Rosales v. Depuy Ace Medical Co.

• Decision Date: 07 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. S078119.,S078119.
• Citation: 991 P.2d 1256,22 Cal.4th 279,92 Cal.Rptr.2d 465
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Hector ROSALES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPUY ACE MEDICAL COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

92 Cal.Rptr.2d 465

22 Cal.4th 279

991 P.2d 1256

Hector ROSALES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPUY ACE MEDICAL COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S078119.

Supreme Court of California.

February 7, 2000.

William J. Cleary, Jr., Los Angeles; Binder & Norris and Paul S. Norris, Pasadena, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Graham & James, James H. Broderick, Jr., Benjamin E. Goldman, Los Angeles, and Brian F. Van Vleck for Defendant and Respondent.

Finegan, Marks & Hampton, Michael A. Marks and Ellen Sims Langille, San Francisco, for California Workers' Compensation Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

Labor Code section 4558 (section 4558) provides an exception to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation system for workers injured as a result of the employer knowingly having removed or failed to install a point of operation guard on a "power press," defined in subdivision (a)(4) of the statute as "any material-forming machine that utilizes a die which is designed for use in the manufacture of other products." The issue presented in this case is, generally, the meaning of "die" for purposes of section 4558 and, specifically, whether the tool used in the power lathe plaintiff was operating when injured was a die. We conclude the undisputed facts demonstrate the tool being used was not a die and, therefore, the injury was not caused by the operation of a power press without a point of operation guard. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant employer.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts are taken from the parties' statements of undisputed facts and from other materials in support of and in opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff was injured while operating a Wasino L3-J3 lathe in the manufacture of a small aluminum knob. In this manufacturing process, the material being formed into the knob is held in a spindle, opposite which is a turret containing 12 different tooling stations. Directed in its operation by a computer, the turret brings the various tools into use to cut or otherwise form the metal. One of these tools was the Vnotching tool, a carbide-point cutting tool. It was programmed to cut a .65-inch-long groove down the side of the knob being manufactured, making six passes along the knob to successively deepen the groove.

Plaintiffs hand was injured by the Vnotching tool while it was in operation or being brought into operation. The lathe's safety sensor, which was designed to prevent operation while the door was open, had been intentionally disabled.

The superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding section 4558 inapplicable in that "[p]laintiff does not dispute that he was injured by a lathe which uses a sharp edge cutting tool rather than a `mirror image' pressing or stamping die." The Court of Appeal reversed, rejecting the idea a power press necessarily employs a die that forms material into a "mirror image" of itself, as suggested in Graham v. Hopkins (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1483, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 82. Relying on a regulatory agency's definition, the appellate court held a power press is any mechanically powered machine that forms material by use of "tools or dies" attached to slides. (Italics added.)

We granted defendant's petition for review. Two days before the scheduled oral argument, the parties jointly moved to dismiss review on the ground they had settled all claims between them. We denied the joint motion, following "the well-established line of judicial authority recognizing an exception to the mootness doctrine, and permitting the court to decline to dismiss a case rendered moot by stipulation of the parties where the appeal raises issues of continuing public importance." (Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1202, fn. 8, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279

; see also People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 584, fn. 2, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310; Baluyut v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 826, 829-830, fn. 4, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 101, 911 P.2d 1; State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands Com. v. Superior Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 50, 60-62, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 399, 900 P.2d 648.)

DISCUSSION

We begin with the statutory language. Subdivision (b) of section 4558 provides: "An employee, or his or her dependents in the event of the employee's death, may bring an action at law for damages against the employer where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by the employer's knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation guard on a power press, and this removal or failure to install is specifically authorized by the employer under conditions known by the employer to create a probability of serious injury or death." Subdivision (a)(4) of section 4558 provides: "`Power press' means any material-forming machine that utilizes a die which is designed for use in the manufacture of other products."

Although this court has not previously discussed the definition of power press in section 4558, subdivision (a)(4), two Court of Appeal decisions prior to the decision below have done so in a manner pertinent to the present case. (Ceja v. J.R. Wood, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1372, 242 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Ceja)

; Graham v. Hopkins, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 1483, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 82

(Graham).)

In Ceja, the plaintiff had been injured while operating a hand-held circular saw. The appellate court held the saw was not a power press because the saw blade was not a die. Referring to a dictionary definition of a die as "any of various tools or devices ... for molding, stamping, cutting or shaping," ¹ and to a regulatory definition of a die as "[t]he tooling used in a press for cutting or forming material" (former Cal. Admin. Code [now Cal.Code Regs.], tit. 8, § 4188), the court explained: "A die usually forms material. It can cut material. It cuts things in a substantially different way, however, from a saw blade, [¶] Unlike a die, a saw blade cuts material with a sharp edge or sharp-edged teeth." (Ceja, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1376,

242 Cal.Rptr. 531, fns. omitted.)

Graham elaborated on Ceja's distinction between a die and a blade. In Graham, the plaintiff was injured while operating a Festo wood-molding machine. The machine had five cutting heads, past which wooden boards were moved. A rotating blade attached to each cutting head performed a cutting or planing operation on the boards. (Graham, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th at p. 1486,

17 Cal.Rptr.2d 82.) The Graham court noted a common characteristic in all the devices mentioned in the dictionary definition quoted in Ceja: "[I]n each case the shape of the `die' itself determines the shape of the product that is formed. That is, in each case, the product formed or the cut made is in some sense a `mirror image' of the die. Of course, that is not true of a saw blade or the Festo machine cutting heads. In short, the cutting heads do not fall within the common definition of the word `die.'" (Graham, supra, at p. 1488, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 82.) The Graham court went on to reject the definition of "die" proposed by the plaintiff in that case—: "`a device which shapes materials' "—as so broad that it would render the term without meaning or purpose in section 4558 and as potentially including, contrary to common usage, such instruments as "a chisel, a pair of scissors or a whittling knife." (Graham, supra, at p. 1488, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 82.)

The Court of Appeal below disagreed with Graham's approach. Citing the regulatory definition quoted in Ceja as well as an unabridged dictionary definition,² the court found it "apparent ... that a `die,' as that term is used in section 4558, should be very broadly construed and necessarily includes any cutting or forming tools which are utilized in a power press. Obviously, this will include tools which operate in ways other than being pressed or stamped into material in order to make a mirror image." (Italics in original.) Without further addressing the nature of a die, the lower court adopted a definition of "power operated presses" from safety standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 4188, subd. (b)): "all mechanically powered machines that shear, punch, form, or assemble metal or other materials by means of tools or dies attached to slides...."

Defendant endorses the Graham court's analysis, according to which a die forms material by imparting to the material some version of the die's own shape, and contends the Court of Appeal below erred in omitting from its definition of "power press" the statutory element that the press use a die as distinguished from a cutting blade or other tool. Plaintiff contends Graham erred in this respect and agrees with the Court of Appeal below that a die should instead be broadly understood as a material-forming tool.

We agree with defendant and the Graham court. From the dictionary definitions previously quoted (see fns. 1 & 2, ante), as well as others we have consulted,³ the term "die" clearly denotes not all material-forming tools, but a subset of such tools. The devices described in dictionary definitions of "die" generally share two pertinent characteristics. First, they impart form to the material by impact or pressure against the material, rather than along the material. Second, they impart to the material some version of the die's own shape. The two characteristics are logically related, since the die, acting by impact against the material, can only alter the form of the material where it impacts it, necessarily leaving an impression or cutout of its own shape (unlike a linear cutting blade that, moving along the surface of the material, can be directed to cut out any desired shape). The first characteristic (impact or pressure against or through the material) particularly describes dies used in presses and hence limits the...