Cavers v. Houston Mclane Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2008
• Docket Number: Docket: WCB-08-14
• Citation: 958 A.2d 905,2008 ME 164
• Parties: Eric D. CAVERS v. HOUSTON McLANE CO., INC. d/b/a The Houston Astros Baseball Club.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

958 A.2d 905

2008 ME 164

Eric D. CAVERS v. HOUSTON McLANE CO., INC. d/b/a The Houston Astros Baseball Club.

Docket: WCB-08-14

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: September 15, 2008.

Decided: October 30, 2008.

William O. LaCasse, Esq., C. Lindsey Morrill, Esq. (orally), Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, ME, for Houston McLane Company.

Patrick M. Kelly, Esq. (orally), McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker, P.A., Topsham, ME, for Eric D. Cavers.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶1] Houston McLane Co., Inc., d/b/a the Houston Astros Baseball Club, a Texas corporation, appeals from a decision of a Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer (Jerome, HO) determining that the Board has personal jurisdiction over the Houston Astros on Eric D. Cavers's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Astros contend that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case violates due process because the only contact the Astros had with Maine was a visit by its Director of Scouting to negotiate and sign Cavers's minor league baseball contract. We affirm.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶2] At all relevant times, Eric Cavers has been a resident of Otisfield. He graduated from Oxford Hills High School. He then attended Franklin Pierce College in New Hampshire on a baseball scholarship. After his third year in college, Cavers attended a try-out sponsored by the Astros in Albany, New York. He then entered the June 2004 Major League Baseball amateur draft. He was selected by the Astros in the tenth round as the 304th overall selection in the draft. On June 9, the Astros' Director of Scouting came to Cavers' home in Otisfield where he and Cavers negotiated and signed a standard Minor League Uniform Player Contract.

[¶3] The contract was for a term of seven baseball seasons and governed all aspects of a player's services on minor league baseball clubs. It also incorporated by reference the agreements and rules applicable to all major league players. The contract obligated the player "to perform professional services on a calendar year basis," although it specified that salary payments would be made only during the playing season. The contract also specified that the player could be required to maintain playing condition and weight while home during the off-season, and that the player would be paid for travel costs from his home to the training site at the start of the training season and to return home at the end of the season, or if released prior to the end of the season.

[¶4] The contract obligated the baseball club to pay medical expenses caused by any playing injury and not covered by workers' compensation or medical insurance. The club reserved the right to select the persons performing medical services and the places where such services would be performed.

[¶5] The contract specified that the player could be assigned or traded to any other club. Spaces on the contract provided for its assignment from one club to another. The contract also stated that the player could be released at any time the club decided that the player's services were no longer needed.

[¶6] The contract included a choice of law provision stating that it "shall be governed by and interpreted in such a manner as to be effective and valid under New York law." It included no provision specifying any jurisdiction or forum as a place for resolution of claims or disputes.

[¶7] An addendum to the contract indicated that it was an agreement with the Houston Astros and specified the rates of pay and a signing bonus. The addendum included a space for approval by the Commissioner of Major League Baseball.

[¶8] Cavers began to play with the Astros' rookie league team in Greenville, Tennessee, as a catcher. On June 27, 2004, he injured his shoulder during a game when throwing a ball to second base. He traveled to Houston where the team doctor told him he had a strained shoulder and recommended conservative treatment and limited activity. He was put on the disabled list and allowed to practice, but not to play. He remained with the Greenville team until the end of the season. He went to Houston again to see the team doctor, who recommended six more months of rest and rehabilitation.

[¶9] As the 2005 season approached, Cavers continued to experience pain. He sought a second opinion from a doctor in Boston, who diagnosed him with a torn labrum, and advised him to undergo arthroscopic surgery. Against the Astros' doctor's advice, Cavers underwent the surgery in March 2005. After a period of recuperation in Maine, Cavers was sent to Florida for rehabilitation. His condition improved, and the Astros assigned him to a team in Troy, New York. After the 2005 season, Cavers went back to college for a semester, and helped coach the Franklin Pierce team. By the 2006 season, after spring training in Florida, Cavers felt he had recovered. He played for another Class A minor league team, the Lexington Kentucky Legends. None of the Astros' teams ever traveled to Maine for games.

[¶10] When the 2006 season ended, the Astros released Cavers from his contract. Cavers played for another team in Illinois for a short period, then returned to Maine. He has not played professional baseball since, and is working as a carpenter in Maine. Cavers has received some medical care for his shoulder in Maine.

[¶11] Cavers filed a petition for award of workers' compensation benefits and for payment of medical and related services in Maine. Before the Workers' Compensation Board, the Astros moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that Maine lacks personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The hearing officer found that Cavers was a resident of Maine at the time of the injury, and thus, the Board had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The hearing officer also determined that the Board had personal jurisdiction over the Astros.

[¶12] The hearing officer determined that Cavers was entitled to the protection of the Maine Workers' Compensation Act for the 2004 shoulder injury, but awarded no wage replacement benefits. The petition for payment of medical bills was granted. The Astros filed a petition for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the hearing officer denied. We granted the Astros' petition for appellate review pursuant to M.R.App. P. 23 and 39-A M.R.S. § 322 (2007). The only issue raised by the Astros on appeal is whether the Board has personal jurisdiction over the Astros.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

[¶13] Cavers has always maintained his residence in Maine. The Maine residency of an employee, by itself, is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Board over claims for work-related injuries received by the employee out of state. Christiansen v. Elwin G. Smith, Inc., 598 A.2d 176, 177 (Me.1991); see also LeBlanc v. United Eng'r & Constructors, Inc., 584 A.2d 675, 677 (Me.1991); Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 444 (Me.1986). The Astros do not dispute that Cavers was a Maine resident at the time he was injured.

[¶14] The Workers' Compensation Act replaces common law tort jurisdiction for work-related injuries. 39-A M.R.S. §§ 103, 104 (2007). The long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2007), and personal jurisdiction due process analysis are appropriately applied to the determination of whether the Workers' Compensation Board has authority over claims against employers arising from injuries that occur in other states to Maine resident employees. See Christiansen, 598 A.2d at 177.

[¶15] The Maine long-arm statute states, in pertinent part:

Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:

A. The transaction of any business within this State.

14 M.R.S. § 704-A(2).

[¶16] By negotiating and contracting with Cavers in Maine, the Astros transacted business within the State.

[¶17] When there is an issue of judicial or administrative authority over an out-of-state party, personal jurisdiction issues are analyzed according to the due process and minimum contacts standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Those standards apply to assertions of state court or agency jurisdiction based on either personal contacts or location of property within a state. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569; Connelly v. Doucette, 2006 ME 124, ¶¶ 6-7, 909 A.2d 221, 223; Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Dworman, 2004 ME 142, ¶ 10, 861 A.2d 662, 665. Thus, Maine's long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A, has been held to allow the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent authorized by the Due Process Clause of the Maine Constitution, Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A, and that of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. See Commerce Bank, 2004 ME 142, ¶ 12, 861 A.2d at 666; Bickford v. Onslow Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 2004 ME 111, ¶ 10, 855 A.2d 1150, 1154-55.

[¶18] Due process is satisfied when: "(1) Maine has a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the defendant, by his or her conduct, reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction by Maine's courts comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Commerce Bank, 2004 ME 142, ¶ 14, 861 A.2d at 666; see also Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154; Christiansen, 598 A.2d at 177.

[¶19] When the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the court, "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs based on specific facts in the record, after which the...