Rodwell v. Pro Football, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1973
• Docket Number: Docket No. 10885,No. 1,1
• Citation: 206 N.W.2d 773,45 Mich.App. 408
• Parties: Robert John RODWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRO FOOTBALL, INC. T/A The Washington Redskins, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 773

206 N.W.2d 773

45 Mich.App. 408

Robert John RODWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRO FOOTBALL, INC. T/A The Washington Redskins, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 10885.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

March 26, 1973.

Leave to Appeal Filed April 16, 1973.

Released for Publication May 11, 1973.

Leave to Appeal Denied Sept. 17, 1973.

Sanford L. Steiner, Ripple & Chambers, Alexander, Buchanan & Conklin, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

James M. Baysinger, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before LESINSKI, C.J., and J. H. GILLIS and PETERSON, ^* JJ.

LESINSKI, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Robert Rodwell was injured while an employee of defendant Pro Football, Inc., the Washington Redskins. Plaintiff filed a petition for a hearing with the Michigan Bureau of Workmen's Compensation on June 20, 1968. Defendant filed a special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the department. The hearing referee found that the defendant was subject to the provisions of the Michigan Act. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board reversed and dismissed plaintiff's petition. On leave granted, plaintiff appeals to this Court.

Plaintiff, a lifelong Michigan resident, was a member of the Eastern Michigan University football team. In 1967, his senior year, he received a questionnaire from the Washington Redskins, a Maryland corporation. He completed the questionnaire and was subsequently drafted by defendant. A few days after the professional draft, a Mr. Temerario, defendant's agent, contacted plaintiff by phone concerning a contract. After negotiations plaintiff signed a contract with defendant in Michigan. Plaintiff later received further instructions and a plane ticket. He flew to Washington, D.C., underwent a physical examination, and proceeded to defendant's training camp in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He was injured approximately 10 days after arriving at camp, while participating in a tackling drill. Plaintiff then returned to Michigan.

The question on appeal is whether a nonresident employer is subject to the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act for an out-of-state injury to a Michigan resident, hired in Michigan to do work mainly outside of Michigan. This question requires both an interpretation of the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act and an inquiry into the constitutionality of such an extension of jurisdiction.

The principal statute involved is M.C.L.A. § 418.845; M.S.A. § 17.237(845): ¹

'The bureau shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the Injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other benefits provided by this act.' (Emphasis supplied.)

A literal reading of the statute would indicate that the Michigan board does have jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of the fact that plaintiff is a Michigan resident and the contract of employment was made in Michigan.

Defendant argues, however, that such an interpretation would ignore M.C.L.A. § 418.115; M.S.A. § 17.237(115):

'This act shall apply to:

'(a) All private employers, other than agricultural employers, who regularly employ 3 or more employees at 1 time.

'(b) All private employers, other than agricultural employers, who regularly employ less than 3 employees if at least 1 of them has been regularly employed by that same employer for 35 or more hours per week for 13 weeks or longer during the preceding 52 weeks.' Formerly M.C.L.A. § 411.2a; M.S.A. § 171.142(1).)

The appeal board found that M.C.L.A. § 418.151; M.S.A. § 17.237(151) ² was applicable. 'The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this act:

'(b) Every person, firm and private corporation, including any public service corporation, who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.'

The board held:

'We would agree that jurisdiction to hear the claim does reside in the Bureau, and the fact that both that agency and this have considered the matter is proof thereof. But, as the Board recently noted in Leiter v B & L Industries Inc (1970 WCABO 1334), decided October 8, 1970, jurisdiction alone does not obviate the necessity of proving the other requisites of a good claim. The Referee did in fact go a relevant step further, which we must examine, of finding defendant subject to the Act. To do this, we must find that defendant regularly employed three or more employees at one time, or less than three if at least one of them has been regularly employed for 35 hours per week for 13 weeks. (Sec.2a(1) Part I, CL 411.2(a)).

'Defendant has very few Michigan contacts. There have been three games here in twenty years, no bank account, and scouts were in and out infrequently until a separate organization took over scouting for several teams. George Mans was clearly working for plaintiff in procuring the best terms possible, and this is evident by plaintiff's own testimony.

