Ross v. State

Decision Date10 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. A98A0615.,A98A0615.
Citation499 S.E.2d 351,231 Ga. App. 506
PartiesROSS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Tony L. Axam, Atlanta, for appellant.

J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Sheila A. Connors, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Judge.

Glenwood Ross appeals his conviction for armed robbery. Ross contends that the trial court erred in its recharge to the jury, that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was abridged, and that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his conviction.

1. "On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State's case, the jury's verdict will be upheld." (Punctuation omitted.) Jessup v. State, 224 Ga.App. 176, 177, 480 S.E.2d 232 (1996).

At trial, the victim testified that prior to exiting her car to go to her hotel room, she saw a small white car containing three black males cruising the hotel parking lot and she had waited to exit her car until the white car was out of sight. Thereafter, as she was ascending a flight of stairs to her room, a light-skinned black male holding a gun and wearing a white shirt, sweat shirt, dark pants, and white tennis shoes demanded her purse. The victim threw down everything she was carrying, whereupon the perpetrator picked up her purse and ran to the back door of a small white car. The perpetrator got into the back seat of the car behind the driver, the car hesitated and then drove off.

Officer James Chambers with the DeKalb County Police Department testified that shortly after receiving information over his radio regarding the armed robbery, he began following a small white car containing three black males traveling away from the scene of the robbery. Officer Chambers noted that the back seat passenger slouched down in his seat and looked back several times. Upon stopping the vehicle, the defendant exited from the back seat. A search of the vehicle revealed, among other things, the victim's purse, the victim's gun, and the perpetrator's gun. The guns were found under the front seat, one on the driver's side and one on the passenger side. Both guns were accessible from the front or back seats.

His co-defendants testified that Ross got out of the car at the hotel, committed the robbery, and got back into the car with a purse and an extra gun. The co-defendants also testified that they pled guilty to robbery for their connection with the present case. Although Ross denied committing the robbery and contended that one of his co-defendants committed the robbery, Ross was the only person in the car wearing a sweat shirt.

Having viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that sufficient evidence was presented to authorize the jury's verdict pursuant to the Jackson v. Virginia standard.

2. In several enumerations of error, Ross contends that the trial court erred in its recharge to the jury. Ross asserts that the trial court failed to fully instruct the jury on a point of law, that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court denied his motion for mistrial based on the inadequate jury instructions, and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial due to the inadequate instructions.

After jury deliberations had begun, the jury sent several questions to the judge: "Is there a difference between holding the gun and being on the scene, with knowledge of crime, but no gun, for armed robbery charge? ... Is `a party to' considered guilty of armed robbery? If so, what does it take to be `a party to,' knowledge only, intent, counsel, other? ... May we see a copy of the Judge's charge to the jury." After hearing argument, the trial court recharged the jury on parties to a crime and knowledge. The trial court also supplied the jury with a copy of the entire charge. Defense counsel stated that he was satisfied with the recharge.

After more deliberation took place, the jurors requested the legal definition of "participation" and "conspirator." The trial court charged the jury: "First of all, participation has no particular legal definition. Participation means what you collectively agree that participation means. It is just a common English word, and the definition of that is just the common English definition of participation. There is no legal definition for me to give you on that word. As to the word conspirator, the court realizes that I inadvertently included in my charge a provision regarding conspirator. It appears on page 6 of the...

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9 cases
  • Manders v. Lee
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • March 14, 2002
    ... ... This interlocutory appeal presents the question of whether a Georgia sheriff in his official capacity is an agent for the state, not the county, when performing his law enforcement duties as to use of force, and thus is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under ... ...
  • Vogleson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 13, 2001
    ...against Vogleson, we reverse.11 We previously addressed restrictions on cross-examination of an accomplice in Whitlock v. State12 and Ross v. State.13 In Whitlock, an accomplice testified that he had pled guilty to certain charges, but had not made a deal with the State. Defense counsel wan......
  • Perez v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2002
    ...272, 274(4), 528 S.E.2d 250 (2000). 22. Whitlock v. State, 239 Ga.App. 763, 765-766(2), 521 S.E.2d 901 (1999); Ross v. State, 231 Ga.App. 506, 509(3), 499 S.E.2d 351 (1998). 23. (Emphasis supplied.) Vogleson v. State, supra at 558(1), 552 S.E.2d 513. 24. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 562, ......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 1, 1999
    ...whether to give unrequested additional instructions when the jury requests a recharge on a particular point. Ross v. State, 231 Ga.App. 506, 508(2), 499 S.E.2d 351 (1998); see Bowley v. State, 261 Ga. 278, 280(3), 404 S.E.2d 97 (1991). Examining both the original charges and the recharge in......
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1 books & journal articles
  • A Better Orientation for Jury Instructions - Charles M. Cork, Iii
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 54-1, September 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...of the trial process. O.C.G.A. Sec. 9-10-9 (1982); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga. App. 812, 814-15, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001); Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 506, 509, 499 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Vogleson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 555, 552 S.E.2d 513 (2001). As a result, i......

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