Rogers v. South Carolina Dept. of Parole and Community Corrections
Decision Date | 08 March 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 24350,24350 |
Citation | 464 S.E.2d 330,320 S.C. 253 |
Parties | Bobby L. ROGERS, Executor of the Estate of Doris Rogers, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PAROLE AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, South Carolina State Board of Parole and Community Corrections, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and South Carolina State Board of Corrections, Appellants. . Heard |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
William H. Davidson, II, David L. Morrison, and Andrew F. Lindemann, all of Ellis, Lawhorne, Davidson, and Sims, P.A., Columbia, for appellants.
J. Michael Baxley, Martin S. Driggers, and W. Carole Holloway, all of Driggers & Baxley, Hartsville, for respondent.
This is a wrongful death action in which respondent obtained a jury verdict in the amount of $600,000. We reverse.
In 1985, Doris Rogers (Doris) was robbed, kidnapped, and murdered. Her assailants were Daniel Jones and Robert Vandroff (Vandroff). Seventeen days prior to Doris's murder, appellants released Vandroff pursuant to a supervised furlough program provided for in S.C.Code Ann. §§ 24-13-710 and -720. 1 Vandroff had been serving time for breaking into the home occupied by Doris and her son (respondent).
In 1989, respondent brought this action for wrongful death claiming appellants were negligent in failing to warn Doris of Vandroff's release on furlough. 2 At trial, the jury returned a verdict for respondent in the amount of $600,000. 3
Did the trial judge err in denying appellants' motion for a directed verdict?
At trial, appellants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that a common law duty to warn of the release of an individual from custody does not exist in this state and that even if such a duty does exist, they did not have a duty to warn Doris in this case. On appeal, appellants argue the trial judge erred in denying their directed verdict motion. We agree.
An essential element in a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Without such a duty, there can be no actionable negligence. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co., 244 S.C. 79, 135 S.E.2d 613 (1964); Kershaw Motor Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 136 S.C. 377, 134 S.E. 377 (1926).
Generally, one has no duty to control the dangerous conduct of another or to warn a potential victim of such conduct. See Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 309 S.C. 114, 420 S.E.2d 495 (1992); Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379 S.E.2d 133 (1989); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314 and 315 (1965). However, when a defendant has the ability to monitor, supervise, and control an individual's conduct, a special relationship exists between the defendant and the individual, and the defendant may have a common law duty to warn potential victims of the individual's dangerous conduct. See Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, supra; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315 and 319 (1965).
We hold such a duty to warn arises when a person being released from custody has made a specific threat of harm directed at a specific individual. See Sheerin v. State, 434 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1989) ( ); Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn.1982) ( ); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728 (1980) ( ).
In this case, however, there was no evidence presented that Vandroff ever made a specific threat to harm Doris. Therefore, appellants had no common law duty to warn Doris of Vandroff's release. Consequently, the trial judge erred in denying appellants' motion for a directed verdict. Carolina Home Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong Furnace Co., 259 S.C. 346, 191 S.E.2d 774 (1972) ( ); South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co., supra; Kershaw Motor Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., supra. We need not address the remaining issues.
REVERSED.
TOAL, A.J., dissents in separate opinion. ALEXANDER S. MACAULAY, Acting Associate Justice, concurs with dissent in separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority's holding that when a defendant has the ability to monitor, supervise and control an individual's conduct, a special relationship exists between the defendant and the individual such that the defendant under certain circumstances has a common law duty to warn potential victims of the individual's dangerous conduct. I further agree that this duty to warn arises only when defendant has knowledge that a specific individual poses a threat to a specific victim. Where I part company with the majority is with its overly restrictive holding regarding how the defendant custodian acquires knowledge of the individual's threat to a specific victim. The majority holds that a defendant custodian of a dangerous individual only has a duty when the dangerous individual has made a specific threat against a potential victim. Under the majority's holding, if the dangerous individual's conduct indicates his intent to harm a potential victim, but the individual in custody has not specifically verbalized or written the threat, the custodian has no duty to warn the potential victim. This restrictive holding defies logic as well as common sense. Quite often, an individual's threat to another is made known by violent acts or attempted violent acts, not by words. Many dangerous individuals in custody are incapable of verbalizing a threat but very capable of carrying out the threat. I would hold that a common law duty exists when the individual has made a specific threat of harm directed at the potential victim or when the individual's conduct indicates an intent to harm the potential victim. I would hold therefore, that whether or not Vandroff's prior course of conduct indicated an intent to harm the victim was a question of fact for the jury to decide.
The following evidence was presented at trial. In 1980, Vandroff was sentenced to seven years for house breaking and larceny of the victim's home. Vandroff admitted to breaking into the victim's home three times before he was apprehended. All persons the parole board contacted when considering Vandroff's parole, including the judge, solicitor, parole officer, and victim's son, stated they did not think parole was appropriate. In spite of this testimony, he was paroled in 1982. Within two months, Vandroff stole a car and was back in jail. Prison records reveal he has a fourth grade education, is mentally retarded and mentally ill. The parole officer recommended against Vandroff's release a second time. The only persons who recommended parole were Vandroff's father and Mr. Cox, Vandroff's father's employer. All other persons who testified to the parole board, including the sheriff, recommended against parole. Prison officials knew that when Vandroff was on parole he lived with his father, about 500 yards from the victim. Because the defendant parole board's own rating indicated that Vandroff's furlough was high risk, he was placed on high security furlough. The victim was not notified of his release.
In my opinion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent, there was evidence that Vandroff's prior course of conduct indicated to defendants an intent on his part to physically harm Doris after his release from prison. Accordingly, the trial judge properly sent this issue to the jury. See Hollins v. Richland County School District, 310 S.C. 486, 427 S.E.2d 654 (1993) (...
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