Rose v. Heisler

• Citation: 118 Conn. 632,174 A. 66
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 16 July 1934
• Parties: ROSE v. HEISLER et al. SAME v. HEISLER.

174 A. 66

118 Conn. 632

ROSE v. HEISLER et al.

SAME v. HEISLER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 16, 1934

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Edward J. Finn Judge.

Actions by Celia Rose against Alex Heisler and another and by Antone Rose against Alex Heisler and another only to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by named defendant's heedlessness, gross and wanton misconduct and other defendant's negligence in operation of automobiles colliding at a street intersection. From judgments on a jury's verdicts for plaintiffs against named defendant only, the latter appeals.

The defendant Widman filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to him, which was granted.

No error.

William J. Larkin, Jr., of Waterbury, and David R. Woodhouse of Hartford, for appellant Heisler.

Sidney S. Cassel and Yale Matzkin, both of Waterbury, for appellees.

Edward J. Brennan, of New Haven, for appellee Widman.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs brought these actions to recover for injuries suffered in an automobile collision, against Heisler, the driver of the car in which they were riding as guests, and Widman, the driver of the other car involved in the collision. The jury rendered a verdict that the plaintiffs recover against Heisler but in favor of Widman. Heisler moved that the entire verdict be set aside, and from the denial of that motion, has appealed. Widman has moved in this court that the appeal be dismissed as to him. The principles announced in Chapin v. Babcock, 67 Conn. 255, 256 34 A. 1039, Sparrow v. Bromage, 83 Conn. 27, 74 A. 1070, 27 L.R.A. (N. S.) 209, 19 Ann.Cas. 796. Donnarumma v. Korkin, 97 Conn. 223, 116 A. 178, and Caviote v. Shea, 116 Conn. 569, 575, 165 A. 788, lead to a conclusion that the motion should be granted, but we are asked to re-examine them. If the illegal conduct of each of the defendants was a proximate cause of the collision, they would be liable jointly and severally, the plaintiff would have a right to recover the entire amount of damages awarded from either, and, if he did so, the defendant paying them would have no right of contribution against the other; or the plaintiff might have sued either alone, and of course, in the event of a recovery, that one would have been compelled to pay the entire amount of damages. Caviote v. Shea, supra. The legal responsibility of the defendant Heisler would be no greater or no less whether the action, if retried, resulted in a judgment against both or, Widman not being a defendant, in a judgment against Heisler alone. The only advantage to him from the setting aside of the verdict in favor of Widman would be the possibility of some benefit to him in the course of the trial from the presence of Widman as a joint defendant or that, in the event of a judgment against both, the plaintiff would elect to get satisfaction, in whole or in part, from Widman. These are not sufficient reasons for continuing the litigation against Widman, where the plaintiff has acquiesced in the judgment holding him not liable. The motion to dismiss the appeal as to Widman is granted.

If the jury believed the...