Roeder v. Roeder

• Decision Date: 19 June 1953
• Citation: 118 Cal.App.2d 572,258 P.2d 581
• Parties: ROEDER v. ROEDER. Civ. 15473.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 581

258 P.2d 581

118 Cal.App.2d 572

ROEDER v. ROEDER.

Civ. 15473.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

June 19, 1953.

Hearing Denied Aug. 13, 1953.

Joseph A. Brown, San Francisco, for appellant.

Lemuel H. Matthews, Joseph A. Kiernan, Jr., and Maddux, Kiernan & Jonas, San Francisco, for respondent.

PETERS, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff, August Edward Roeder, brought this action against his grandniece, Margaret Jane Roeder, to set aside a deed and to compel a reconveyance of certain real property on the ground that such deed had been secured by fraud, undue influence and mistake, and that there had not been a valid delivery. The trial court found a valid delivery, and that there was no fraud or undue influence, that plaintiff was competent at the time of delivery, and that the parties intended (defendant having so averred in her answer) that a life estate should be reserved to plaintiff. Judgment was entered reforming the deed and determining that defendant was the owner of the property subject to a life estate in plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals, contending that, as a matter of law, the evidence shows that the deed was executed as the result of mistake, that it was secured by fraud and undue influence and in violation of a confidential relationship, and that it was error to grant him the partial remedy of reformation.

The evidence most favorable to defendant shows the following:

The deed by which plaintiff conveyed the property in question to defendant was delivered December 2, 1949, at which time plaintiff was 77 years of age. The property involved is a twelve-unit apartment house in San Francisco which produces an income of $450 to $500 a month, plaintiff's only substantial source of income. Plaintiff lived in the apartment house and managed its operations. For many years prior to 1949 plaintiff and the family group of defendant had been friendly, and exchanged visits, they being his only blood relatives known to any of the witnesses. Plaintiff is defendant's great uncle, her father, Emory Roeder, being plaintiff's nephew. The Emory Roeders live in Alameda. Commencing in about September, 1949, plaintiff began to discuss with the Emory Roeders problems concerning the management of the apartment house, inasmuch as he was having difficulties with some of the tenants and with repairmen and contractors. Defendant, who was working as a secretary, frequently had dinner with plaintiff at his apartment and would remain an hour or so thereafter and listen to her uncle talk about his management and tenant problems. During these conversations plaintiff urged his niece to come and live in the apartment house to assist him in its management. He told her that he was getting old and needed someone he knew to help him. At one stage in the discussions he offered defendant a full-time job as manager of the apartment house at the same salary she was earning as a secretary. He told defendant that several years before 1949 he had made a will leaving the property to her, and he told her and other witnesses that sooner or later defendant would own the property and that she might as well come over and get acquainted with it and at the same time relieve him of some of the work.

Sometime in November of 1949 plaintiff agreed to convey the property to defendant, and she agreed to come and live at the apartment house and assist her uncle in its management. After plaintiff had told defendant that he had willed the property to her, she told plaintiff that inheritance taxes might be costly and that she wanted, if possible, to avoid paying this tax. She suggested that a deed of gift might avoid complications at his death. She also told him that such a deed would not change the status of the property so far as he was concerned. Plaintiff evidenced an interest in this method of handling the transaction and suggested that she investigate its possibilities. Defendant consulted with one Howen, an old friend of plaintiff and an old friend of defendant and of her family. Howen confirmed her impression that a deed was a proper method of handling the transaction. Thereafter, and later in November, defendant told plaintiff what she had discovered. In this conversation she told plaintiff that 'I had found out that there was an instrument called a gift deed that would transfer the property into my name * * * and would eliminate any difficulty at the time of his death, but at no time was I interested in any of the revenue or the income from the property, that that was all to still be his and he was to still live in the apartment house as he had done during the years, and that in effect the only thing that would be changed would be the fact the property would be in my name and not in his.' At this, or a subsequent, conversation defendant told the plaintiff that if he executed the deed he would retain all the rights of an owner except that the title would be in her name, and that the deed would make no difference in his right of control over the property. It did not enter her mind to tell him that the oral agreement limiting the deed would not be binding if she should die, or that she could mortgage or sell the property without his consent. While she knew her general legal rights as owner, she did not give the matters relating to the legal consequences of the transaction another thought, because it never entered her mind that she would ever deprive plaintiff of his rights to the rents or other control of the property.

