Singh v. Singh

• Decision Date: 15 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 60675,60675
• Citation: 611 N.E.2d 347,81 Ohio App.3d 376
• Parties: SINGH, Appellant, v. SINGH, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 376

81 Ohio App.3d 376

611 N.E.2d 347

SINGH, Appellant, v. SINGH, Appellee.

No. 60675.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Decided June 15, 1992.

Forbes, Forbes & Teamor and Douglas L. Winston, Cleveland, for appellant

McDonald, Hopkins, Burke & Haber and Thomas Schrader, Cleveland, for appellee.

McMANAMON, Judge.

On June 27, 1986, Dr. Kuldeeph Singh placed the following advertisement in "India Abroad," a periodical catering to persons of Indian nationality and/or descent:

"Gurshikh Tonk-Kshatrya (tailor) match for a beautiful, B.A. 26, 5'2"', slim girl. US immigrant, employed, briefly married before, issueless. Reply with photograph. F 3918, IA."

Dr. Singh was in effect, offering his sister-in-law Satinder Kaur for a negotiated marriage. Harbhajan Singh (no relation to Dr. Singh) responded to the advertisement and married Satinder Kaur "shortly thereafter."

The marriage was dissolved within three years and was followed by a lawsuit between the dissatisfied former husband and Dr. Singh. The dismissal Harbhajan Singh raises three assignments of error (see Appendix), challenging not only the dismissal of his complaint but also the denial of his motion to amend it. Upon review of the record, we affirm.

of Harbhajan Singh's complaint pursuant to a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion is the subject of this appeal.

Harbhajan Singh's suit alleged fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed Dr. Singh fraudulently induced Harbhajan Singh to marry Satinder Kaur by failing to disclose certain material facts concerning her physical condition and that Dr. Singh joined Satinder Kaur in ejecting her husband from the marital residence, causing him emotional distress.

According to Harbhajan Singh, Dr. Singh fraudulently represented that Satinder Kaur's previous husband married her solely to gain American citizenship, and after doing so, left the marriage, and Dr. Singh knew but fraudulently failed to disclose (1) that Satinder Kaur was also Dr. Singh's patient and, in 1985, Dr. Singh performed surgery on her "for an incurable disease, which adversely impairs her ability to have normal sexual relations"; and (2) that this "incurable disease" had resulted in the failure of Satinder Kaur's first marriage.

Dr. Singh responded by filing a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, with a request for sanctions and attorney fees. He essentially argued that Harbhajan Singh's claims constitute "amatory" actions which are barred by R.C. 2305.29. The court granted the motion to dismiss but overruled the motion for sanctions and attorney fees.

We will initially address the second assignment of error. In this assignment, Harbhajan Singh argues that the court erred in dismissing his complaint by holding that it comprises an obsolete "amatory" action.

When a party files a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all the factual allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753, 755. In order to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it must appear "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245, 71 O.O.2d 223, 224, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755.

R.C. 2305.29 provides:

"No person shall be liable in civil damages for any breach of a promise to marry, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation, and no person shall be liable in civil damages for seduction of any person eighteen years of age or The trial court dismissed Harbhajan Singh's complaint on the basis that it constituted an "amatory action" and was barred by the statute. A review of the complaint, however, shows the statute to be inapplicable.

older who is not incompetent, as defined in section 2111.01 of the Revised Code."

The code section initially addresses civil suits for breach of promise to marry. There is no argument that this case involves such a claim, nor do we find that one could rationally be made. Counsel for Dr. Singh, however, does propose that the claim sounds in alienation of affections and/or criminal conversation. We disagree.

An action for alienation of affections required proof that " 'the defendant wrongfully, maliciously and intentionally enticed, induced, persuaded and caused plaintiff's husband to lose his affections for * * * [his wife], and that defendant intended to bring about the alienation.' " Strock v. Pressnell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 215, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242, fn. 7, quoting Trainor v. Deters (1969), 22 Ohio App.2d 135, 137, 51 O.O.2d 258, 259, 259 N.E.2d 131, 133. The complaint contains no such allegations.

