Roselli v. Noel

• Decision Date: 25 May 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 75-321.
• Parties: Roseanna ROSELLI et al. v. Philip W. NOEL et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

414 F. Supp. 417

Roseanna ROSELLI et al. v. Philip W. NOEL et al.

Civ. A. No. 75-321.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

May 25, 1976.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald Simon, Diane Fuchs, Alden C. Harrington, R. I. Legal Services, Providence, R. I., for plaintiffs.

Harold E. Krause, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., State of R. I., Providence, R. I. for defendants.

OPINION

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

The present litigation involves the "fall out" resulting from the legal battle waged between welfare recipients and the executive branch of the Rhode Island State government over the State's conversion of its method of computing payments for Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") from one based on individual need to a "flat grant" method. That battle has been waged on two fronts, the lines first drawn in this district court, then in the First Circuit Court of Appeals, and once again in this Court. That case, which is the subject of a separate opinion issued today, 414 F.Supp. 411, was brought as a class action by the plaintiff¹ herein against one of the defendants herein, John Affleck, the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services. In the instant case, plaintiff Roselli has also joined the Governor of the State as a defendant. In the first suit, which hereinafter will be referred to collectively as Roselli I, this Court issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of the shelter portion of the State's flat grant program as a violation of superseding federal law, § 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23). Roselli v. Affleck, 373 F.Supp. 36 (D.R.I.1974). That decision was affirmed on appeal, 508 F.2d 1277 (1st Cir. 1974) and, until today, has been awaiting decision on the merits.

At issue in Roselli I was the validity of the shelter portion of the "flat grant" which the State implemented on November 1, 1973 to provide AFDC benefits. Since the AFDC program is largely financed by the federal government, the State is required to administer it in compliance with applicable federal legislation and regulations. Roselli I, 373 F.Supp. at 41. In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970), the United States Supreme Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) and enunciated guidelines which a State must follow in converting to a flat grant program. The Court noted that two factors determine the amount of money a welfare recipient receives.

"First it is necessary to establish a `standard of need,' a yardstick for measuring who is eligible for public assistance. Second, it must be decided how much assistance will be given, that is, what `level of benefits' will be paid.

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. . . Consistent with . . . § 402(a)(23), a State may, after recomputing its standard of need for conversion to flat grant, pare down payments to accommodate budgetary realities by reducing the percent of benefits paid or switching to a percent reduction system, but it may not obscure the actual standard of need.

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. . . Providing all factors in the old equation are accounted for and fairly priced and providing the consolidation on a statistical basis reflects a fair averaging, a State may, of course, consistently with § 402(a)(23) redefine its method for determining need." Rosado v. Wyman, supra at 408, 413, 419, 90 S.Ct. at 1216, 1218, 1221 (emphasis in original).

In Roselli I this Court found that "in Rhode Island the `standard of need', actual need, and payment level were one and the same thing" prior to conversion to the flat grant. 373 F.Supp. at 42. The Court found, however, that in redefining its shelter standard for the flat grant, the State had relied on out-dated figures and an illegal attribution of income policy which had the combined effect of lowering and obscuring the true shelter standard. As a result, it enjoined implementation of the shelter portion of the flat grant and ordered the State to continue paying shelter costs on an "as needed" basis pending resolution of Roselli I on the merits.

Thus, Roselli I had no impact on the non-shelter portion of the flat grant, which has been in effect since November 1, 1973. "Though it need not recognize inflation after the institution of the flat grant", Roselli I, supra, 508 F.2d at 1282, in May of 1975 the State did just that. In May, 1975, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted and the Governor signed into law the budget for Fiscal Year 1976, which authorized a separate appropriation of $2.3 million for a "Standards Increase for AFDC and GPA General Public Assistance." Federal supplements to the AFDC program will result in a total pool of $4.3 million. Both the defendants had supported inclusion of this standards increase in the FY 1976 budget, defendant Affleck stating that:

"The only solution to the problem of spiralling costs for welfare recipients is a standards increase which will at least keep them current with today's cost of living."

Although the defendants have not strayed from their conviction that a standards increase is urgently needed by welfare recipients to keep apace of inflation, they did not begin distribution of the appropriation with the beginning of FY 1976 on July 1, 1975. The reasons for this decision were stipulated by the parties.

"Prior to July 1st, Governor Noel decided not to distribute the Standards Increase until Roselli I was terminated.

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The Governor feared that an adverse decision in Roselli I would create fiscal requirements which the State under the current budget would be without funds to meet.

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The Governor believed that an adverse decision would create two options. These options were that the defendants would have either to seek additional funds from the General Assembly or to implement a ratable reduction.

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The Governor rejected both of these alternatives.

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Instead, and in order to avoid these two alternatives, the defendants withheld the standards increase and determined not to distribute it until Roselli I was decided in order that they could use the standards increase money to cover any costs that the Roselli I decision might impose.

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Pursuant to this decision, the defendants developed a proposal to use the Standards Increase fund to resolve the legal challenge to the shelter standard raised by Roselli I. In this plan, the defendants proposed to `attribute' the standards increase funds to the `pure rent factor' or to call the general standards increase a rent increase."

Shortly after this decision was made, the defendants through their counsel informed plaintiff's counsel in Roselli I of their plan to use the Standards Increase ("SI") to offset an increase in the rent factor, if any, caused by implementation of a shelter flat grant in conformance with this Court's previous decision in Roselli I. The plaintiff rejected this as a settlement proposal. On September 11, 1975, defendant Affleck again urged plaintiff, through her counsel, to accept this plan and settle Roselli I before October 1, 1975, because he feared that by that date the SI appropriation would have to be diverted to meet rising costs of the GPA program. Defendant Affleck advised plaintiff to "take the money and run" before it was too late.

The plaintiff interpreted this warning as an attempt to coerce her to settle Roselli I without pressing for a final decision on the merits. As a result, she filed the instant action on the ground that the defendants sought to deny her meaningful access to the federal court in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. After a hearing, this Court entered a temporary restraining order barring the defendants from dissipating the SI account. That order has been continued by consent until final resolution. Interim proceedings have left the following issues for resolution on the merits: plaintiff's request for class action certification and causes of action founded in 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(23), 1983 and state law; and defendant's opposition to class certification and motion to abstain. There being no factual dispute, the parties have presented these issues by way of cross-motions for summary judgment.

Jurisdiction

Plaintiff has raised a number of bases of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. I need not address each one if I conclude that plaintiff's constitutional cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not wholly insubstantial, see, e. g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 35 L.Ed.2d 36 (1973). In that event, jurisdiction would be conferred upon the Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and, in the exercise of its discretion, over all pendent federal and statutory claims. Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 358 (1st Cir. 1974); Silva v. East Providence Housing Authority, 390 F.Supp. 691, 694 (D.R.I. 1975); Lund v. Affleck, 388 F.Supp. 137, 138-139 (D.R.I.1975). See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

There can be no question that plaintiff was exercising her First Amendment right to petition the government when she instituted her challenge to the shelter flat grant in Roselli I. California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-511, 513, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir. 1967); Sutton v. County Court of Racine County, 353 F.Supp. 716, 718 (E.D.Wis. 1973). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 442, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941). Cf. McQueen v. Drucker, 317 F.Supp. 1122, 1132 (D.Mass.1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971). Although "direct interference with the jurisdiction of the court is the plainest sort of contempt," Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1972) (citations omitted), it is not true, as defendants contend, that only intentional government interference raises a colorable First Amendment cl...