Rogers v. Knight, CV-16-834.
| Decision Date | 05 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-16-834.,CV-16-834. |
| Citation | 527 S.W.3d 719 |
| Parties | Harold Eugene ROGERS, Appellant v. Gleenover KNIGHT, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Harold Eugene Rogers, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Kathryn Henry, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Harold Eugene Rogers, appearing pro se, appeals the dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. Rogers's petition alleged that Knight, as records supervisor for the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), miscalculated Rogers's parole eligibility. The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice because Rogers was parole eligible and he had a parole hearing; therefore, no justiciable controversy existed. We affirm.
In 1973, a Sebastian County jury convicted Rogers of rape and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In 1980, Rogers was convicted of a second rape, which he committed while he was in prison. For that crime, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment to be served consecutively to his life sentence. In 2015, Rogers filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that because he was sixteen years old when he committed the first rape, the life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). The circuit court agreed and resentenced him to ninety years' imprisonment.
On May 31, 2016, Rogers filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus pertaining to the statutes that govern his parole-eligibility dates. He alleged that under Bosnick v. Lockhart , 283 Ark. 533, 677 S.W.2d 292 (1984), his parole eligibility as to both of his sentences should be governed by the parole statute in effect at the time of his 1973 conviction because it was his "original sentence."1 Rogers believed the ADC was requiring him to serve one-half of his aggregate 100–year sentence before becoming eligible for parole, and he asserted that he was parole eligible.
In response, the State asserted that Rogers's requested relief should be denied because Rogers was already parole eligible and had a parole hearing on May 5, 2016. It attached an ADC document titled "Inmate Record Summary," which showed that Rogers already had a parole hearing. It argued that because Rogers was parole eligible, there was no justiciable controversy. The circuit court agreed and dismissed Rogers's petition with prejudice.
Because the circuit court considered exhibits outside the pleadings in making its ruling, we will treat the dismissal as one on summary judgment. See Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc. , 2013 Ark. 130, 426 S.W.3d 448. The purpose of a declaratory judgment "is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Civitan Ctr., Inc. , 2012 Ark. 40, 386 S.W.3d 432. Declaratory relief may be granted if the petitioner establishes (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) that the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue involved in the controversy is ripe for judicial determination. Id. We review a circuit court's decision that there is no justiciable controversy de novo. Brown v. State , 2017 Ark. 232, 522 S.W.3d 791.
We agree that no justiciable controversy exists. Rogers claims he is parole eligible and has a right to a parole hearing. The State is not contesting his parole eligibility or his entitlement to a parole hearing, and in fact had provided him such prior to the filing of the petition. A controversy is justiciable when "a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it." McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith , 2012 Ark. 452, at 14, 425 S.W.3d 671, 681–82 (citing MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp. , 363 Ark. 22, 35, 210 S.W.3d 878, 886 (2005) ). A case is nonjusticiable "when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy." Neely v. McCastlain , 2009 Ark. 189, at 5, 306 S.W.3d 424, 427.
In his petition, Rogers also asked the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus directing Knight to apply Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43–2807 to both of his rape sentences so that he would be parole eligible. Again, the State submitted an exhibit showing he was parole eligible at the time he filed his petition, and he had a parole hearing. Rogers presented no evidence or argument to contradict this. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying Rogers's petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus.
Affirmed.
I cannot agree with the majority's decision to affirm the circuit court's denial of Rogers's petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. Specifically, I cannot agree that no justiciable controversy exists simply because Rogers was eligible for parole at the time his petition was filed and he had a parole hearing. Because I would reverse and remand this case for a hearing to determine whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate, I must respectfully dissent.
In the July 13, 2016 order denying Rogers's petition, the circuit court found that "[i]t appears that the petitioner is upset that his parole was not granted and filed this matter in an effort to gain immediate release." This statement is inaccurate.
What Rogers asked was that his parole eligibility be accurately calculated pursuant to applicable law. He did not ask for a parole hearing. Based on the record before us, I cannot determine whether an accurate calculation was completed. Specifically, the record contains two letters from appellant Knight to Rogers. The March 1, 2016 letter states that "[y]our total sentence of 100 years began 11/5/1973." The March 4, 2016 letter states that "[y]our second offense of Rape was committed 3/8/1980 and falls under Act 93 which came into effect 4/1/77 and states that second offenders (which you are) falls under this Act and must serve one half of your time before being parole eligible." However, another document pertaining to Rogers's 1980 rape conviction contains a section entitled "Minimum Release." This section reflects that Rogers's sentence will begin on "12/08/2021." However, the same document also contains a section entitled "Parole Eligibility." This section reflects that Rogers's sentence began on "05/21/1991" and his parole-eligibility date was "01/17/1995." Based on the foregoing, I cannot say that Rogers's parole eligibility has been accurately calculated pursuant to the applicable law.
Finally, I must note that the majority cites Neely v. McCastlain for the proposition that However, Neely states that Id. at 5–6, 306 S.W.3d at 427. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). There is at least a question of fact as to whether Rogers's parole eligibility was correctly calculated. Further, because it is unclear what impact an incorrect calculation may have on Rogers, pursuant to Neely , I cannot say that Rogers's case presents no justiciable issue based on mootness.
In sum, because I would reverse and remand this case for a hearing to determine whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate, I must dissent.
In my view, Harold Eugene Rogers's petition established that he pled a justiciable issue. In his Petition and brief, Rogers relied on Bosnick v. Lockhart , 283 Ark. 206, 672 S.W.2d 52 (1984), which, as in the case before us, involved a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. In Bosnick , a prisoner serving a life sentence escaped. After he was apprehended, he received a three-year sentence for the escape, set to run consecutive to his life term. The Department of Correction (ADC) calculated Bosnick 's parole eligibility in accordance with Act 93 of 1977, that had been passed after his life sentence had been imposed but before his sentence for escape. The Bosnick court held that such a scheme violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Bosnick court also issued a writ of mandamus compelling the ADC to properly calculate and credit him with the correct parole eligibility date. Bosnick proscribed the type of parole eligibility calculation to which Rogers believed he was being subjected. Because Rogers's petition essentially asserted the same facts upon which the Bosnick court held were sufficient to grant...
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