Rody v. Hollis, 41968
| Decision Date | 03 August 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 41968,41968 |
| Citation | 81 Wn.2d 88,500 P.2d 97 |
| Parties | Gus RODY and Pauline Rody, husband and wife, et al., Respondents, v. Walter D. HOLLIS and Anita Hollis, husband and wife, and Washington State Human Rights Commission, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Morton M. Tytler, Olympia, for appellants.
Alan N. Rasmussen, Spanaway, for respondents.
In this case the Washington State Human Rights Commission is appealing from the decision of the Superior Court that the act of the legislature, RCW 49.60.225, authorizing an administrative tribunal appointed by the commission to award damages up to $1000 for discrimination in real property transactions, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The facts of this case can be briefly summarized as follows: The Washington State Human Rights Commission received a complaint from Mr. and Mrs. Hollis charging Mr. and Mrs. Rody with racial discrimination in a real property transaction. The complaint alleged that the Rodys had refused to rent a house which they owned to the Hollises because the Hollises are black. In accordance with RCW 49.60.250, an administrative tribunal appointed by the commission conducted a hearing and found that the Rodys had discriminated against the Hollises in violation of RCW 49.60.222, a provision of the law against discrimination. The tribunal also found that the Gerlas, relatives of the Rodys, had aided and abetted them in their unlawful actions, by agreeing to buy the house after they knew that the Human Rights Commission was investigating the report of discrimination against the Hollises. Both the Rodys and Gerlas were ordered to cease and desist from these practices in the future. Pursuant to the authority granted to the administrative tribunal by RCW 49.60.225, the Rodys were ordered to pay $250 and the Gerlas were ordered to pay $100 to the Hollises.
The Rodys and Gerlas appealed the tribunal's decision to the superior court, under RCW 34.04.130 and 49.60.270. The superior court affirmed the tribunal's finding that the Rodys had discriminated against the Hollises but dismissed the complaint against the Gerlas, reasoning that they had committed no acts prior to or contemporaneous with the principal discrimination and thus did not aid or abet such discrimination within the meaning of RCW 49.60.220. The superior court also held that RCW 49.60.225, which allows a hearing tribunal to award a civil penalty for housing discrimination of up to $1000, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of the Washington State Constitution. Thereupon, the superior court struck and voided the award of $250 which the commission had ordered to be paid to the Hollises by the Rodys.
The Human Rights Commission, in bringing this appeal, urges that the lower court erred in not affirming and enforcing the order of the hearing tribunal in its entirety.
The first issue on appeal is the constitutionality of the delegation to the hearing tribunal of the power to determine the amount of fines for discrimination in real property transactions. This power is granted by RCW 49.60.225, which provides as follows:
When a determination has been made under RCW 49.60.250 that an unfair practice involving real property has been committed, the board or its successor may, in addition to other relief authorized by RCW 49.60.250, award the complainant up to one thousand dollars for loss of the right secured by (RCW 49.60.010, 49.60.030, 49.60.040 and 49.60.222 through 49.60.226) to be free from discrimination in real property transactions because of race, creed, color or national origin.
We agree with the Human Rights Commission that this statute does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power to an administrative agency.
It is the rule in this state that legislative power may not be delegated to an administrative agency without the prescription of reasonable standards. See Caffall Bros. Forest Products, Inc. v. State, 79 Wash.2d 223, 484 P.2d 912 (1971), Keeting v. Public Utility District No. 1, 49 Wash.2d 761, 306 P.2d 762 (1957). The legislature must provide standards or guidelines which define in general terms what is to be done and the instrumentality or administrative body which is to accomplish it.
In the instant case the requisite standards can be gleaned directly and by implication from the legislative provisions themselves. The legislature has defined in general terms what is to be done; damages up to $1000 are to be awarded for discrimination in real property transactions. The legislature has indicated the administrative body which is to do this--a hearing tribunal established under RCW 49.60.250. Under RCW 49.60.225, the hearing tribunal is authorized to
award the complainant up to one thousand dollars for loss of the right . . . to be free from discrimination in real property transactions because of race, creed, color or national origin.
We believe that it is perfectly clear what the award is to be for; the only discretion left to the hearing tribunal is to determine the amount of the award. And where the purpose of the award is made clear--to provide damages for loss of the right to be free from discrimination in housing transactions--it is clear by implication that the Amount of the award is to be adjusted to accomplish these purposes. Standards to guide administrative action need not, and cannot, be perfectly specific. This is particularly so where the power which is exercised is quasi-judicial in nature, as in the instant case. Judicial power is traditionally and of necessity largely discretionary and standardless. The judicial process operates upon individuals and, in so doing, attempts to treat them as such. All that can, and should, be done is to define the conduct sought to be punished, or the injury to be compensated, set out the Normally acceptable limits of punishment or compensation, and then allow the adjudicative body to determine the appropriate punishment or compensation by applying general principles of morality and traditional concepts of justice.
In the federal courts it has long been established that Congress may authorize an agency to issue regulations the violation of which is criminal, as...
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...statute and required that the property be offered for sale to the complainant. The Supreme Court of Washington, in Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wash.2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972), upheld an administrative award of damages for discrimination in a housing transaction; in approving the granting of administr......
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