Ronald E., In re

• Citation: 137 Cal.Rptr. 781,19 Cal.3d 315,562 P.2d 684
• Decision Date: 15 April 1977
• Docket Number: Cr. 19652
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 562 P.2d 684 In re RONALD E., a minor, on Habeas Corpus.

Page 781

137 Cal.Rptr. 781

19 Cal.3d 315, 562 P.2d 684

In re RONALD E., a minor, on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 19652.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

April 15, 1977.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1977.

Appellate Defenders, Inc., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and J. Perry Langford, San Diego, for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Karl J. Phaler and John W. Carney, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

WRIGHT, ^* Justice.

Ronald E., a juvenile, asserts as grounds for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus that he is unlawfully detained by the Youth Authority. He contends that because he was not properly advised of particular constitutional rights when he admitted the truth of allegations of misconduct contained in multiple petitions pursuant to the Juvenile Court Law (see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 777), juvenile court orders which have resulted in his continuing detention by the Youth Authority are constitutionally defective. Petitioner additionally contends that no waiver of such rights may be implied under such circumstances. (See Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449.) He also complains of the denial of procedural rights in the revocation of his parole from the Youth Authority. ¹ For reasons hereinafter set forth we conclude that petitioner is entitled to no relief.

Noncompliance with Boykin-Tahl Requirements

Petitioner contends that he was not advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights at any of the jurisdictional hearings on the initial and the first three supplemental petitions (see fn. 1) alleging misconduct pursuant to the Juvenile Court Law. In dealing with the protections of such rights we stated in In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449: '. . . (T)he record must contain On its face direct evidence that the accused was aware, or made aware, of his right to confrontation, to a jury trial, and against self-incrimination, as well as the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea.' (Id., at p. 132, 81 Cal.Rptr. at p. 584, 460 P.2d at p. 456.) Tahl, of course, was in response to the compulsion of Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, which held that a guilty plea must be deemed as involuntarily entered if the accused was unaware of particular constitutional rights waived by such a plea: 'First, . . . the privilege against complusory self-incrimination . . .. Second, . . . the right to trial by jury. . . . Third, . . . the right to confront one's accusers . . .' (Id., at pp. 243--244, 89 S.Ct. at p. 1712.) Our statement in Tahl, however, requires that the record demonstrate, in addition to evidence of an informed waiver of the three specified constitutional right, that the accused who admits his guilt was also aware '(of) the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea.' But in In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 83 Cal.Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473, we cast some doubt on the scope of our holding in Tahl when we indicated that a record need establish an informed waiver of only three constitutional rights in order to overcome a claim that a plea was involuntarily entered under Boykin. (Id., at p. 926, fn. 10, 83 Cal.Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473; see People v. Guerra (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 534, 538--539, 98 Cal.Rptr. 627.)

Finally, in In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561, we noted that the admonishments with respect to the privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses were constitutionally compelled, as distinguished from the admonishments with respect to the other rights mentioned in Tahl. We announced a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure requiring a court to admonish an accused as to the consequences of an admission which may subject him to severe sanctions. ² Unlike an uninformed waiver of the specified constitutional rights which renders a plea or admission involuntary and requires that it be set aside, an uninformed waiver based on the failure of the court to advise an accused of the consequences of an admission constitutes error which requires that the admission be set aside only if the error is prejudicial to the accused. (Id., at p. 864, 112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561.)

The Boykin-Tahl protections afforded an accused, other than the right of trial by jury, are available to juveniles charged pursuant to the Juvenile Court Law, as proceedings thereunder may result in a substantial deprivation of liberty analogous to incarceration for crime. (See In re Mary B. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 816, 820, 98 Cal.Rptr. 178.) The absence of a knowledgeable waiver of constitutional rights before entering a guilty plea or, in the case of juvenile court proceedings, the admission of jurisdictional facts constitutes grounds for relief on habeas corpus. (See In re Sutherland (1972) 6 Cal.3d 666, 100 Cal.Rptr. 129, 493 P.2d 857.)

