Rollins v. Pizzarelli

• Decision Date: 04 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. SC92080.,SC92080.
• Citation: 761 So.2d 294
• Parties: Jane ROLLINS, et al., Petitioners, v. Michael PIZZARELLI, et al., etc., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

761 So.2d 294

Jane ROLLINS, et al., Petitioners, v. Michael PIZZARELLI, et al., etc., Respondents.

No. SC92080.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 4, 2000.

Rehearing Denied June 19, 2000.

James K. Clark of James K. Clark & Associates, Miami, Florida; and Garrison M. Dundas of Brennan, Hayskar, Jefferson, Walker & Schwerer, Ft. Pierce, Florida, for Petitioners.

Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Fountain & Williams, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondents.

Sharon Lee Stedman of Sharon Lee Stedman, P.A., Orlando, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Allstate Insurance Company.

Dock A. Blanchard of Blanchard, Merriam, Adel & Kirkland, P.A., Ocala, Florida, for Amicus Curiae The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.

OPINION ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the respondents' motion for rehearing, rehearing is granted. The opinion issued in this case on February 4, 1999, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted in its place.

We have for review Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So.2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), in which the district court recognized conflict with the opinion in Kokotis v. DeMarco, 679 So.2d 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), and certified the following question to this Court:

WHETHER THE TERM "PAID OR PAYABLE" IN SECTION 627.736(3), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1996),

SHOULD BE DEFINED AS "THAT WHICH HAS BEEN PAID, OR PRESENTLY EARNED AND CURRENTLY OWING" SO THAT THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF SECTION 627.736 WILL NOT BE INTERPRETED TO PERMIT ANY REMAINING PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS TO BE USED FOR SETOFFS FOR FUTURE COLLATERAL SOURCES.

704 So.2d at 633. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.

FACTS

The record in this case is silent regarding many of the relevant facts, as it fails to provide a complete transcript of the trial. Additionally, the district court opinion does not provide a factual background. Based on the parties' representations at oral argument and in their briefs, we are able to glean the following facts. Carlene Pizzarelli, the daughter of Michael and Michelle Pizzarelli, was injured in an accident when she was a passenger in a car that was hit by another car driven by Dasha Marie Cates and owned by Jane Rollins. The Pizzarellis sued Rollins and Cates. Medical bills incurred prior to trial by the Pizzarellis in the amount of $13,212.60 were admitted into evidence without objection. Section 627.736(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits will cover 80% of medical bills. The Pizzarellis had $10,000 in PIP coverage.

During the trial, the issue arose as to whether the jury should be advised that $524.78 in additional PIP benefits were available to the Pizzarellis to defray the cost of future medical expenses. The defendants, Rollins and Cates, argued that the plain language of section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes (1991),¹ required the court to instruct the jury not to compensate the Pizzarellis for PIP benefits that had been paid or were to be paid in the future. The Pizzarellis argued that section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991),² applied and entitled Rollins and Cates to a setoff only for those PIP benefits that had been paid up until the time of trial.

The trial judge ruled that because the PIP payments were made a part of the record of the case through the payout ledger, the future PIP benefits issue could be taken up post-trial. The jury awarded the Pizzarellis $5000 in future medical expenses and $48 in lost earnings. The jury also found that the victim suffered permanent injury and awarded the Pizzarellis $20,000 for past and future pain and suffering. After trial, both parties stipulated that there remained $524.78 in available PIP benefits.

Section 627.736(3) provides that "An injured party who is entitled to bring suit under the provisions of §§ 627.730-627.7405, or his legal representative, shall have no right to recover any damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable." The trial court concluded that the remaining $524.78 in PIP benefits fit the definition of "payable" and therefore set off the $524.78 from the $5000 future medical expense award.

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that section 627.736(3) applied rather than section 627.7372. However, the Fourth District disagreed with the trial court as to the definition of "payable," reasoning that under the plain language of the statute, "payable" benefits do not include those for future medical expenses that have not yet been incurred. See Pizzarelli, 704 So.2d at 633

. The district court reversed and instructed the trial court on remand to reinstate the jury's verdict for the full amount of future damages and to award reasonable costs and attorney's fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991).³

See Pizzarelli, 704 So.2d at 633.

ANALYSIS

The question presented by this case is whether the Legislature, by using the term "payable" in section 627.727(3), intended to limit the setoff from damages only to expenses that had been incurred and were due and owing at the time of the judgment or whether the Legislature intended the setoff to be coextensive with the remaining amount of PIP benefits. The Fifth District concluded in Kokotis that "`payable' as used in this statute includes expenses which have not yet accrued but which will result from the covered injury." 679 So.2d at 297. In contrast, the Fourth District concluded that the term "payable" in section 627.727(3) means only those medical expenses that have been incurred prior to trial but not yet paid or processed by the PIP carrier. See Pizzarelli, 704 So.2d at 632

.

The Legislature's intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.1992)

. Accordingly, "[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Modder v. American Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 688 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla.1997) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). "Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons can find different meanings in the same language." Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992). We find that because the term "payable," as used by the Legislature in section 627.736(3), is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is necessary to resort to principles of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent.

See Forsythe, 604 So.2d at 455; Holly, 450 So.2d at 219.

The term "payable" is not defined by statute. When a term is undefined by statute, "[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction" requires that we give a statutory term "its plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992). When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning "can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary." Id. Further, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that in the absence of a statutory definition, courts can resort to definitions of the same term found in case law. See State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997)

; State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc., 693 So.2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

The term "payable" has been defined in this Court's case law as "meaning `capable of being paid; suitable to be paid; admitting or demanding payment; justly due; legally enforceable.'" In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 74 Fla. 250, 254, 77 So. 102, 103 (1917). Black's Law Dictionary provides this same definition, but with an important amplification that "when used without qualification, [the] term normally means that the debt is payable at once, as opposed to `owing.'" Black's Law Dictionary 1128 (6th ed.1990).

In accounting parlance, the term "payable," as in "accounts payable," has a similar usage. An "account payable" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, in part, as a "liability representing an amount owed to a creditor, usually arising from purchase of merchandise or materials and supplies; not necessarily due or past due." Id. at 18 (emphasis supplied).

Thus, the most common usage of "payable" strongly suggests a limitation to incurred expenses that have not yet been paid at the time of trial, rather than potential future expenses that have not yet been incurred. Because a plaintiff's future medical expenses have not yet been incurred, these expenses cannot be presented to the PIP carrier for payment and therefore do not represent a liability or a "payable" benefit of the PIP carrier.

This definition is also consistent with the usage given to the term "payable" in the very next subsection of the PIP statute to describe when PIP benefits are "due." § 627.736(4).⁴ That subsection provides that PIP benefits are "due and payable as loss accrues, upon receipt of reasonable proof of such loss." Id. (emphasis supplied). This use of the term "payable" in section 627.736(4) supports the construction of the term as referring to those medical expenses that have been already been incurred. This interpretation is thus consistent with the axioms of statutory construction that statutes must be read together to ascertain their meaning, see Forsythe, 604 So.2d at 455

; City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277, 1282 (Fla.1983), and that the same meaning should be given to the same term within subsections of the same statute. See WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So.2d 674, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

Further, as the Fourth District's opinion in Rollins points out, "[w]hen the Florida Legislature wishes to provide for set-offs for future benefits it well knows how to express itself." Pizza...