Rosas v. IBP, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-2004-EEO.
• Citation: 869 F. Supp. 912
• Parties: Elida ROSAS, Plaintiff, v. IBP, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

869 F. Supp. 912

Elida ROSAS, Plaintiff, v. IBP, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 94-2004-EEO.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

November 29, 1994.

John L. Hampton, Glenn B. Brown, Boddington & Brown, Chtd., Kansas City, KS, for plaintiff.

Terri Savely Bezek, John J. Jurcyk Jr., Frank D. Menghini, Douglas M. Greenwald, McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, KS, Katherine E. Rich, Holman, McCollum & Hansen, P.C., Prairie Village, KS, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EARL E. O'CONNOR, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant IBP, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 25). Plaintiff claims that defendant IBP, Inc. ("IBP") terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising her rights under the Kansas Workers' Compensation Act. Defendant seeks summary judgment, contending the undisputed facts establish that IBP terminated plaintiff for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons. The court has examined the parties' factual and legal submissions, as well as the applicable law, and is now prepared to rule. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.

I. Factual Background.

The following facts constitute the uncontroverted material facts as established pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and in accordance with District of Kansas Rule 206(c).

In November 1988, plaintiff, Elida Rosas, was hired to work at IBP's Emporia meat processing plant. From November of 1988 through July 6, 1989, plaintiff performed "regular duty" job assignments. On July 1, 1989, she complained of pain in her left hand and wrist. Plaintiff was taken off her regular duty job and assigned to "light duty" jobs on July 6, 1989.

In September 1989, plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim in connection with her complaints of hand and wrist pain.

Following her initial complaint to the company on July 1, 1989, plaintiff continued to complain of pain in her left hand and wrist through May 1990, when plaintiff took a pregnancy-related leave of absence. During that time period, plaintiff was treated in the company dispensary and by physicians unaffiliated with the defendant. Plaintiff remained on a pregnancy-related leave of absence until October 4, 1990, when she returned to a light duty job assignment.

On October 30, 1990, plaintiff received medical authorization to return to her regular duty job. Plaintiff refused to return to her regular duty job, and was placed on a leave of absence. She was told to return to work when she felt that she could perform her regular duty job. From October 30, 1990, until January 8, 1992, plaintiff did not return to the IBP plant seeking any type of work, nor did she have any contact with IBP or any of its employees concerning starting back to work.

On March 18, 1991, at a preliminary hearing on her workers' compensation claim, plaintiff testified under oath, through an interpreter, as follows:

Q. Just explain why you can't go back to work at IBP doing the same job that you've been doing.

A. I can't because I'm too hurt. I can't do anything.

On February 28, 1992, at a second preliminary hearing on plaintiffs workers' compensation claim, she testified under oath, through an interpreter, as follows:

Q. Mrs. Rosas, are you able to return to work at this time?

A. No.

Q. Tell us why not.

A. She says the way her hand is she is not able to use that even to open that door, much less to work.

* * * * * *

Q. Do you want them to train you in something that you are able to do?

A. I can't do any type of work at the present. I can't even open and close my hand.

Q. You couldn't return back to the same job at this time?

A. I cannot work.

Q. Okay. You can't work at all?

A. No. I can't open and close my hand. It really hurts.

Plaintiff stated in her deposition in this law-suit that she testified truthfully at the preliminary hearings.

IBP has a company policy to terminate employees who have for any reason taken twelve consecutive months' leave. IBP terminated plaintiff on January 8, 1992, for violating its Leave of Absence policy.

II. Standards Governing Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hicks v. Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir.1991). Essentially, the inquiry as to whether an issue is genuine is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. This inquiry necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at trial. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial "as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991). The nonmoving party may not rest on his pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241.

"We must view the record in the light most favorable to the parties opposing the motion for summary judgment." Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). "In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial." Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 793 (10th Cir. 1988). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. Where the nonmoving party fails to properly respond to the motion for summary judgment, the facts as set forth by the moving party are deemed admitted for purposes of the summary judgment motion. D.Kan. Rule 206(c).

In this diversity case, we ascertain and apply Kansas law with the objective that the result obtained in federal court should be the same result that a Kansas court would reach. See Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. No. 28-J v. GAF Corp., 959 F.2d 868, 870 (10th Cir.1992).

III. Discussion.

In Kansas, the employer-employee relationship is governed by the doctrine of employment-at-will. The doctrine holds that in the absence of a contract, express or implied, between an employee and her employer covering the duration of employment, the employment is terminable at the will of either party. Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779 (1976). Kansas law recognizes a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for employees discharged in retaliation for the exercise of their rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan.App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).

On May 27, 1994, the Kansas Supreme Court answered a certified question posed to it in the case Ortega v. IBP, Inc., Case No. 92-2351. The question was as follows:

Where an employee-at-will claims that an employer terminated his or her employment in retaliation for the exercise of statutory rights under the Workers' Compensation Act, K.S.A. § 44-501 et seq., and that he or she is therefore entitled to maintain a cause of action for wrongful discharge under Kansas law, is plaintiff required to prove that claim by clear and convincing evidence?

The court, answering in the affirmative, stated:

A party having the burden of proving a discharge from employment in retaliation for having filed a workers compensation claim must establish that claim by a preponderance of the evidence, but the evidence must be clear and convincing in nature.

Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 527, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994). In Nordstrom v. Miller, 227 Kan. 59, 605 P.2d 545 (1980), the court articulated the meaning of clear and convincing evidence:

The witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the details in connection with the transaction must be narrated exactly and in order; the testimony must be clear, direct and weighty; and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts at issue.

Nordstrom, 227 Kan. at 65, 605 P.2d 545 (citation and quotations omitted). The court in Ortega succinctly stated the requirements of clear and convincing evidence in the following language:

It is clear if it is certain, unambiguous, and plain to the understanding. It is convincing if it is reasonable and persuasive enough to cause the trier of facts to believe it.

Ortega, 255 Kan. at 527, 874 P.2d 1188 (citing Chandler v. Central Oil Corp., 253 Kan. 50, 58, 853 P.2d 649 (1993)). Under Kansas law, clear and convincing evidence is not a quantum of proof, but rather a quality of proof. Ortega, 255...