Rose v. Medtronics, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1980
• Citation: 107 Cal.App.3d 150,166 Cal.Rptr. 16
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Manny ROSE, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MEDTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 56429.

Page 16

166 Cal.Rptr. 16

107 Cal.App.3d 150

Manny ROSE, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MEDTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 56429.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

June 19, 1980.

Lawrence A. Chusid, Robert S. Canter and Alan M. Salkow, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Haight, Dickson, Brown & Bonesteel, Robert L. Dickson, Roy G. Weatherup, Carl J. Klunder, and Jerry M. Custis, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

FLEMING, Acting Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff Manny Rose appeals the dismissal of class-action allegations in his suit for damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the defective manufacture of a cardiac pacemaker.

Rose's first amended complaint makes the following allegations: In 1975 his physician surgically implanted in Rose a cardiac pacemaker manufactured by defendant Medtronics, Inc. In October 1977 Medtronics notified physicians throughout the country that certain of its pacemakers, whose specific models and serial numbers were enumerated, contained a potential defect in one of its components. In turn, Rose's physician notified him that his pacemaker was one of the potentially defective models and should be replaced. In November 1977 Rose had his pacemaker surgically replaced.

In April 1978 Rose instituted the action at bench on behalf of himself and a class of approximately 4,000 others for injuries caused and damages suffered as a result of Medtronics' "medical negligence." The class was allegedly composed of those individuals who were "required to undergo a second operation for the implantation of a cardiac pacemaker, due to the fact that a previously inserted cardiac pacemaker manufactured by defendant Medtronic(s), Inc., was announced to be defective. The class would include those persons who had implanted into them a pacemaker manufactured by (Medtronics) bearing a model and serial number in the group enumerated (in Rose's) complaint." The first amended complaint pleaded causes of action based on negligent conduct, on product liability, on strict liability, and on breach of express and implied warranties, and alleged that the class members sustained bodily injuries, suffering, worry, and anxiety, and that Rose himself sustained damages in excess of $5,000.

Medtronics demurred to the first amended complaint on the ground, inter alia, that Rose failed to plead facts sufficient to constitute a valid class action. In sustaining the demurrer to the class action without leave to amend, the trial court concluded that "a class action is an inappropriate vehicle to use for the adjudication of the highly individual experiences and perhaps injury suffered by the many persons who(m Rose) seeks to represent, (citation)." The court reasoned that "even though the mechanical failure of the device is susceptible to proof applicable perhaps to all users of the device, the results therefrom are so susceptible to individual proof that the individual issues would predominate over the common issues." In October 1978 the court ordered the action dismissed as to "the unnamed members of the purported class only, but (allowed it to) remain pending insofar as the complaint asserts claims on behalf of the individually named plaintiff."

On appeal, Rose contends the trial court erred, procedurally, in making its determination at the pleading stage, thereby denying him an opportunity to establish the propriety of the class action at an evidentiary hearing (See Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 820-821, 94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964; Civ.Code, § 1781(c)); and erred, substantively, in concluding that his pleading did not assert a valid class action.

Procedurally, where there is a "reasonable possibility" that the plaintiff in a class action can establish a community of interest among potential claimants, the preferred course is to defer decision on the propriety of the class action until an evidentiary hearing has been held on the appropriateness of class litigation. (Beckstead v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 780, 783, 98 Cal.Rptr. 779; see also, Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d pp. 820-21, 94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964; La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 876, 97 Cal.Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d 1113.) But when the complaint on its face fails to contain sufficient allegations of fact to establish a class interest, the class issue may be properly disposed of by demurrer. (Bartlett v. Hawaiian Village (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 435, 437-438, 151 Cal.Rptr. 392; see also, Diamond v. General Motors Corp. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 374, 381, 97 Cal.Rptr. 639; Bozaich v. State of California (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 688, 108 Cal.Rptr. 392, order striking class allegations from complaint.) We therefore consider the substance of the first amended complaint.

A class action is maintainable only when there exists a community of interest in common questions of law and fact among the claimants to be represented, and it is likely that the combination of claims in a single action will substantially benefit both the claimants and the courts. (Civ. Code, § 1781; Code Civ. Proc., § 382; Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d 800, 809-10, 94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964; Darr v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732.) If each member of the class will be required to litigate numerous and substantial issues affecting his individual right to recover damages after the common questions have been determined, the requirement of community of interest is not satisfied. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 459-60, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701; Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses (1948) 32 Cal.2d 833, 838-40, 198 P.2d 514; Altman v Manhattan Savings Bank (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 761, 768, 148 Cal.Rptr. 100; Stilson v. Reader's Digest Assn. Inc. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 270, 273-74, 104 Cal.Rptr. 581.)

A dispute over the propriety of a class action requires the court to evaluate the factors necessarily involved in the particular action. In general, mass tort actions for personal injuries are not appropriate for class-action treatment (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, Supplemental Notes of Advisory Committee, reported in 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 23, p. 299), in that the major elements in tort actions for personal injuries liability, causation, and damages may vary widely from claim to claim. Reluctance to extend class-action treatment to mass torts governs even those types of claims which necessarily contain common questions of law and fact. This is most clearly seen in airplane accident causes, where, although the injuries indubitably possess a common origin, courts decline to adjudicate such causes as class actions. (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. of Cal. (9 Cir.1975) 523 F.2d 1083; Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. (1975) D.C., 68 F.R.D. 500; Causey v. Pan American World Airways (1975) D.C., 66 F.R.D. 392; Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (1970) D.C., 50 F.R.D. 76.) Rather, consolidation of actions is the preferred procedure...