Roon v. King County

• Decision Date: 23 February 1946
• Docket Number: 29708.
• Citation: 24 Wn.2d 519,166 P.2d 165
• Parties: ROON v. KING COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

166 P.2d 165

24 Wn.2d 519

ROON v. KING COUNTY.

No. 29708.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

February 23, 1946

Suit be Anna B. Roon against King County to vacate and set aside a tax foreclosure judgment and deed and all proceedings connected therewith, to quiet plaintiff's title as against that judgment and deed, and to obtain a determination of true value of land for assessment purposes and an accounting. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Roger J Meakim, judge.

L. H Wheeler, of Seattle, for appellant.

Lloyd Shorett and Wm. R. Bell, both of Seattle, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

Plaintiff as owner of certain land brought suit to vacate and set aside a tax foreclosure judgment and deed and all proceedings connected therewith; to quiet her title as against such judgment and deed; and to obtain a determination of the true value of the land for assessment purposes and an accounting of certain sums of money previously tendered and paid into court by her as in full payment of all taxes then owing on the land. The ground of plaintiff's action, as alleged in her complaint consisting of four causes of action, was that throughout a period of many years the defendant county, through its taxing officials, had 'wrongfully, arbitrarily, wilfully unconscionably, capriciously, tyrannically, and fraudulently' overvalued and overassessed her property at more than four times its true and fair value in money, and that such valuations and assessments were made on a fundamentally wrong basis. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds (1) that none of the alleged causes stated facts sufficient to entitle plaintiff to any relief; and (2) that each of the causes was barred by the statute of limitations applicable thereto. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant thereupon joined issue by appropriate admissions and denials of plaintiff's allegations. The action came on for trial Before the court without a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, defendant challenged its legal sufficiency. The challenge was sustained, and the court thereafter entered judgment dismissing the action and directing that the money theretofore tendered and deposited in court by the plaintiff be returned to her. Plaintiff appealed.

As indicated above, the evidence in the case consists solely of that which was introduced by the appellant plaintiff, Anna B. Roon, and we summarize it as follows:

At all times involved in this action prior to December 14, 1940, appellant was the record owner of certain land situated on Maury Island, a part of Vashon Island, in King county, Washington, and described as the west 764 feet of Government lot 4, section 23, township 22 north, range 3 east. W.M., together with second-class tidelands to low tide. The land has a south frontage on Puget Sound and measures about 660 feet north and south, and 764 feet east and west, comprising altogether approximately 18.5 acres. For taxation purposes the land is divided into four tax lots, numbered 24, 11, 18, and 25, respectively, each fronting on the Sound and extending back, northwardly, about 660 feet. Each of lots 24, 11, and 18 is 231 feet wide from east to west, and has an area of about 5.60 or 5.75 acres, while lot 25 has a width of 71 feet and an area of 1.71 acres.

The front, or south, side of the land rises on a steep incline from near the water's edge to a height of approximately 300 feet at a point about one-fourth the distance between the water line and the north boundary of the land, that is to say, about three-fourths of the entire tract is situated north of the brink of the bluff. A portion of the bluff has an almost perpendicular height of from 75 to 200 feet, and the entire bluff is, for the most part, so steep near the line of high tide that only when the tide is out is it possible to pass along the shore. Any attempt to dig into the bank would in all probability cause an earth slide. Along the entire water front there is but one place on any of these lots where there is space sufficient to permit construction of a residence building. The one exception is a small area, having a width of about 50 feet, in one corner of lot 18, on which a house was built some years ago, but this has since burned down.

On account of the steep incline of the bluff there is no ready means of access to the water from the upper portion of the land, and the construction of a road, or even trails, in that area would be impracticable. Consequently, the only access to the beach is by boat or else by a circuitous route overland. The tidelands have no commercial value.

That portion of the land lying north of the bluff and constituting about threefourths of the area of the entire tract is unimproved, unproductive, and without any water supply. There is no merchantable timber upon it, and its surface is overgrown with hazel brush, poison oak, and ferns. No part of the land adjoins any public road.

