Rogers v. Ames, No. 19-0612
| Decision Date | 12 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-0612 |
| Parties | Clayton E. Rogers, Petitioner v. Donnie Ames, Superintendent, Mt. Olive Correctional Complex, Respondent |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Petitioner Clayton E. Rogers ("Petitioner"), by counsel Matthew Victor, appeals the June 10, 2019, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent Donnie Ames, Superintendent, Mt. Olive Correctional Complex, by counsel Holly M. Flanigan and Lara K. Bissett, filed a response in support of the circuit court's order.
The Court has considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the record on appeal. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the parties' arguments, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder without a recommendation of mercy following a jury trial in February of 2011. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in State v. Rogers, 231 W. Va. 205, 744 S.E.2d 315 (2013). Prior to discussing Petitioner's habeas petition, we will provide a brief recitation of the factual and procedural history of this matter.
Petitioner was charged with the first-degree murder of his girlfriend, Laura S. Amos ("victim"). During Petitioner's trial, Keith Hubbard testified that on August 28, 2010, he was drinking with Petitioner and the victim under a bridge in St. Albans, West Virginia. Mr. Hubbard stated that Petitioner and the victim argued about another man, Greg Lacy, who had allegedly proposed marriage to the victim. Petitioner was angered by this proposal and, according to Mr. Hubbard, told the victim that he would kill her. Mr. Hubbard and the victim left the area under the bridge and went to Mr. Lacy's home, where they spent the night.
The next day, August 29, 2010, Petitioner, Mr. Hubbard, and a third man, Larry Means, were drinking together on the porch of an abandoned house. According to Mr. Hubbard, Petitioner was still angry about Mr. Lacy's proposal to the victim. The victim joined these men on the front porch and the group continued drinking. Mr. Lacy then arrived and walked up to the porch. An argument between Petitioner and Mr. Lacy ensued. Following this argument, Mr. Lacy left. Approximately five minutes later, Petitioner and the victim walked around the corner of the house. Ten or fifteen minutes after Petitioner and the victim walked around the corner of the house, Mr. Hubbard heard the victim scream his name three times. He ran around the side of the house but did not see anybody. Mr. Hubbard returned to the front porch where he and Mr. Means sat for a period of time until another man, Rusty Martin, came by and informed Mr. Hubbard that he was looking for a house to rent. Mr. Hubbard told him that he should look at the house where they had been sitting. According to Mr. Hubbard, he and Mr. Martin started to enter the home and saw the victim lying on the floor in a pool of blood. She had been stabbed twice in the neck.1 Upon seeing the victim lying on the floor, the men exited the house, and called the police.
The police arrived at the house and began an investigation. One policeman, Officer Don Scurlock of the Nitro Police Department, described what he observed once arriving at the house: "I could see a female lying face up on the floor in the living room . . . I saw a large pool of blood around her head." Officer Scurlock confirmed that the victim was deceased when they arrived at the scene, and that she had suffered knife wounds to her neck.
After interviewing Mr. Hubbard, Mr. Means, and Mr. Martin, the police obtained an arrest warrant for Petitioner, who had fled the scene. Petitioner was found and arrested the following day, August 30, 2010. He was advised of his Miranda rights,2 signed a waiver of rights form, and then admitted to stabbing the victim on both sides of her neck using two knives. Petitioner told the police where he discarded the knives.3
Thereafter, Petitioner was indicted for first-degree murder. His four-day trial commenced in February of 2011. The jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder without a recommendation of mercy. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole.
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed a direct appeal with this Court, arguing that: 1) his statement to the police was taken in violation of the prompt presentment statute, W. Va. Code § 62-1-5(a)(1) (1997); 2) the trial court erred by denying his trial counsel's motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest; and 3) the prosecutor made improper remarks during the trial. This Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction finding that: 1) the prompt presentment statute was not violated; 2) the trial court did not err in denying trial counsel's motion to withdraw; and 3) the prosecutor's remarks did not clearly prejudice Petitioner or result in manifest injustice. See State v. Rogers, 231 W. Va. 205, 744 S.E.2d 315.
Petitioner, by counsel, filed an amended4 habeas petition on March 23, 2015. Petitioner's Losh5 list set forth the following grounds for relief: 1) the trial court's jury instruction on the element of malice was erroneous; 2) the trial court's voluntary manslaughter jury instruction was erroneous; 3) the venire overheard confidential bench discussions with individual jurors; 4) the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress, motion for a new trial, and counsel's motion to withdraw; 5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 6) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and 7) cumulative error. Petitioner also claimed the Court's opinion in his direct appeal should be overturned because the Court "got it wrong" when it rejected the three assignments of error he raised. Finally, he argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him.
The circuit court ("habeas court") held Petitioner's omnibus evidentiary hearing on April 25, 2018. Petitioner informed the habeas court that he did not wish to testify or present any evidence. Petitioner affirmed that this decision was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The habeas court entered its order denying his habeas petition on June 10, 2019. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant appeal.
This Court's standard of review is as follows:
In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006). With this standard in mind, we now address the issues presented.
Petitioner appeals the habeas court's order denying his habeas petition. He raises ten assignments of error: 1) the trial court's jury instruction on the element of malice was erroneous; 2) the trial court's jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter was erroneous; 3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury venire to overhear confidential bench questioning of individual jurors; 4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 5) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; 6) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; 7) the trial court erred in denying his trial counsel's motion to withdraw; 8) the trial court erred in denying him a new trial based upon the prosecutor's improper comments; 9) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder; and 10) the cumulative effect of the individual errors deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. We address each of these assignments of error in turn.
1. Malice Instruction
Petitioner first argues that the trial court's jury instruction on the element of malice was erroneous. Malice is an element of first-degree murder.6 The trial court gave the following instruction on malice:
Malice is defined as that condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, the existence of which is inferred from the acts committed or the words spoken. Malice is not confined to ill will to any one or more particular persons, but is intended to denote an action flowing from any wicked or corrupt motive, done with an evil purpose and wrongful intention where the act has been attended with circumstances showing such a reckless disregard for human life as to necessarily include a formed design against the life of another. Therefore, malice may be inferred from any willful, deliberate and cruel act against another.
Petitioner contends that this instruction was "plainly erroneous" and unconstitutional because the trial court omitted the word "only" from its instruction. However, Petitioner does not state where the word "only" should have been included. Further, Petitioner relies on syllabus point four of State v. Jenkins, 191 W. Va. 87, 443 S.E.2d 244 (1994), in which this Court held that "[a]n instruction in a first degree murder case that informs the jury that malice need not be shown on the part of the defendant against the deceased is erroneous." According to Petitioner, the trial court's instruction absolved the State from directing "ill will" at the victim.
The State contends that the trial court's malice instruction was a correct statement of law. It notes that the instruction in the present case is similar to a malice instruction that was challenged and approved of by this Court in State v. Mullins, 193 W. Va. 315, 456 S.E.2d 42 (1995). The malice instruction in Mullins was as follows:
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