Rosko v. City of Marlborough

Decision Date10 December 1968
Citation355 Mass. 51,242 N.E.2d 857
PartiesMichael J. ROSKO et al. v. CITY OF MARLBOROUGH.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

J. Fleet Cowden, Boston, for petitioners.

William J. Brennan, City Sol. and Eugene L. Tougas, Waltham, for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER and REARDON, JJ.

REARDON, Justice.

This petition was brought in the Land Court under G.L. c. 185, § 1 (j 1/2), and c. 240, § 14A, to test the validity of two amendments to the zoning ordinance of Marlborough. The parties filed stipulations on certain facts. In his decision the judge found to be valid a zoning amendment adopted by the city council on March 27, 1967, and thereafter approved by the mayor. Since this amendment superseded the first amendment complained of, the judge found the question of validity of that amendment moot. The parties have not argued questions relating to the first amendment. We therefore confine ourselves to a discussion of the second.

The petitioners own lots land situated within a fifteen acre locus, itself part of larger parcel of 327.1 acres situated west of and abutting Interstate Route 495 in Marlborough. This larger parcel and two others comprising approximately 115 and 355 acres respectively were included by the 1967 amendment in a newly created classification, 'Limited Industrial District.' Within the locus were a number of single family houses and several lots where various business enterprises had been conducted for a period of years. The locus lies between Route 495 and Felton Street which was designated as a boundary of the newly classified district on its west side. Access is available from the southern end of the parcels to Route 495 and to Route 20. In May of 1966 two of the owners of land in the locus, holding some seven acres, agreed after negotiations to sell their land to a manufacturing company. The amendment followed a study conducted between November, 1965, and February, 1967, by a city planner who recommended the 1967 classification of the three parcels to the planning board on the ground that the land, situated as it was, lent itself 'admirably for rezoning for limited industrial use' largely because of its proximity to the interchange of Routes 495 and 20. The action recommended by the planning board was designed to implement the suggestions of the planner and was adopted by the city council. The judge found that 'a limited industrial district would tend to encourage the most appropriate use of the land in view of the fact that the land abuts a new interstate highway,' that such use would tend to increase property valuations in the city and otherwise further its economic advancement, and that Felton Street provided a good natural boundary of a 'new district (that) had to stop somewhere,' having in mind the residential nature of the development on the west side of Felton Street. The petitioners base their argument largely on a contention that this fifteen acre locus was included largely in the new district to satisfy the two landowners therein who wished to convey their land to a manufacturing firm for purposes of a factory.

'A zoning ordinance will be sustained unless it is shown that there is no substantial relation between it and the furtherance of any of the general objects mentioned in the statute.' Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works of Fall River, 324 Mass. 542, 545, 87 N.E.2d 211, 213. The presumption is in favor of the ordinance and we will not refuse its enforcement unless there is a showing beyond reasonable doubt of conflict with the Constitution or the enabling statute. Caires v. Building Commr. of Hingham, 323 Mass. 589, 594, 83 N.E.2d 550. The judge has found in the face of the petitioners' principal argument...

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7 cases
  • Crall v. City of Leominster
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 5 June 1972
    ...v. Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 449, 87 N.E.2d 9, 15, and cases cited. Cohen v. Lynn, 333 Mass. 699, 701, 132 N.E.2d 664. Rosko v. Marlborough, 355 Mass. 51, 53, 242 N.E.2d 857. We have held on numerous occasions that where a party has the burden of proving an essential fact, 'it can (rarely) be ......
  • Collura v. Town of Arlington
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 3 June 1975
    ...unless there is a showing beyond reasonable doubt of conflict with the Constitution or the enabling statute.' Rosko v. Marlborough, 355 Mass. 51, 53, 242 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1968). Caires v. Building Commr. of Hingham, 323 Mass. 589, 594, 83 N.E.2d 550 (1949). Lanner v. Board of Appeal of Tewk......
  • Grasso v. New Bedford
    • United States
    • Massachusetts Superior Court
    • 2 November 1998
    ... 1998-MBAR-294 Vincent Grasso et al.1 v. City of New Bedford et al.2 No. 9201987 Superior Court of Massachusetts November 2, 1998 ... addition to present conditions and use. Rosko v ... Marlborough , 355 Mass. 51, 53 (1968). Lanner v ... Board of Appeal of Tewksbury , 348 ... ...
  • Harrison v. Town of Braintree
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 14 April 1969
    ...by landowners whose land has been subjected to the zoning classification or reclassification which is attacked, see Rosko v. City of Marlborough, Mass., 242 N.E.2d 857. In Pierce v. Town of Wellesley, 336 Mass. 517, 146 N.E.2d 666, the Land Court proceedings were brought by a resident in th......
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