The People concede that at the initial jurisdictional hearing in 1971 there was no compliance with Boykin-Tahl requirements. We are of the view, however, that petitioner is no longer entitled to raise on petition for the writ of habeas corpus the issue of improprieties in proceedings resulting in detention which he has accepted without timely challenge. We can only assume that petitioner was not unduly distressed by detentions in juvenile hall, in foster homes and in parental custody and that he elected to waive any constitutional defect in such detentions. Petitioner, moreover, fails to explain his neglect to challenge promptly the validity of any of such commitments, the last of which was ordered in 1973 approximately four years after Boykin. He does not assert, for instance, that his failure to challenge such claimed improprieties was predicated on a lack of knowledge of his constitutional rights at a time when he might have made a timely challenge. Petitioner cannot now resort to habeas corpus proceedings as a substitute for his failure to take expeditious appeals, absent special circumstances constituting an excuse for such failure. (In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 773, 112 Cal.Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129.) In view of such lack of diligence on petitioner's part we conclude that he has waived the constitutional defects he now claims in the initial wardship proceedings and proceedings pursuant to the first and second supplemental petitions. (In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304, 209 P.2d 793.)

Petitioner did not seek to challenge his detention on constitutional grounds until revocation of parole after the jurisdictional hearing on the fourth supplemental petition. At that time he raised Boykin-Tahl issues arising out of the jurisdictional hearing on the third supplemental petition at which he had admitted the truth of allegations that he had unlawfully received stolen property. Although the remedy selected by petitioner was procedurally defective and the issue thus was not properly presented until the filing of the instant petition, we conclude that if petitioner is entitled to relief for failure of the juvenile court to properly advise him of Boykin-Tahl rights prior to his admission of the truth of allegations contained in the third supplemental petition, that relief should not be denied him for want of diligence. ³ The allegations of the third supplemental petition, the truth of which was admitted by petitioner, recite that he 'did wilfully and unlawfully receive certain property, to wit, one twelve gauge shotgun, Savage Model 720, serial number 99436, two pairs opal earrings, one opal ring, one opal necklace, which said property had been stolen knowing that said property had been stolen and did conceal and withhold and aid in concealing and withholding said property from the owner, knowing that said property had been stolen; thereby violating section 496 of the Penal Code.' Petitioner's counsel indicated that he had discussed the petition with his client. The court advised petitioner that 'under the law you don't have to say anything you can remain silent' and that he had the 'right to cross-examine' witnesses. ⁴ Petitioner expressly acknowledged that he surrendered such rights in admitting the allegations of the petition.

It appears from the foregoing that petitioner was expressly advised of the specific constitutional rights which he would be deemed to waive when he admitted the truth of the allegations of the third supplemental petition. Although there appears to have been no express advice as to the nature of the charge or the consequences of the plea, the record need only 'demonstrate' that petitioner understood the nature of the charge in order to foreclose any relief based on a claim that he was not expressly advised thereof. (See Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, 605, 119 Cal.Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086.) Here the specific conduct alleged to constitute the elements of the offense charged is set out in detail in the petition. Petitioner is charged with 'wilfully and unlawfully' receiving items of personal property, each of which is particularly described. It is further alleged that such items of personal property had been stolen; that petitioner knew that they had been stolen; that he concealed and withheld and aided in concealing and withholding such property from the owner, knowing that it had been stolen; and that he had 'thereby' violated section 496 of the Penal Code. ⁵ The record reflects that petitioner's attorney had discussed the charges with petitioner.

We conclude that the Boykin-Tahl requirement that an accused be advised of the nature of the charges against him is satisfied if, as in this case, the record demonstrates that the accused had fair notice of what he was being asked to admit. ⁶ The record fairly demonstrates that petitioner knowingly admitted to having engaged in a detailed course of conduct which...