Rodriguez–Gonzalez v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 26 March 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–2199 (ADC).
• Citation: 854 F.Supp.2d 176,182 Soc.Sec.Rep.Serv. 456
• Parties: Aixa I. RODRIGUEZ–GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

854 F.Supp.2d 176

182 Soc.Sec.Rep.Serv. 456

Aixa I. RODRIGUEZ–GONZALEZ, Plaintiff,

v.Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil No. 10–2199 (ADC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 26, 2012.

Salvador Medina–De–La–Cruz, Salvador Medina De La Cruz Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Ginette L. Milanes, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

AIDA M. DELGADO–COLÓN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Aixa I. Rodríguez–González (“plaintiff” or “Rodríguez–González”), filed the present action against defendant, Michael J. Astrue (“defendant” or “Astrue”), seeking review of an Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) decision to deny plaintiff's claim for disability benefits pursuant. Docket No. 1. On May 5, 2011, defendant answered the complaint. Docket No. 6. The parties each submitted a memorandum of law and defendant filed the certified administrative record of the proceedings and evidence considered by the administrative law judge. Docket Nos. 11, 12.

Pending before the court is Magistrate–Judge Justo Arenas' (“Magistrate–Judge”) Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) recommending that the decision of the Social Security Commissioner be affirmed. Docket No. 16. Plaintiff has failed to interpose any objections.

I. Applicable Standard of Review

A district court may refer pending motions to a Magistrate–Judge for a report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); L. Cv. R. 72(a). Any party adversely affected by the recommendation issued may file written objections within fourteen (14) days of being served with the report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); L. Civ. R. 72(d). A party that files a timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of “those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which specific objection is made.” Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F.Supp.2d 189, 191–92 (D.P.R.2005) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). The objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. “The district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections.” Rivera–García v. United States, Civ. No. 06–1004(PG), 2008 WL 3287236, *1 (D.P.R. Aug. 7, 2008) (citing Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419 (5th Cir.1987)). Moreover, to the extent the objections amount to no more than general or conclusory objections to the report and recommendation, without specifying to which issues in the report objection is made, or where the objections are repetitive of the arguments already made to the magistrate-judge, a de novo review is unwarranted. Id. “Instead, the report and recommendation is reviewed by the district judge for clear error.” Id. (citing Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly–Rate Employees Pension Plan, 806 F.Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y.1992) (“It is improper for an objecting party to ... submit[ ] papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the apple’ when they file objections to a R & R.”)).

In conducting its review, the court is free to “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendationsmade by the magistrate-judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(b)(1); see also Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir.1985); Alamo Rodríguez v. Pfizer Pharma., Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 144, 146 (D.P.R.2003). Hence, the court may accept those parts of the report and recommendation to which the plaintiff does not object. See Hernández–Mejías v. General Elec., 428 F.Supp.2d 4, 6 (D.P.R.2005) (citing LaCedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Det. Facility, 334 F.Supp.2d 114, 125–26 (D.R.I.2004)).

II. Conclusion

After careful consideration of the Report and Recommendation and the record, the court hereby ADOPTS the Magistrate–Judge's Report and Recommendation in full. Docket No. 16. Defendant's final decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant action is DISMISSED.

The Clerk of Court is to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JUSTO ARENAS, United States Magistrate Judge.

On December 9, 2010, plaintiff filed this petition for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security which denied her application for a period of disability and Social Security disability insurance benefits. She filed a memorandum of law seeking reversal of the final decision on July 7, 2011. (Docket No. 11.) Defendant filed a memorandum in support of the final decision on August 2, 2011.

Plaintiff has the burden of proving that she has become disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 138, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). A finding of disability requires that plaintiff be unable to perform any substantial gainful activity or work because of a medical condition which has lasted or which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. See42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1). In general terms, evidence of a physical or mental impairment or a combination of both is insufficient for the Commissioner to award benefits. There must be a causal relationship between such impairment or impairments and plaintiff's inability to perform substantial gainful activity. See McDonald v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 795 F.2d 1118, 1120 (1st Cir.1986). Partial disability does not qualify a claimant for benefits. See Rodríguez v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 494, 496 (1st Cir.1965).

The only issue for the court to determine is whether the final decision that plaintiff is not under a disability is supported by substantial evidence in the record when looking at such record as a whole. In order to be entitled to such benefits, plaintiff must establish that she was disabled under the Act at any time between June 18, 2003, her alleged onset date, and March 31, 2006, when she last met the earnings requirements for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. See Evangelista v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 140 n. 3 (1st Cir.1987).

After evaluating the evidence of record, Administrative Law Judge John D. McNamee–Alemany entered the following findings on July 24, 2007:

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on March 31, 2006.

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date on June 28, 2003 through the date last insured of March 31, 2006.

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; herniated disc at L5–S1 level; lumbar spondylosis, and major depressive disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled on of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work, providing the opportunity to alternate sitting and standing to relieve pain or discomfort; she could occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl; any task should not have required frequent handling.

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was born on December 9, 1966 and was 39 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18–49, on the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1563).

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is unable to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).

9. Transferability of skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical–Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82–41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Through the date last insured, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were job that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 404.1560(c) and 404.1566).

11. The claimant was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from June 28, 2003, the alleged onset date, through March 31, 2006, the date last insured. (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

Tr. at 35–40.

The administrative law judge ended the sequential inquiry at step five. At this level, it has already been determined that the claimant cannot perform any work she has performed in the past due to a severe impairment or combination of impairments. The inquiry requires a consideration of the claimant's residual functional capacity as well as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience to see if the claimant can do other work. If the claimant cannot, a finding of disability will follow. See20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). At step five, the Commissioner bears the burden of determining that significant jobs exist in the national economy given the above factors. See Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31 (1st Cir.1999); Lancellotta v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 806 F.2d 284 (1st Cir.1986); Vázquez v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 683 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1982).

This decision was reviewed by the Appeals Council upon request by plaintiff. (Tr. at 75–81.) The Appeals Council then vacated that final decision. The Appeals Council noted that evidence from a vocationalexpert was needed in order to determine the extent to which claimant's limitations, such as alternating sitting and standing, with no frequent...