Criminal conversation was a claim focused on the act of adultery as "the all-important element," distinguished from the mere alienation of a spouse's affections. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d at 215, 527 N.E.2d at 1242, fn. 7. " 'The fundamental right violated by criminal conversation [was] that of exclusive sexual intercourse, * * * and * * * the cause of action [was] complete upon the allegation and proof of sexual intercourse between the defendant and the wife of plaintiff * * *.' " Id., quoting Baltrunas v. Baubles (1926), 23 Ohio App. 104, 106, 154 N.E. 747, 747.

In the present case, the allegations in Harbhajan Singh's complaint relate neither to acts of adultery nor to the alienation of Harbhajan Singh's affections by Dr. Singh. Instead, the complaint involves the alleged nondisclosure of certain material facts concerning Satinder's alleged physical condition. Even under a liberal reading of the complaint, we do not find the claims disposable pursuant to R.C. 2305.29. Thus, we find the court erred in dismissing Harbhajan Singh's complaint on that basis.

We conclude, however, that such error was harmless since the court properly dismissed the complaint.

An appellate court will not reverse a correct judgment merely because the trial court assigned erroneous reasons as the basis of the judgment. Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine (1944), 144 Ohio St. 275, 284, 29 O.O. 426, 430, 58 N.E.2d 658, 662. For this reason, the trial court's holding insofar as it relates to R.C. 2305.29 is harmless error.

The second assignment of error is overruled.

In his first assignment, Harbhajan Singh asserts the court erred in dismissing his complaint since it delineates a cause of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Although the complaint is couched in terms of fraud and emotional distress, it patently stems from Dr. Singh's advertisement and the negotiations which offered his sister-in-law for marriage. Although other cultures may recognize the marketing of brides, we cannot respond to a demand that Ohio courts enforce or condone such activity. The Married Woman's Act of 1887, Am.H.B. No. 31 (84 Ohio Laws 132), effected a radical change in the rights of married women while removing most of their common-law disabilities. Married women were given equal rights with their husbands to contract, take, hold and dispose of property without their husband's consent, and to sue or be sued alone. The intent of the Act was patently to emancipate women and to place them on equal footing with men in respect to their rights and liabilities. Liggett v. Liggett. (1905), 3 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 518.

From that date, women may not be considered the personal chattels of men, whether they are merchandised by relatives in magazine advertisements or otherwise. Persons who adhere to such customs are free to pursue them, but should they ultimately be dissatisfied with a wife so selected, we hold it is against the public policy of this state to treat these agreements as enforceable.

Further, Harbhajan Singh argues, in effect, that his wife was defective since she had an unnamed "incurable disease" which adversely impaired her ability to have normal sexual relations. Again, we hold, as a public policy, that this state cannot recognize a cause of action which treats female persons as goods and subjects others to suits if the women themselves are found unacceptable. Harbhajan Singh's attempt to craft a "defective-bride" cause of action by framing his complaint in terms of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress is unavailing. These claims are clearly premised on an alleged "defect" in Satinder Kaur which Dr. Singh allegedly did not disclose before the marriage. Such claims are against public policy and their dismissal was proper.

Assuming, arguendo, that Harbhajan Singh's claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress were actionable, they are, nevertheless, without merit.

In order to set forth a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege the following:

" '(a) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact " '(b) which is material to the transaction at hand,

" '(c) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred,

" '(d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it,

" '(e) justifiable reliance upon the representation concealment, and

" '(f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.' " Cohen v. Lamko, Inc. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 167, 169, 10 OBR 500, 501, 462 N.E.2d 407, 409, quoting Friedland v. Lipman (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 255, 22 O.O.3d 422, 429 N.E.2d 456, paragraph one of syllabus.

Civ.R. 9(B) mandates that:

"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with...