Roney v. Illinois Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 11 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 99 C 4941.,99 C 4941.
• Parties: Gul RONEY, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

376 F.Supp.2d 857

Gul RONEY, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.

No. 99 C 4941.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

July 11, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Deidre Baumann, Baumann, Shuldiner & Lee, Chicago, IL, for Gul Roney, Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEVIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Illinois Department of Transportation's (hereinafter " IDOT") motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants IDOT's motion.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff Gul Roney (hereinafter "Roney"), who is of Indian descent, began working for IDOT's District 1, Bureau of Construction¹ in 1979 as an Engineering Technician II. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s LR56.1(a)(3) St. ¶ 56.) In February of 1992, Roney was promoted to the position of Engineering Technician IV.² (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s LR56.1(b)(3)(B) St. ¶ 6.) Roney's payroll title was Resident Technician ET-IV. (Id. ¶ 8.)

On July 27, 1999, Roney initiated the instant lawsuit when he filed his initial complaint alleging national origin discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and a hostile work environment on the part of IDOT in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.³ (Def.'s Ex. C.) Roney brings these claims averring that IDOT subjected him to various discriminatory and retaliatory acts, including constructive discharge, because of his previous participation in a lawsuit he filed in 1995 in which he also alleged national origin discrimination and retaliation claims against IDOT. (2nd Am.Complt.) See Roney v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., No. 95 C 4240, 1997 WL 94718 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 3, 1997). In that lawsuit, IDOT ultimately won a jury verdict in its favor which the Seventh Circuit subsequently affirmed. See Roney v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 191 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.1999)(unpublished disposition).

On April 7, 2000, IDOT filed a motion for summary judgment in this case alleging that Roney's discriminatory and retaliatory claims were barred based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Dkt. Nos. 10-14.) The District Judge granted IDOT's motion to the extent that it barred Roney's discriminatory and retaliatory claims that occurred prior to July 2, 1997. (Dkt. No. 15.) Accordingly, the basis of the subject lawsuit is Roney's claims that occurred from July 2, 1997 through November 4, 1999, the date of his alleged constructive discharge. (2nd Am.Complt.¶ 11.)

Roney filed his Second Amended Complaint on August 15, 2000 alleging national origin discrimination, retaliation, harassment, constructive discharge and a hostile work environment. (Dkt. No. 21.) IDOT now moves for summary judgment on Roney's claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party had produced evidence to show that it is entitled to summary judgment, the party seeking to avoid such judgment must affirmatively demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. LINC v. Finance Corp. v. Onwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir.1997).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must "review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Vanasco v. National-Louis Univ., 137 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir.1998). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Nevertheless, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations, but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See also LINC, 129 F.3d at 920. A genuine issue of material fact is not shown by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202.

This standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where issues of intent and credibility often dominate. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir.1993). "[S]ummary judgment is improper in a discrimination case where a material issue involves any weighing of conflicting indications of motive and intent." Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93, 97 (7th Cir.1985)(citing Kephart v. Inst. of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217, 1218 (7th Cir.1980)). Finally, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict." Freeman v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 374, 2000 WL 1640952, *3 (7th Cir.2000)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202).

ANALYSIS

I. RETALIATION CLAIM

Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter or ... has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing" under this statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Thus, to demonstrate that an employer has violated this provision of Title VII, a plaintiff may present either direct or indirect evidence of the employer's retaliatory intent. Williams v. Waste Management of Ill., Inc., 361 F.3d 1021, 1031 (7th Cir.2004); Haywood v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir.2003); Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.2002).

A. DIRECT METHOD

Under the direct method, a "plaintiff must present direct evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action taken by the employer⁴; and (3) a causal connection between the two." Williams, 361 F.3d at 1031 (citing Sitar v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.2003)); Haywood, 323 F.3d at 531 (citing Stone v. City of Indianapolis Public Utilities Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002)). If the plaintiff's evidence is "contradicted, the case must be tried unless the defendant presents unrebutted evidence that it would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff anyway, `in which event the defendant's retaliatory motive, even if unchallenged, was not a but-for cause of the plaintiff's harm.'" Haywood, 323 F.3d at 531 (quoting Stone, 281 F.3d at 643-44); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989).

Roney avers that IDOT subjected him to a multitude of adverse employment actions in retaliation for instituting his prior lawsuit against IDOT. (Pl.'s Resp. at 7-12, 20-22, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s LR56.1(a)(3) St. ¶ 78, 95.) For instance, he alleges that he was (1) denied overtime, (2) prevented from utilizing his skills as a Resident Engineer, (3) moved from one construction job site to another every six months, (4) received lower salary raises, (5) did not have his positive letters of recommendation and performance evaluations recognized by IDOT which resulted in the denial of a merit increase, (6) was watched closely by other Resident Engineers, (7) had his Resident Engineer's mailbox removed, (8) had his name removed from the list of Resident Engineers, (9) had his performance evaluations altered and documents removed from his personnel file, (10) was disciplined on fabricated grounds for an alleged incident that occurred in May of 1999 and received an oral warning for threatening and verbally abusing his Resident Engineer, (11) was disciplined on fabricated grounds a second time for an alleged incident that occurred in July of 1999 and received a notice of suspension pending discharge for falsification of overtime, (12) was subjected to an improper disciplinary policy and procedure related to his two disciplinary actions, and (13) was constructively discharged.⁵ (Id.) Moreover, Roney claims that he was also subjected to adverse actions when IDOT illegally destroyed relevant job site records, falsely reported to the Illinois State Police that he had been terminated which resulted in an unwarranted criminal investigation, maliciously reported to the Illinois Secretary of State that he was required to fill out a Statement of Economic Interest which resulted in threats of termination, refused to allow him the use of a state vehicle, even though a vehicle was provided to every other Resident Engineer working under Schmidt, assigned him to dangerous painting operations for which he was not properly trained, and falsely reported to the Illinois Department of Employment Security that he had been terminated which resulted in the denial of employment benefits. (Id.)

"Title VII does not forbid every act of invidious discrimination that an employer might commit against an employee; the act must be `with respect to [the employee's] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.'" Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Authority, 315 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir.2002)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Case law generally defines this as either "`a tangible employment action,' that is, `a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a...