Roofing Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Palmer
Decision Date | 15 November 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 10937,10937 |
Parties | , 65 A.L.R.3d 496 ROOFING WHOLESALE CO., INC., Petitioner, v. Wilson D. PALMER, as a Clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, in and for the State of Arizona, Respondent. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Jerold Kaplan and John W. Nelson, Phoenix, for petitioner.
Moise Berger, Maricopa County Atty., by William Carter, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for respondent.
This is a petition for special action in the nature of mandamus in which we are asked to order the respondent, Wilson D. Palmer, Clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, to issue a writ of attachment and writ of garnishment pursuant to §§ 12--1521, 1522, and 1571 A.R.S. Because of recent developments in this filed of law and because it was a matter of general interest and importance throughout the State, we accepted jurisdiction.
The plaintiff-petitioner, Roofing Wholesale Co., Inc., filed an action against James E. Diehl, Jane Doe Diehl, dba Diehl's Construction Company, Consolidated Services, Inc., and State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, as the result of an expressed open account contract for the direct payment of money. At the time of filing the complaint, the plaintiff-petitioner asked the Clerk of the Court to issue a writ of general attachment and writ of garnishment which the Clerk of the Court refused to issue. The petition for special action to this court resulted.
Our statutes read:
'A plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint or at any time thereafter, may in the following cases have the property of defendant attached as security for satisfaction of any judgment which may be recovered, unless defendant gives security to pay such judgment:
And:
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969) held that prejudgment garnishment procedures whereby a defendant's wages are frozen in the interim between the garnishment of the wages and the determination of the lawsuit without the defendant having a chance to be heard prior to the garnishment, violate the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. As a result of said decision, this court was called upon to rule upon the constitutionality of our garnishment statutes in two cases:
'* * * Therefore, we hold that the procedure for garnishment of wages in this state does not measure up to the standards set forth in Sniadach, and that prior to the issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment of wages there must be some provision for notice to the defendant and a hearing on the validity of the plaintiff's claim.
* * *
* * *
Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court of Maricopa Co., 105 Ariz. 270, 272, 463 P.2d 68, 70 (1969).
And:
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* * *
* * *
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 290, 486 P.2d 184, 188 (1971).
We are not alone in limiting the reach of Sniadach, supra, to wages. See American Olean Tile Company v. Zimmerman, 317 F.Supp. 150 (U.S.D.C.Hawaii 1970); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Jack R. Dick v. Meckler, 323 F.Supp. 100 (U.S.D.C.Conn.1971). Other courts have come to an opposite rule. See Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis.2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Service, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Randone v. Appellate Department of Superior Court, 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971).
On 12 June 1972, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in the matter of Fuentes v. Shevin and Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), in which, by a four to three decision, the Supreme Court held that the replevin laws in both cases violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Four members of the court held that the due process clause of the United State Constitution gave the defendant the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner prior to the actual seizure of the property involved. It was upon the basis of this opinion that the Federal District Court in Arizona in the case of Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 344 F.Supp. 1136 (D.Ariz.1972), stated, in a ruling limited to that case only, that the Arizona garnishment and attachment statute was unconstitutional even when wages were not concerned.
A reading of Fuentes v. Shevin and Parham v. Cortese, supra, makes it clear that the four judges in that opinion fully intended to apply the due process caluse of the United States Constitution to situations as are presently before the court, absent, of course, a 'contractual waiver of due process rights * * * 'voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly' made.' Fuentes, supra, 407 U.S. at 94--95, 92 S.Ct. at 2001. The petitioner, however, asserts that because two justices did not participate in this opinion the four man opinion is clearly not a majority opinion, is advisory only, and therefore not binding upon this court. Admittedly, were we convinced that the four man majority of the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes, supra, would become at least a five man majority when the two judges who did not participate in the particular case are called up to participate in a similar question, we would then be inclined to follow the decision as set down in Fuentes, supra. When, however, we have doubts that once the full court hears the case that the opinion will stand, we are reluctant to declare unconstitutional Arizona statutes based upon a decision by less than a clear majority. In this we are not without some support from the United States Supreme Court itself:
* * *.' United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216, 62 S.Ct. 552, 558, 86 L.Ed. 796, 810 (1942).
Further, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has stated:
'Where courts are concerned, it has been uniformly held, so far as we can ascertain, that a clear majority of all the legally constituted members thereof shall concur or no valid judgment may be entered except such as may follow no decision.' Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 255 (1930).
In the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Flotill Products, Inc., 389 U.S. 179, 88 S.Ct. 401, 19 L.Ed.2d 398 (1967), Mr. Justice Brennan at Footnote 7, discussed the statement from the Frischer case, supra, as follows:
'7. The authorities cited in Frischer as supporting the exception fail with one exception to do so. Four of the decisions cited dealt simply with the rule in cases where a court is equally divided in its vote. Madlem's Appeal, 103 Pa. 584 (1883); Putnam v. Rees, 12 Ohio 21 (1843); Northern R. Co. v. Concord R. Co., 50 N.H. 166 (1870); Ayres v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 632 (1867). Another, in addition to dealing with the question of an equally divided court, involved a constitutional provision for the concurrence of a majority of the judges Sitting. Mugge v. Tate, Jones & Co., 51 Fla. 255, 41 So. 603 (1906). The others are likewise not in point. Deglow v. Kruse, 57 Ohio St. 434, 49 N.E. 477 (1898) ( ); Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Burchard, 35 Colo. 539, 558, 86 P. 749, 755 (1906) ( ). The whole of the court's discussion in the only decision in point, Johnson v. State ex rel. Brannon, 1 Ga. 271 (1846), was ...
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