RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ again reported to the SIF.

7. Thereafter, RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ returned to work in January 1999.

8. On March 15, 2000, RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ filed an administrative claim with the EEOC.

9. The EEOC issued RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ a Right to Sue Letter on September 15, 2003.

10. The instant complaint was filed on December 15, 2003.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P., which sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions, in pertinent part provides that they shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st Cir.2000); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1995).

"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'" Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 361 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995)).

Credibility issues fall outside the scope of summary judgment. "`Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). See also, Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st Cir.2000) ("court should not engage in credibility assessments."); Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.1999) ("credibility determinations are for the factfinder at trial, not for the court at summary judgment."); Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.1998) (credibility issues not proper on summary judgment); Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers, Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 108, 113 (D.P.R.2002). "There is no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, and no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood. In fact, only if the record, viewed in this manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment.". Cruz-Baez v. Negron-Irizarry, 360 F.Supp.2d 326, 332 (D.P.R.2005) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted).

In cases where the non-movant party bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite and competent evidence to rebut a motion for summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202; Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.2001); Grant's Dairy v. Comm'r of Maine Dep't of Agric., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2000), and cannot rely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation". Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir.2000); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff asserts claims under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793, et seq., Puerto Rico Law 100 of May 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq. (2002) and Puerto Rico Law 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, 501 et seq., (1999) for alleged disability discrimination.

According to the complaint, plaintiff GILBERTO RODRIGUEZ VELAZQUEZ commenced working for AMA in 1988 as a "skilled mechanic" until May 2, 1994, when he suffered a work-related accident. As a result thereof, plaintiff was absent from work approximately one year while receiving treatment from the SIF.

Plaintiff returned to work at AMA in May 1995, with a SIF certification of 35% disability and a recommendation for reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff claims he was provided a bench to perform his duties but denied "a proper reasonable accommodation, which includes a parking space for disable [sic] persons [such as plaintiff] and properly functioning elevators and/or ramps, notwithstanding [plaintiffs] constant demands for said accommodations". Complaint ¶ 25.

Plaintiff again reported to the SIF in January 1996, where he received treatment for the next three years.

In January 1999, plaintiff went back to work at AMA. "Before returning to work SIF recommended to AMA to modify [plaintiff's] work schedule and to provide him again with a bench to perform his duties as a reasonable accommodation." Complaint ¶ 28.

"Notwithstanding the SIF's clear and unambiguous recommendation, AMA denied [plaintiff] the recommended bench and did not modify [his] work schedule. Furthermore, AMA continued to deny [plaintiff] with a parking space for a qualified individual with disabilities, and did not have properly working elevators and/or ramps." Complaint ¶ 29.

"Due to [plaintiff's] constant demands for his rights and necessary reasonable accommodation, AMA ... forced [plaintiff] to perform duties that were detrimental to his physical disability and constantly discriminated against him .... AMA ... denied [plaintiff] a toolbox that all employees of his same rank were entitled to; forced to work for the full 8-hour period standing up; denied the parking space constantly requested by [plaintiff]; continued to grant salary increases, and other benefits to other non-disable [sic] employees in the same work area as [plaintiff]; constantly filed unjustified and baseless reports against [plaintiff] in, order to intimidate him; and continuously proffer derogatory comments against [plaintiff] due to this disability." Complaint ¶ 31.

Plaintiff again reported to the SIF on August 5, 1999, where, in less than a month, was granted 100% disability status.

On June 6, 2003, "in another discriminatory action [AMA] proceeded to terminate [plaintiff s] employment based on a falsely (sic) absentee allegation." Complaint ¶ 35.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Defendant raises Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the. ADA related claims.

ADA "forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). It is evident from a reading of the complaint that the claims under ADA are based exclusively on defendant's alleged failure to grant him a reasonable accommodation in his work under Title I.

Under Garrett, states have been found to be immune from Title I ADA suits in federal court based on the protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment.¹

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the commencement and prosecution in federal court of suits claiming damages brought against any state, including Puerto Rico, without its consent. Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.2006); Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico and Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2003); Futura Dev. v. Estado Libre Asociado, 144...