Rollins v. Bombardier Recreational Prods., Inc., 73635–3–I.
| Decision Date | 21 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 73635–3–I.,73635–3–I. |
| Citation | 366 P.3d 33,191 Wash.App. 876 |
| Parties | Cheri ROLLINS, individually and as guardian ad litem of Blake Rollins, a minor, Appellant, v. BOMBARDIER RECREATIONAL PRODUCTS, INC., a foreign corporation, Respondent, Dennis Long and Lynette Long, husband and wife; Wildfun Powersports Rentals, LLC., Wildfun Watersports, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Shellie McGaughey, Dan'l Wayne Bridges, McGaughey Bridges Dunlap PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Thomas Raymond Merrick, Attorney at Law, Philip Randolph Meade, Merrick Hofstedt & Lindsey PS, Seattle, WA, R. Bryan Martin Jr., Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Cheri Rollins suffered serious injuries when the personal watercraft (jet ski) she tried to start exploded. She appeals the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of her product liability claim against Bombardier Recreational Products (Bombardier). She contends Bombardier negligently designed the model of personal watercraft when it failed to include an engine ventilation system. The trial court dismissed her product liability claim on summary judgment, reasoning that, as a matter of law, the Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA) preempted her state product liability claim. Because her claim directly conflicts with the Coast Guard's explicit decision, pursuant to Congressional authority, to exempt personal watercraft from the ventilation system requirement, it defeats the purpose of the FBSA and is therefore preempted. We affirm the order of dismissal.
¶ 2 The main facts are undisputed. On August 1, 2009, Cheri Rollins tried to start a personal watercraft (jet ski) when it exploded.1 The jet ski was a 1999 Sea–Doo XP Ltd. manufactured by Bombardier and owned by Rollins' parents, Dennis and Lynette Long. The explosion occurred due to accumulated gas vapor in the jet ski's engine compartment. When Rollins engaged the ignition switch, an electrical arc ignited the vapor. Bombardier does not equip these jet skis with a powered ventilation system. Such a system may have prevented the explosion by eliminating the accumulated vapor.
¶ 3 In August 2011, Rollins sued the Longs alleging their failure to properly maintain the jet ski negligently caused her injuries. In April 2012, the Longs filed a third party complaint against Bombardier. The complaint alleged violations of Washington's Product Liability Act (WPLA) and Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Rollins amended her complaint to assert the same WPLA design-defect claim against Bombardier. The parties agree that the defect underlying Rollins' claim is Bombardier's alleged failure to Include a powered ventilation system—a "blower" device—on the jet ski.
¶ 4 In June 2013, Bombardier moved for summary judgment dismissal, arguing that federal law preempted Rollins' product liability claim. In September 2013, Rollins and the Longs entered into a Settlement Agreement, entitled "Settlement Agreement, Release, and Assignment." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2594–99. The Agreement provided that the Longs' insurer, State Farm, paid Rollins $1.2 million. As consideration, Rollins assigned her personal injury claim against Bombardier to the Longs and State Farm. After executing the Agreement, Rollins non-suited her claims, with prejudice, against the Longs. In October 2013, Rollins notified Bombardier that State Farm controlled her claims. In November 2013, Bombardier filed a motion to dismiss "pursuant to CR 12, 17, and 56." CP at 2548–66. Bombardier argued that Rollins' lawsuit was an improper claim for indemnification brought by State Farm. Because the Agreement settled Rollins' claims against the Longs and granted State Farm ownership of her remaining claims, the lawsuit had transformed into an attempt by State Farm to use "[Rollins] as a vessel through which it seeks indemnification from Bombardier." CP at 2555. Bombardier also argued that State Farm was not the party in interest.
¶ 5 The trial court issued two orders addressing Bombardier's two motions—the June 12 motion for summary judgment and the November 21 motion to dismiss. In December 2013, the trial court granted Bombardier's summary judgment motion and dismissed Rollins' product liability claim, reasoning that the claim is preempted by federal law. In January 2014, the trial court issued an order ruling that the settlement agreement between the Longs and Rollins was an "indemnification agreement ... collusive in effect." CP at 2791. But the court concluded that Bombardier's November 21 motion to dismiss was rendered moot when it dismissed Rollins' claim on summary judgment. Rollins appeals the trial court's order granting Bombardier's June 12 motion for summary judgment.
¶ 6 We review summary judgment orders de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 148 Wash.2d 788, 794–95, 64 P.3d 22 (2003). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c) ; Michak, 148 Wash.2d at 794–95, 64 P.3d 22. The parties agree on the material facts. The sole issue is whether federal law preempts Rollins' product liability claim.
¶ 7 Bombardier contends a federal regulation exempting Bombardier from including powered ventilation systems on its jet skis preempts Rollins' state law claim under the WPLA. Rollins alleges Bombardier's jet ski was defectively designed because it lacked a powered ventilation system.
¶ 8 Federal preemption doctrine derives from the supremacy clause, which provides that "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI. Federal preemption of state law can be "either expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's languageor implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly defines the extent to which it intends to supersede state law. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). Absent explicit preemptive language, implied preemption can occur in two ways: "field preemption, where the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ and conflict pre-emption, where ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ " Gade, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374. "There is a strong presumption against preemption and ‘state laws are not superseded by federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ " Stevedoring Servs. of Am. Inc. v. Eggert, 129 Wash.2d 17, 24, 914 P.2d 737 (1996) (quoting Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Assn. v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 327, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993) ).
¶ 9 We conclude that federal law impliedly preempts Rollins' state product liability claim because it directly conflicts with federal safety standards promulgated under the FBSA. It therefore "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64, 123 S.Ct. 518, 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002) (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) ).
¶ 10 In the FBSA, Congress explicitly provided that federal regulations of recreational watercraft preempt conflicting state laws. The FBSA "was enacted ‘to improve boating safety,’ to authorize ‘the establishment of national construction and performance standards for boats and associated equipment,’ and to encourage greater ‘uniformity of boating laws and regulations as among the several States and the Federal Government.’ " Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 57, 123 S.Ct. 518 (quoting Pub. L. 92–75, § 2, 85 Stat. 213–14). The Senate Report underlying the FBSA explains, "[t]he need for uniformity in standards if interstate commerce is not to be unduly impeded supports the establishment of uniform construction and equipment standards at the Federal level." S. REP. NO. 92–248 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1335. The same report explains preemption of conflicting state law is necessary to "assure[ ] that manufacture for the domestic trade will not involve compliance with widely varying local requirements." S. REP. NO. 92–248, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1341.
¶ 11 In accordance with this purpose, section 4302 of the FBSA delegates to the Secretary of Transportation authority to "[establish] minimum safety standards for recreational vessels and associated equipment," including "requiring the installation, carrying, or use of associated equipment (including ... ventilation systems ... )." 46 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(1)–(2). The official notes of section 4302 emphasize that this delegation of authority grants the Secretary broad discretion to establish uniform safety standards:
In lieu of establishing specific statutory safety requirements, subsection (a) provides flexible regulatory authority to establish uniform standards for the design, construction, materials, and performance of the boats themselves and all associated equipment. It also provides for the display of seals and other devices for certifying or evidencing compliance with applicable safety regulations or standards.
46 U.S.C. § 4302, historical and revision notes (emphasis added). Consistent with this flexible regulatory authority, the FBSA also grants the Secretary the discretionary power to exempt certain vessels from those same regulations: "If the Secretary considers that...
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