Rose v. Freedom of Information Com'n

• Decision Date: 18 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14256,14256
• Citation: 602 A.2d 1019,221 Conn. 217
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 73 Ed. Law Rep. 119 Carol ROSE et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Page 1019

602 A.2d 1019

221 Conn. 217, 73 Ed. Law Rep. 119

Carol ROSE et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 14256.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 6, 1991.

Decided Feb. 18, 1992.

Martin A. Gould, with whom was Alfred J. Garofolo, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Constance L. Chambers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, for appellee (named defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO and BERDON, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is the relationship between the interest in the open conduct of government codified in General Statutes § 1-21 ¹ of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the interest in confidentiality for "records of teacher performance and evaluation" expressed by the legislature in General Statutes § 10-151c. ² The underlying controversy between the plaintiffs, Carol Rose and Vera Rozarie, and the defendant freedom of information commission (FOIC) concerns the validity of an FOIC order to the defendant board of education of the town of Stratford (board) to disclose the substance of the board's action approving a recommendation to take disciplinary action against the plaintiffs. The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal of the FOIC's order for want of subject matter jurisdiction after concluding that the plaintiffs were not "parties aggrieved" by a decision of the FOIC within the meaning of General Statutes § 1-21i(d) ³ and therefore lacked standing to appeal. After the plaintiffs appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court, we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We disagree with the trial court's procedural ruling, but conclude that, on the merits, the plaintiffs' appeal was properly dismissed.

The material facts are undisputed. On April 28, 1989, teachers and administrators at the Flood Intermediate School in Stratford staged a mock arrest of a teacher as a prelude to teaching students about the Scopes Monkey Trial. The students were led to believe that the arrest was genuine and were released from school, over a weekend, unaware of the true circumstances of the arrest. The mock arrest upset both students and parents.

In response to this incident, the Stratford superintendent of schools recommended to the board that it take disciplinary action against the teachers and administrators involved in the incident, including the plaintiffs, who were the principal and assistant principal of the school. By notice dated May 5, 1989, the board called a special meeting with the following agenda: "Review of incident at Flood Intermediate School on and after April 28, 1989, discussion of appropriate action concerning the incident, and action to resolve the issue relating to the incident." At the special meeting, on May 15, 1989, the board voted to enter executive session ⁴ to discuss the incident and the recommended disciplinary action. Following its discussion in executive session, the board reconvened in public and voted by a four to three margin to "accept the recommendations of the Superintendent of Schools concerning disciplinary action to be taken to remedy the incident which occurred at Flood Intermediate School." Before adjourning the meeting, the board chairperson announced that it would be "inappropriate" to disclose the specific action voted on because the discussion had taken place in executive session.

Stephen J. Winters, Constance K. Davis, and the Bridgeport Post-Telegram (complainants) filed a complaint with the FOIC alleging that the board's failure to specify the nature of the disciplinary action that it was approving had violated the open meeting provisions of § 1-21. On October 26, 1989, the FOIC conducted a full hearing on the complaint. The board responded that §§ 1-18a(e), ⁵ 1-19(b)(2), ⁶ and 10-151c authorized the manner in which it had proceeded at the public meeting. The plaintiffs moved to intervene as parties before the FOIC pursuant to General Statutes § 1-21i(b). ⁷ The FOIC denied the plaintiffs party status, but allowed them to participate in the hearing as intervenors pursuant to § 1-21j-28 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. ⁸

The FOIC concluded: (1) that §§ 1-21(a) and 1-18a(e)(1) "require that votes of agencies with respect to personnel matters be taken in public"; (2) that §§ 1-19(b)(2) and 10-151c "do not authorize or permit the non-disclosure of the substance of a vote of a board of education concerning the discipline of school teachers or administrators"; and (3) that the board had "failed to comply with the open meeting provisions of § 1-21(a) ... when it failed to state in public the substance of the motion upon which it voted at the May 15, 1989 special meeting." It ordered the board to "provide the complainant[s] with a record containing the recommendation for disciplinary action it approved."

The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the FOIC to the Superior Court pursuant to § 1-21i(d). They alleged that, procedurally, the FOIC had improperly denied them party status and that, substantively, its order of disclosure had violated § 10-151c. ⁹ The Superior Court granted the FOIC's motion to dismiss the appeal upon concluding that the plaintiffs were not "parties" within the meaning of § 1-21i(d) of the FOIA and § 1-21j-12(g) of the FOIC regulations ¹⁰ and thus lacked standing to appeal from the FOIC decision. In its memorandum of decision the court also discussed, however, and found unpersuasive, the merits of the plaintiffs' appeal.

The plaintiffs renew in this court the issues that they raised in their administrative appeal to the Superior Court. They maintain that because the substance of the recommended disciplinary action was part of the plaintiffs' "personnel or medical ... or similar file[s]" within the meaning of § 1-21i(b), the FOIC improperly: (1) denied them party status; and (2) failed to give effect to the protection from disclosure afforded to them by § 10-151c. We agree with the plaintiffs that they had standing to appeal the FOIC order to the Superior Court, but we disagree with their conception of the relationship between §§ 1-21 and 10-151c.

I

We first address the propriety of the trial court's decision on the procedural issue of whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the order of the FOIC. Administrative appeals depend upon statutory authorization. Farricielli v. Personnel Appeal Board, 186 Conn. 198, 201, 440 A.2d 286 (1982); Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 53, 347 A.2d 89 (1974). For FOIC orders, such authority is to be found in § 1-21i(d), which provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the decision of said commission may appeal therefrom, in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183." ¹¹ (Emphasis added.)

"It is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has ... some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 501, 467 A.2d 674 (1983)...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unisys Corporation v. Department of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 693, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991). " 'Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 192, 332 A.2d 78 (1973). These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of [a] direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"; Shaskan v. Waltham Industries Corporation, 168 Conn. 43, 49, 357 A.2d 472 (1975); Baker v. Carr, supra [369 U.S. at] 204 ; provides the requisite assurance of "concrete adverseness" and diligent advocacy.' " Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 648-49, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989), quoting Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21, 439 A.2d 349 (1981).

A

The trial court, adhering to the Appellate Court's interpretation of § 1-21i(d) in Stanchem, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 13 Conn.App. 315, 536 A.2d 592 (1988), and relying upon the FOIC regulations defining "party," concluded that only one who had been granted party status in the proceedings before the FOIC, or had properly sought and was "entitled as of right to be admitted as a party," has standing to appeal to the Superior Court from an FOIC decision. It determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing because (1) the FOIC had denied them party status, and (2) they had failed to demonstrate that they had been improperly denied party status.

The plaintiffs claim they were entitled to party status because § 1-21i(b), which provides that "[a] public employee whose personnel or medical file or similar file is the subject of an appeal under this subsection may intervene as a party in the proceedings on the matter before the commission," and § 10-151c, which exempts "records of teacher performance and evaluation" from the FOIA, conferred such a right. Although there may be merit to the plaintiffs' contention that the FOIC incorrectly denied them party status, we need not reach that question, because careful examination of § 1-21i(d) discloses that it authorizes an appeal to the Superior Court upon a showing of classical aggrievement. ¹²

The legislature in § 1-21i(d) permits an appeal by "[a]ny party aggrieved" by a...