'This leaves us with plaintiff alone and the question of whether his employment with defendant is that contemplated by the statute to make defendant subject to our Act (Sec. 2(a), Part I). We do not believe so. The employment to be undertaken by plaintiff was to be performed for a foreign employer in a foreign state. All the contact with plaintiff was done at a distance. His presence in Michigan was not for any furtherance to the defendant's business or ends; defendant's only connection with this state was one of their employees resided here.

'It is our opinion, therefore, that defendant did not meet the minimal requirements for an employer to be subject to the Michigan Act. We reverse the Referee and grant defendant's motion to dismiss the application.'

We accept the board's findings of fact and limit our review to the legal issue. We approach statutory interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act in light of the principle that we will construe it liberally to reach employers and to protect employees. 99 CJS Meaning of 'Employer' § 38, pp. 223--224 (1958). We of course give weight to the board's interpretation of the statute, but we are not bound by such construction when it is clearly erroneous. Roosevelt Oil Co. v. Secretary of State, 339 Mich. 679, 64 N.W.2d 582 (1954).

The board's holding here has the effect of reading the word Michigan into M.C.L.A. § 418.115; M.S.A. § 17.237(115), and into M.C.L.A. § 418.151; M.S.A. $ 17.237(151), before the word Employers. A superficial reading of Smith v. Lawrence Baking Co., 370 Mich. 169, 121 N.W.2d 684 (1963), would seem to support such interpretation. In overruling Wagner v. LaSalle Foundry Co., 345 Mich. 185, 75 N.W.2d 866 (1956), the Smith Court said at page 178 of 370 Mich., 121 N.W.2d at page 688:

'For the reasons stated by Justice Talbot Smith in his dissenting opinion in Wagner v. LaSalle Foundry Co., Supra, we conclude the majority opinion in Wagner was in error in reading into part 7, § 9, of the workmen's compensation act the words, 'provided, that such last employer was a Michigan employer.' The act under consideration is a Michigan act. It deals with Michigan workmen and Michigan working conditions and Michigan problems. Clearly, the legislature did not have in mind employers outside the State over whom it would have no jurisdiction.

'The majority opinion in Wagner v. LaSalle Foundry Co., Supra, is hereby reversed, and part 7, § 9, of the workmen's compensation act is interpreted to read as the legislature intended--'The total compensation due shall be recoverable from the Michigan employer who last employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due and in which it was contracted." ³ (Emphasis supplied.)

However, it is important to note that the Smith holding allowed the employee to recover from a Michigan employer. Wagner had prevented recovery from the Michigan employer and probably from the Ohio employer who last employed plaintiff in Ohio, because of a lack of Michigan jurisdiction over this Ohio employer. The Smith Court expressly adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Wagner which had emphasized recovery, the lack of jurisdiction over the Ohio employer, and the fact that the employee might well not be able to recover even in Ohio. The Smith Court therefore emphasized that this was a Michigan act and interpolated the word Michigan in order to grant recovery from an employer over which it had jurisdiction.

A court would have no problem obtaining jurisdiction over defendant in this case. The Michigan 'long-arm' statute would be applicable. M.C.L.A. § 600.715(1); M.S.A. § 27A.715(1). In Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 199, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971), the Court construed M.C.L.A. § 600.705(1); M.S.A. § 27A.705(1), an almost identical statute for jurisdiction over individuals. The Court said:

'The courts of those states having 'long-arm' statutes similar to that of Michigan which confer, specifically, limited personal jurisdiction over defendants based on 'the transaction of any business within the state,' have generally construed their statutes as extending the state's jurisdiction to the farthest limits permitted by due process.

'The phrase 'transaction of any business' is construed as broader than 'doing business'.

'It can scarcely be doubted that the negotiations in Michigan resulting in defendant's retainer come within the concept of the transaction of 'any' business.' (Citations omitted.)

The Legislature has the power to extend the jurisdiction of the board as far as it has extended the jurisdiction of the courts. Defendant's active recruitment of plaintiff in Michigan, the actual signing of the contract here, and Michigan's interest in protecting its residents form sufficient basis for Michigan jurisdiction in this case. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Hill v. Smith, 337 F.Supp. 981 (W.D.Mi...