Defendant testified that, after plaintiff had told her to do so, she asked Howen to draft the deed, and that he did so from a legal description secured from the original deed which plaintiff had secured from his safe deposit box. The plaintiff went to his bank alone and secured the original deed and delivered it to defendant to be used for this purpose. The deed was prepared by Howen and delivered to defendant on November 30, 1949. On December 2nd she delivered it to plaintiff. Then she and plaintiff visited a notary in San Francisco and the deed was executed, acknowledged and delivered. The notary testified that plaintiff presented the deed to her and asked if she would acknowledge it. Upon being asked by the notary, plaintiff stated that he knew what he was signing, and did so in her presence. After the signature was acknowledged the deed was handed to plaintiff who, in turn, handed it to defendant. The defendant had the deed recorded.

Defendant, thereafter, commenced to assist plaintiff in the management of the apartment house. Early in February of 1950, defendant, after redecorating one of the apartments, moved in and proceeded to assist her uncle in the management of the project as she had agreed. She managed the apartment, collected the rents, deposited them in her uncle's commercial account, paid the bills, and handled the complaints of the tenants and contractors. Plaintiff expressed to efendant, her family, and to various friends, his pleasure at this arrangement. This continued until April 10 or 11, 1950, when defendant contracted pneumonia, and returned to her home in Alameda for treatment. She remained in Alameda until the first week in May, when she returned to the apartment house and resumed her duties as manager. At no time did she attempt to retain the rents for her own use, or exercise her legal rights under the deed.

About this time plaintiff became engaged to and married a divorcee, Jeanette by name, then about 34 years of age. Plaintiff was then 77. Plaintiff had known Jeanette for about a year prior to the marriage, she being the renter of a garage in the apartment house. In May, plaintiff introduced Jeanette to defendant as his fiancee. Apparently at this conversation it was suggested that Jeanette would like defendant's apartment. Defendant told Jeanette that the apartment building was in defendant's name and that it was her responsibility to stay on the premises. Plaintiff married Jeanette on May 8, 1950. Thereafter, relations between the parties rapidly deteriorated. On May 10th or 11th the plaintiff and his new wife visited the Emory Roeders in Alameda. Emory Roeder was then sick in bed. Jeanette demanded the key to plaintiff's safe deposit box, then in the possession of Emory Roeder, and demanded that defendant convey the apartment house back to plaintiff. Plaintiff did not participate in this conversation, although he was present. Mrs. Emory Roeder protested discussing such matters while her husband was ill, and the conversation was terminated. A few days later the safe deposit key was sent to plaintiff.

A few days after this occurrence plaintiff came to defendant's room hungry and temporarily deserted by his new wife. Defendant took him to Alameda, and her family fed and cared for him. By that time the complaint in this action had already been filed, but such fact was unknown to defendant until several months later when she was served. Nevertheless, on this visit, plaintiff said nothing about the property, nor did he mention the action then on file. Howen also testified that, about this time, plaintiff complained to him about being lonesome, and being compelled to prepare his own meals.

As a result of these controversies, the defendant moved out of the apartment on June 10, 1950, and was served with process in this action several days later.

At the time of trial, which was in November, 1951, plaintiff gave the definite impression that he was then incompetent. He could not recall the execution of the deed; claimed that his signature was a forgery; denied deeding the property to defendant; denied ever willing the property to her; denied ever discussing deeding the property to defendant; denied that there was a mortgage on the apartment although the existence of such was an admitted fact; was unable to remember marrying, Jeanette, and could not recognize her in the courtroom; and could not identify his signature on the complaint. But whatever plaintiff's mental...