Roger R. Wilkerson v. Eaton Corp., 94-LW-3875
| Decision Date | 10 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | 65182,94-LW-3875 |
| Parties | ROGER R. WILKERSON, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. EATON CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-177755.
For Plaintiff-Appellant: NWABUEZE V. OKOCHA, Okocha & Associates Co., L.P.A., 409 Investment Building, 601 Rockwell Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1602.
For Defendant-Appellee: DAVID A. SCHAEFER, McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Haiman, 1800 Midland Building, 101 Prospect Avenue, West, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.
Plaintiffs-appellants Roger R. Wilkerson and Carol Wilkerson ("Roger" and "Carol" or "the Wilkersons") timely appeal from the following judgment entries of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas:
Defendants-appellees are Eaton Corporation ("Eaton"), John Guska, Robert Hazelton, Floyd Wilkerson[1], Jack Evans, Thomas Freyberg, Priscilla Nunn, Derek Mumford, Walter Duvall, Erwin Panfil and James R. Stover who hereinafter will be identified by surname.
Roger Wilkerson was a Senior Analyst with Eaton until his employment was terminated on October 20, 1989. In his appellate brief, Roger alleges his termination constituted discriminatory retaliation although he performed his job duties satisfactorily. Specifically, Roger claims appellees Eaton management personnel conspired and discriminated against him for two years prior to his termination due to his defense of a black female employee Carol Hagins ("Hagins").
Roger maintains Eaton was "racially hostile" to Hagins and that Eaton management personnel physically assaulted her and discriminatorily discharged her as well. He specifically alleges Eaton discriminated against him in retaliation for his (1) protesting Eaton's treatment of Hagins to management personnel; (2) agreeing to testify on behalf of Hagins before the State of Ohio Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); and (3) filing a personal complaint with the EEOC against Eaton.
Roger also claims Eaton management personnel thereafter attempted to coerce him into signing a general release which would have prevented him from maintaining his EEOC action against Eaton. In addition, he claims Eaton management personnel attempted to persuade him either to refuse to testify on behalf of Hagins or to lie under oath at the EEOC hearing. Roger maintains Eaton promised him he would not be terminated from his job until 1990 if he agreed to comply with such demands.
Roger further claims when he refused to submit to the foregoing demands, appellee Guska who was acting under the direction of appellee Hazelton, "physically and forcibly restrained and detained" Roger in an office on October 4, 1989. Roger alleges that, thereafter, appellee Mumford, vice-president of Eaton, told Roger and a fellow employee, Sharon Weisfeld, that Roger was terminated due to his support for the black female employee Hagins, his refusal to sign the general release and his age.
The Wilkersons commenced this action against Eaton on October 17, 1989. Since appellants' assignments of error touch upon procedural matters, the relevant procedural data is presented infra. In their initial complaint, appellants charged Hazelton and Guska with assaulting Roger and accused Eaton of negligently hiring Guska and Hazelton who intentionally invaded Roger's right to privacy and inflicted emotional distress upon him.
Thereafter, the Wilkersons filed a first amended complaint adding to the previous causes of action relative to Eaton's (1) attempts to dissuade Roger from cooperating with the EEOC; (2) interference with Roger's employment relationship; (3) racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1985; (4) wrongful termination; and (5) causing Carol's loss of consortium.
Appellees then removed the within case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio where it remained through the year 1990. The federal court, however, dismissed the case holding appellants failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted .under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1985. The federal court then granted appellants' motion to remand the case sub judice to the Common Pleas Court for consideration of the state law claims.
Following remand, the Wilkersons sought twice in 1991 to amend their complaint again in the Common Pleas Court in order to add (1) three new defendants; (2) a claim of false imprisonment of Wilkerson by Guska and Hazelton; and (3) a claim of discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02. Appellants also twice filed motions to compel discovery in 1992. As noted supra, the trial court overruled both motions for leave to file a second amended complaint as well as the motions to compel and the trial court granted a protective order to Eaton.
On August 31, 1992, Eaton filed a motion for summary judgment attaching, inter alia, portions of Roger's deposition and a copy of the general release which Roger refused to sign. On October 1, 1992, approximately three yearn after the original action was filed, appellants filed a motion for extension of time to file a brief in opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment so that appellants could complete discovery. The trial court, however, denied appellants' motion for extension of time and ordered appellants to respond to appellees' motion for summary judgment in approximately two and one-half months, viz., by January 22, 1993.
On January 22, 1993, however, appellants did not file a brief in opposition but instead filed a second motion for extension of time to file their brief in opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment. The trial court overruled this motion and granted appellees' motion for summary judgment. The instant appeal followed.
Appellants' first assignment of error follows:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT.
This assignment lacks merit.
Amendment of pleadings is controlled by Civ.R. 15(A)[2]. Civ.R. 15(C)[3] provides for the relation back of an amendment to the date of the original pleading. The trial court may exercise broad discretion when ruling upon a motion to amend. See Patterson v. V & M Auto Body (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 573; Wilmington Steel Products, Inc. v. Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 120; Hoover v. Sumlin (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 1; Peterson v. Teodosio (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 161.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the movant fails to provide operative facts in support of new allegations. There must be a prima facie showing that the movant can support the new matters sought to be pleaded, that the amendment will not cause prejudice to the nonmoving party and that the amendment is not merely a tactic to delay. See Wilmington Steel, supra; Edmondson v. Steelman (1992), 87 Ohio App.3d 455; Singh v. Singh (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 376; Easterling v. Am. Olean Tile Co., Inc. (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 846; Fish v. Coffey (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 129; Solowitch v. Bennett (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 115.
In the case sub judice, appellants twice moved the trial court in 1991 for leave to file a second amended complaint. In appellants' first motion for leave to file the second amended complaint, appellants initially sought to add three additional defendants, viz., Scott Crook ("Crook"), Steven Hardis ("Hardis") and Robert C. McNew ("McNew"), claiming these were necessary and indispensable parties to the wit in Action since they were part of the conspiracy to discriminate against Wilkerson.
Civ.R. 19(A)[4] mandates the compulsory joinder of a party if (1) the non-joinder of that party prevents the other parties from obtaining complete relief or (2) if the party to be joined has one of three specific interests in the within action. In the case sub judice, neither of these two criteria is present to warrant a finding Hardis, Crook and McNew were indispensable parties to the within action.
The only relevant evidence attached to this first motion in support of the compulsory joinder of additional parties was an excerpt from appellees' answers to appellants' first set of interrogatories. In section III(2) of this document, appellees refer to only Hardis and McNew as follows:
It was decided to offer plaintiff [Wilkerson] a package giving him time and financial coverage to find a position with another company in his chosen field. Stephen R. Hardis Vice-Chairman and Chief Financial and Administrative Officer, Robert A. McNew, Legal Counsel and Priscilla Nunn, Human Resources Supervisor, were all informed of the decision. (Emphasis added).
McNew is again mentioned in the attached answer to Interrogatory No. 5 as having been present in the capacity of legal counsel for Eaton in meetings held with other Eaton management personnel, viz., Mumford, Floyd Wilkerson and Evans. Based upon this evidence, we cannot say Crook, Hardis or McNew had an interest in the within action or that their non-joinder would have prevented appellants from obtaining complete relief.
In addition, appellant did not provide operative facts demonstrating these three parties committed any of the acts which formed the substantive basis of appellants' claims. Wilmington...
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