Ross v. Savage
Decision Date | 01 July 1913 |
Citation | 63 So. 148,66 Fla. 106 |
Parties | ROSS v. SAVAGE et al. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; R. M. Call, Judge.
Action by Herbert W. Savage and another against Roderick G. Ross. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
All the points adjudicated by an appellate court upon a writ of error or an appeal become the law of the case, and are no longer open for discussion or consideration, but this principle has no applicability to and is not decisive of points presented upon a second writ of error that were not presented upon the former writ of error, and consequently were not before the appellate court for adjudication.
In construing any written instrument, whether a deed of conveyance, a bill of sale, mortgage, contract, or what not the entire instrument must be considered, in order to gather the real intent and to determine the true design of the makers thereof. To that end, all the different provisions of such instrument must be looked to, and all construed so as to give effect to each and every of them, if that can reasonably be done. If clauses therein seem to be repugnant to each other, they must be given such an interpretation and construction as to reconcile them if possible, remembering that the intent is the principal thing to be regarded. If one interpretation, looking to the other provisions of the instrument and its general scope, would lead to an absurd conclusion, such interpretation must be abandoned, and one adopted which will be more in accord with reason and probability.
When parties deliberately put their engagements in writing in such terms as import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of the engagement, it is, as between them, conclusively presumed that the whole engagement and the extent and manner of the undertaking is contained in the writing. No other language is admissible to show what they meant or intended, and for the simple reason that each of them has made that to be found in the instrument the agreed test of his meaning and intention.
The first point in construing a contract is to ascertain what was the meaning and understanding of the parties, as shown by the language used, applied to the subject-matter.
When words or terms having a definite legal meaning and effect are knowingly used in a written instrument, the parties thereto will be presumed to have intended such words or terms to have their proper legal meaning and effect, at least in the absence of any contrary intention appearing in the instrument.
There must be a meeting of two minds in one and the same intention in order that there may be a contract.
Where a lease contains the following stipulation: 'It being expressly understood between the parties hereto that this lease is made for the sole purpose of granting to the lessee the rights and privileges of exploring for mining, taking out and shipping therefrom the merchantable phosphate rock, as well as all other minerals of whatsoever kind or nature as hereinafter provided for, which is or may hereafter be found on, in or under the said land, with the right in the lessee to construct all buildings, and to make all excavations openings, ditches, and drains and construct all railroads wagon roads and all other improvements which are or may become necessary or suitable for the purpose of mining or removing therefrom phosphate or other mineral of whatever nature or kind found thereon and of the carrying on of mining operations thereon'--it is obvious that the mutual intention of the parties executing the lease was to give to the lessee the mining rights set forth therein.
When the main purpose of the parties in executing a lease was to give to the lessee the right to mine the phosphate rock upon the lands described therein, even though there is no express covenant on the part of the lessors that there was phosphate rock on the leased premises, in the absence of any showing in the lease to the contrary, it must be held that the parties to the lease assumed that sufficient phosphate rock was in or on the land to enable the lessee to comply with terms of the contract, and that but for this mutual assumption the contract would not have been made.
Where a lease is executed for the purpose of giving to the lessee the right to mine the phosphate rock on the land described therein, and the lessee agrees therein to pay 'royalty on all phosphate rock mined and shipped from said lands under this lease, while the same shall remain in force at the rate of fifty (50¢ ) for each gross ton,' a further covenant therein, to the effect that the lessee shall pay advance royalties or ground rent up to a certain named amount, whether sufficient rock is mined or not, to yield such amount at the royalty per ton named, is not an independent covenant, but must be held to be dependent upon the covenant to pay royalty upon the phosphate rock mined. In an action upon such contract by the lessors, pleas setting up, in substance, the nonexistence of any minable rock in or upon the land constitute a good defense to the action, and it is error to sustain a demurrer to the pleas.
COUNSEL Bisbee & Bedell, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.
Baker & Baker, of Jacksonville, for defendants in error.
This case comes here for the second time. For the opinion upon the former writ of error, see Savage v. Ross, 59 Fla. 407, 52 So. 16, wherein we reversed the judgment for the reasons stated. Upon the going down of the mandate, divers and sundry proceedings were had, to which it is unnecessary to refer. What is termed the 'amended third count to the amended declaration' is as follows:
Then follows a lengthy description of the land, which we omit.
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