Rogers v. State, 1D08-2856.
Decision Date | 12 August 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 1D08-2856.,1D08-2856. |
Citation | 16 So.3d 928 |
Parties | Christine Lashay ROGERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Christine Lashay Rogers appeals a trial court order ruling — only on remand after we had reversed her murder conviction for lack of any judicial determination of her mental competency to proceed — that she had in fact been mentally competent to proceed when she stood trial some years earlier. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D) (). We reverse the order under review.1
Thirteen years old when she allegedly stabbed an acquaintance to death, Ms. Rogers was tried as an adult and convicted of second-degree murder. Prior to trial, three experts had examined her to determine whether she was competent to stand trial, and prepared written reports that reflected their conflicting views on the question.2 The last examination took place on August 17, 2004, but no adjudication as to competency occurred before she went to trial on February 22, 2005.
On direct appeal, she contended that her conviction should be overturned because the trial court had erred in failing to conduct a hearing on her competence to proceed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210 and in failing to make a ruling on her competence to proceed. A panel of this court agreed and reversed, concluding that the conflicting reports concerning her competency made it incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a competency hearing under the rule. Rogers v. State, 954 So.2d 64, 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The prior panel reversed Ms. Rogers' conviction outright, albeit without foreclosing retrial if she were deemed competent on remand once "the trial judge conduct[ed] a hearing on appellant's competency to stand trial under Rule 3.210." Id.
Overturning a conviction on direct appeal is not an unusual remedy for lack of a necessary pretrial determination of competency to proceed or for a trial court's failure to conduct a proper competency hearing. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386-87, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Tingle v. State, 536 So.2d 202, 204 (Fla.1988) (); Scott v. State, 420 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla.1982) ( ); Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022, 1023, 1025-26 (Fla.1980) ; Culbreath v. State, 903 So.2d 338, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ( ); Shaw v. State, 546 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) () . For lack of a pretrial competency determination, the prior panel overturned the conviction in the present case.3
On remand, however, the trial court convened an evidentiary hearing, over defense objection, to determine retrospectively whether Ms. Rogers had been competent to assist counsel during her trial.4 In doing so, the trial court never acknowledged that the conviction had been reversed, and rejected the defense contention that a new trial was necessary, in the event she was determined competent to stand trial. After the evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial court ruled that she had been competent to proceed at the time of the trial that led to the conviction that was reversed.
But no such determination was contemplated by this court's earlier opinion reversing the conviction. Even in considering the question retroactively on remand, the trial court strayed from the mandate.5 The trial court had no authority to reinstate a judgment the reviewing court had reversed. As a technical matter, moreover, it has not done so — the order on review simply declares Ms. Rogers to have been competent at the time the trial occurred — although it is not clear on what other basis she is now being held.
While the Florida Supreme Court has, even on direct appeal,6 remanded for a retrospective determination of a defendant's competence at the time of trial, it has only done so explicitly and only in unmistakable language. In Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515-16 (Fla.1971), for example, our supreme court "temporarily remanded to the Circuit Court of Pinellas County with directions that the claim of insanity at the time of trial be determined in a full hearing," ruling that, if In contrast, the prior panel's decision reversing7 in the present case did not order a retrospective determination and laid down no conditions under which a post hoc competency hearing might be possible.
The prior panel ruled that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing and in failing to adjudicate Ms. Rogers' competence to proceed before trial, and reversed on that ground. 954 So.2d at 65. On remand, the trial court was bound by this judgment, and had no authority to conduct the hearing it conducted or to enter the order it entered.
Reversed.
1. We do so without prejudice to appellant's retrial if, in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210, she is hereafter determined to be competent to stand retrial. But we do not address any issue under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
2. These reports indicate that Ms. Rogers was experiencing auditory hallucinations, including voices telling her to kill herself. Ms. Rogers reported to Dr. Larson (who examined her on four occasions between the dates of March 26, 2004, through June 4, 2004), that she was not then experiencing auditory hallucinations, explaining that the medicine made it stop. She reported to Dr. Haga on August 17, 2004, however, that she was again experiencing auditory hallucinations and believed the medications were no longer helping and might instead be causing the hallucinations.
She also reported to Dr. Haga that she was having nightmares in which she saw her sister getting into a wreck, officers telling her that they were going to kill (or hang) her, and a body being cut up. Dr. Larson also noted in his report that Ms. Rogers had been prescribed a number of psychotropic medications while in custody.
The reports indicated that Ms. Rogers has a "Full Scale I.Q." of between 58 and 65, and that she is functioning in the extremely low range (mentally retarded range), the mildly retarded range or that she falls in a borderline category. Dr. Larson indicated in his report that infirmary records from the time Ms. Rogers had been in custody document diagnoses of major depressive disorder with psychotic features and adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood.
Faced with conflicting reports by examining experts, including a report of the most recent examination indicating that Ms. Rogers was experiencing auditory hallucinations despite medication, the prior panel reversed her conviction. Rogers v. State, 954 So.2d 64, 64-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
4. Our disposition today renders moot her argument that the trial court misinterpreted the evidence and abused its discretion in finding, on the evidence adduced, that she had been competent to stand trial.
Nor do we reach the contention that the trial court erred in permitting Ms. Rogers' trial counsel to testify at the...
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Monte v. State
... ... Mason holding that "no per se rule exists in Florida forbidding a nunc pro tunc competency determination regardless of the circumstances." See Rogers v. State, 16 So.3d 928, 931 n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The First District based its doubt on a comment made by Justice Pariente in a footnote to her ... ...
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Monte v. State Of Fla.
... ... Mason holding that "no per se rule exists in Florida forbidding a nunc pro tunc competency determination regardless of the circumstances." See Rogers v. State, 16 So. 3d 928, 931 n.5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The First District based its doubt on a comment made by Justice Pariente in a footnote to her ... ...
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Pretrial motions and defenses
...hearing for a retrial. Held: The trial court’s actions contravened the mandate, which had reversed the conviction. Rogers v. State, 16 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) While a competency claim cannot be cloaked as an allegation of ineffective assistance, where the allegation is that counsel w......