Vogleson v. State
| Decision Date | 13 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. A01A0485.,A01A0485. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | VOGLESON v. The STATE. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Sara M. Yeager, Chamblee, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, Dist. Atty., Barbara B. Conroy, Jennifer M. Daniels, Robert M. Coker, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
A jury found Owen Vogleson guilty of trafficking in cocaine and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. His co-defendant negotiated a reduction in sentence in exchange for his testimony against Vogleson. Vogleson claims that the trial court erred by denying him his constitutional right to cross-examine his co-defendant1 about the mandatory minimum sentence the co-defendant was facing before he agreed to testify against Vogleson. He also claims that the only evidence linking him to the crimes was the uncorroborated testimony of his co-defendant, which was insufficient to support his convictions. Although we find that the evidence was sufficient to support Vogleson's convictions, we reverse because we find that the trial court erred by limiting Vogleson's cross-examination of his co-defendant.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence.2 Viewed in that light, the evidence shows that on April 26, 1999, DeKalb County Police Detective Franklin received a tip from a confidential informant that a white Jeep Cherokee, license tag number 324 JLC, could be found immediately in the area of Redan Road and Covington Highway and that the Jeep would be carrying a large amount of illegal drugs. The informant told Franklin that the Jeep would be occupied by two black males. When he received the tip, Franklin notified uniformed officers Becker and Frank that he would be moving into the area.
When he reached the area, Franklin observed the Jeep and was able to confirm the license tag number, the race and gender of the driver and the race of the passenger. The passenger had his seat reclined, making it difficult for Franklin to determine his gender. Franklin eventually was able to determine that the passenger was male. Franklin testified that the driver repeatedly looked into his side view and rear view mirrors and turned around in his seat to watch the vehicles following him. Franklin notified Officers Becker and Frank of his observations and of the Jeep's location.
Officer Becker located the Jeep, drove behind it and activated his blue lights. When the Jeep stopped, Becker, speaking through his public address system, asked the driver, whom he identified as Wilson, to get out and go to the rear of the vehicle. Wilson complied with that request and with Becker's request for his driver's license. Becker asked Wilson if there were any guns in the vehicle, and Wilson said, "yes." Wilson told Becker that there was a gun under the driver's seat. After patting Wilson down, Becker went to the driver's side of the vehicle, looked under the driver's seat and found a gun and a bag of marijuana. When Wilson acknowledged that the gun and marijuana belonged to him, Becker placed him under arrest.
Becker then approached the passenger, whom he identified as Vogleson, and instructed him to exit the Jeep. After Vogleson exited, Becker asked Officer Frank to conduct an open air search of the vehicle. Frank walked his dog (trained in the detection of narcotics) around the outside of the vehicle. The dog "alerted" on the front driver's side and the front passenger's side of the vehicle and again in those areas and the backseat when he entered the vehicle. The officers found two bags containing almost two kilograms of cocaine on the front passenger floorboard and a large amount of marijuana under the backseat.
At trial, Wilson testified to the following. His involvement in the buying and selling of cocaine was limited to connecting suppliers with potential purchasers, thereby earning a "finder's fee." Vogleson had cocaine he needed to sell, and a friend (the informant) had told Wilson he was interested in buying up to five kilograms. On April 26, 1999, Wilson and Vogleson met to sell the cocaine. At Vogleson's suggestion, they went to a restaurant on Covington Highway to get something to eat. Vogleson went into the restaurant and talked to someone who had entered the restaurant carrying a box. When Vogleson exited the restaurant, he was carrying a white plastic grocery bag, which contained food and two kilograms of cocaine. In the car, Vogleson gave Wilson the food, showed him the cocaine and placed the bag containing the cocaine under his leg. They then left the restaurant and headed in the direction of Wilson's friend's house to sell him the cocaine.
1. Vogleson claims that the trial court committed reversible error by denying him the right to cross-examine Wilson about the mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in cocaine. He argues that he was denied his constitutional right to explore Wilson's bias as a witness.
On direct examination, Wilson admitted that he received a deal from the State in exchange for his testimony in this case, including a recommendation for a reduction in sentence that would require him to serve ten years in prison. On cross-examination, the following transpired:
Before Wilson could answer, the trial judge admonished Vogleson's attorney for disregarding his instruction. Vogleson's attorney then asked additional questions on other subjects designed to explore Wilson's bias.
Vogleson argues that Hernandez v. State3 requires reversal. In Hernandez, we held that cross-examination of an accomplice regarding the deal he had made with the prosecution, including the potential sentence he could receive and the fact that he would not be eligible for parole, was constitutionally protected because it sought to show the witness's motive, bias or interest in cooperating with the State and testifying against Hernandez.4 The fact that he faced a sentence without eligibility for parole, or a mandatory minimum sentence, gave him much more incentive to give favorable testimony.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This guarantee applies to both federal and state criminal defendants.5 Implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation is the right of cross-examination, which is an essential and fundamental requirement for a fair trial.6
"Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested."7 Because the exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying is an important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination, the potential bias or partiality of a witness may always be explored at trial.8 "It is especially important in a case where a witness or an accomplice may have substantial reason to cooperate with the government that a defendant be permitted to search for an agreement between the government and the witness"9 and explore the details of any agreement.
Much of Wilson's deal with the State was revealed on direct examination. But the trial court completely precluded any testimony regarding the sentence Wilson would have received if he had not reached a deal with the State and had been convicted of the crimes for which he was indicted. By doing so, the trial court prevented the jury from considering the most important aspect of Wilson's deal—how much prison time he was avoiding by agreeing to cooperate with the State.
We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby "to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." [Cit.] [Vogleson] has met that burden here: A reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [Wilson's] credibility had [Vogleson's] counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed ... cross-examination.10
Because the trial court denied Vogleson his constitutionally protected right to explore Wilson's motive, bias and interest in cooperating with the State and testifying against Vogleson, we reverse.11
We previously addressed restrictions on cross-examination of an accomplice in Whitlock v. State12 and Ross v. State.13 In Whitlock, an accomplice testified that he had pled guilty to certain charges, but had not made a deal with the State. Defense counsel wanted to show that the accomplice could have received a maximum sentence of eighty years imprisonment if he had been convicted of the crimes charged in the indictment but was given only a minimum sentence of ten years. The court allowed counsel to show the crimes with which the accomplice had been charged and the counts that were dismissed, and that he received the "minimum sentence" for the crimes to which he pled guilty even though he could have received a "substantial amount of time" on the charges. The court would not let counsel inform the jury of the lengths of the minimum and maximum sentences. We held that the limitation on cross-examination...
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