Between the years 1930 and 1940, both inclusive, these tax lots were assessed, and taxes were levied thereon, according to the following valuations and rates:

Year T.L.24 T.L.11 T.L.18 T.L.25 Rate %

1930 $370 $370 $410 $100 .07563

1931 370 370 410 100 .07145

1932 310 310 350 90 .07297

1933 310 310 350 90 .06155

1934 260 260 300 80 .05777

1935 260 260 300 80 .04537

1936 260 260 300 80 .03807

1937 190 260 300 80 .04050

1938 190 100 300 80 .04910

1939 100 100 100 80 ______

1940 100 100 100 50 .03450 From these figures we have estimated the total tax levied against the entire tract in 1930 as amounting to $94.54. From that time forward until 1940 the assessed valuations were periodically and progressively reduced, so that in the last mentioned year the total tax amounted to $12.08.

Three tracts of land of comparable size, adjoining appellant's property on the north, were assessed, during the years here in controversy, upon valuations of approximately one-third of that at which appellant's land was valued, although those tracts were worth from 100% to 150% more than the land owned by the appellant.

At no time during the course of years above mentioned did the appellant pay any portion of the taxes assessed against her land, although she testified that on a number of occasions she had endeavored to have the board of equalization reduce the assessed valuations, but could never get a hearing Before that body.

On July 6, 1940, the respondent county issued a certificate of delinquency covering the entire amount of taxes unpaid since 1930. Thereafter, tax foreclosure proceedings were instituted by the county, and on October 14, 1940, a decree of foreclosure was entered. Pursuant to the decree, the property was put up for sale in the usual manner, and the county, being the only bidder thereon, became the purchaser. A deed to the property was issued to, and recorded by, the county on December 14, 1940.

Nearly three years later, December 6, 1943, appellant tendered to the county treasurer the sum of $188.34 in full payment of all taxes alleged to be due, owing, and delinquent on the property. The tender was refused, and two days later appellant instituted this action and at the same time paid into the registry of the court the amount of money previously tendered by her.

Appellant's first, and principal, contention is that upon the facts admitted by respondent's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, she is entitled to equitable relief, on the ground that her property has been fraudulently overassessed.

Prior to March 18, 1931, it had become well settled by the decisions of this court that an excessive valuation of land for taxation might, in certain instances, be so great as to constitute constructive fraud and warrant the intervention of a court of equity to grant relief. First Thought Gold Mines v. Stevens County, 91 Wash. 437, 157 P. 1080; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Pierce County, 127 Wash. 369, 220 P. 826; Inland Empire Land Co. v. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 P. 14; Inland Empire Land Co. v. Douglas County, 149 Wash. 253, 270 P. 812; Bestman v. Snohomish County, 169 Wash.244, 13 P.2d 503; Northwestern & Pacific Hypotheekbank v. Adams County, 174 Wash. 447, 24 P.2d 1086. The last two cited cases were actions for the recovery of 1930 taxes paid under protest by the plaintiff landowners.

On March 18, 1931, an act relating to actions to recover illegal taxes was enacted by the legislature, to take effect immediately, Laws of 1931, chapter 62, p. 201, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 11315-1.

Section 1 of the act, rem.Rev.Stat. § 11315-1, provides that injunctions and restraining orders shall not be issued or granted to restrain the collection of any tax or any part thereof, or the sale of any property for the nonpayment of any tax or part thereof, except in cases where (1) the law under which the tax is imposed is void, and (2) where the property upon which the tax is imposed is exempt from taxation.

Section 2 of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 11315-2, provides that in all cases of the levy of taxes which are deemed unlawful or excessive by the person whose property is taxed or from whom the tax is demanded, such person may pay, under protest, the tax or any part thereof deemed unlawful and may thereafter bring an action, in the superior court or in any federal court of competent jurisdiction, against the state, county, or municipality by whose officers the tax was collected, to recover such tax, or any portion thereof, so paid under protest.

Section 7 of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.), § 11315-7, prescribes that, except as permitted by the act, no action shall ever be brought or defense interposed attacking tacking the validity of any tax, or any part thereof, provided,...