Rossford Exempted Village School District v. State Board of Education, 88-LW-1597
| Decision Date | 12 May 1988 |
| Docket Number | 88-LW-1597,86AP-1166 |
| Parties | ROSSFORD EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant-Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Kolb Kolb & Kolb, and Matt Kolb, for appellant.
Anthony J. Celebreeze, Jr., Attorney General, Lauren M. Ross and Lawrence D. Pratt, for appellee State Board of Education.
Norman Hartsel Co., L.P.A., and Norman C. Hartsel, for appellees Jeffrey L. Drake, Barbara R. Drake, and Carmen Rudolph.
Appellant, Rossford Exempted Village School District, appeals from a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and raises the following assignment of error:
"The Common Pleas Court of Franklin County erred in dismissing this appeal on the ground that the action of the State Board of Education in transferring territory from one district to another was not judicially appealable."
On February 24, 1986, appellees, Jeffrey L. Drake, Barbara R. Drake and Carmen Rudolph, filed a petition pursuant to R.C. 3311.24 to transfer twenty-one acres of real property from the Rossford Exempted Village School District to the Perrysburg Exempted Village School District. The appellant, Rossford Exempted Village School District, opposed the transfer and requested a hearing pursuant to R.C. 119.09. The State Board of Education appointed a referee who conducted the hearing and recommended the proposed transfer. In September of 1986, the State Board of Education acted on the referee's recommendation and approved the transfer. Appellant appealed the decision of the State Board of Education to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, which dismissed the appeal, stating: "It appears the decision of the State Board of Education is a legislative act which is not arbitrary and is in accordance with law."
Appellant contends that the action of the State Board of Education in transferring territory from one district to another was judicially appealable, arguing that a decision by the State Board of Education to approve a transfer, rather than to deny one, affects property rights which result in a justiciable controversy, which renders the decision of the State Board of Education quasi-judicial in nature and, consequently, subject to review by the court. Appellant contends that previous case law should be narrowly limited. Even so, we are bound by decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court and will deviate from former decisions of this court only when manifestly necessary.
Section 4(B), Article 4, of the Ohio Constitution gives the courts of common pleas "original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law." The State Board of Education, an administrative agency by R.C. 3301.13, is made subject to R.C. 119.12, which provides for appeals by:
(A) "any party adversely affected by an order of an agency issued pursuant to an adjudication denying an applicant admission to an examination, or denying the issuance or renewal of a license, registration of licensee, or revoking or suspending a license * * * " [or]
(B) " * * * any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication. * * * " [Emphasis added.]
In Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, the third paragraph of the syllabus states that quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review. In Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 117 (hereinafter "Bd. of Edn."), the Supreme Court found constitutional R.C. 3311.06, which provides for State Board of Education approval of annexation of school district territory incidental to annexation of the same territory by a city or village, following Bd. of Edn. of Jefferson Local School District v. Bd. of Edn. of Columbus City School District (1962), 173 Ohio St. 130. In so doing, the court stated, at page 120:
Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Bd. of Edn. of Marion v. Bd. of Edn. of Elgin (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 152 (hereinafter "Marion"), quoted a portion of the above-quoted statement from the PER CURIAM opinion of Bd. of Edn. as a holding and found that it necessarily followed that a decision by the State Board of Education to disapprove a transfer not only is legislative but also is not subject to an R.C. 119.12 appeal, stating in the syllabus that:
"The act of the Ohio State Board of Education disapproving a transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 is a legislative act and, as such, is not appealable pursuant to R.C. 119.12."
This court in In re Transfer of Territory (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 78 (hereinafter "Transfer"), found that the functions and duties of the State Board of Education under R.C. 3311.06 are essentially the same as those under R.C. 3311.24, which provides for transfer of school district territory following a specified procedure, independent of any transfer of the territory for other purposes. That case held that an act of the State Board of Education disapproving a transfer of land pursuant to R.C. 3311.24 is similar to disapproval of a transfer pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 and, as such, is a legislative act, which is not appealable pursuant to R.C. 119.12.
Four weeks subsequent to the decision in Bd. of Edn., the Supreme Court in the PER CURIAM opinion in State, ex rel. Bell, v. Cambridge Bd. of Edn. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 316 (hereinafter "Bell"), stated at 318 with respect to an R.C. 3311.24 proceeding:
This court in Transfer commented upon the Supreme Court's holding in Bell by referring to it as "dictum," which "indicated that the aggrieved party may have had an appeal from a decision under R.C. 3311.24 pursuant to R.C. 119.12." This court also indicated that Bell was decided on other grounds.
We have some difficulty in ignoring the express holding in Bell that an R.C. 119.12 appeal can be taken by a board of education from an R.C. 3311.24 determination of the State Board of Education. The comment that Bell was decided upon other grounds is only partially accurate.
There were two issues determined by the Supreme Court in Bell. The first or "basic" issue was whether R.C. 3311.24 "vests discretionary authority in the Cambridge Board of Education, rather than a mandatory duty to adopt a resolution transferring the territory in question." The court held that once the state board approved the transfer, the Cambridge board had a mandatory duty. The second issue arguably arose only if the Supreme Court found a mandatory duty and dealt with the validity and sufficiency of the R.C. 3311.24 petition, which raised the issue of whether the proceedings were so defective as to render the state board approval voidable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court found to the effect that this issue could not be raised in mandamus because an adequate remedy by way of an R.C. 119.12 appeal from the state board approval was, or had been, available to the Cambridge Board of Education. Accordingly, it is difficult to find a basis to consider the express holding to be "dictum."
Although the R.C. 3311.24 Bell is difficult to reconcile with the contrary R.C. 3311.06 Bd. of Edn., the Bell decision was made four weeks later, so presumably the Supreme Court was aware of its R.C. 3311.06 Bd. of Edn. but did not wish to extend it to an R.C. 3311.24 proceeding. The comment in our decision in Transfer that the state board action occurred prior to the decision in Bd. of Edn. finding no R.C. 119.12 appeal from an R.C. 3311.06 determination is inappropriate since: (1) Bd. of Edn. would have no direct effect on an R.C. 3311.24 proceeding; (2) the time of the administrative action which is under direct review is of no significance in determining effect of a court decision occurring between the administrative action and direct court review thereof; and (3) Bd. of Edn. merely followed the holding of the much earlier decision in Jefferson Local, supra.
On the other hand, the holding of Bell is consistent with the comment in the opinion of Transfer, at 80, that:
" * * * [W]e find persuasive the village's argument that a decision of the State Board of Education on a territory transfer request pursuant to R.C. 3311.24 is an administrative, quasi-judicial decision * * *. As Justice Holmes emphasized in his dissenting opinion in that case [Bd. of Edn. of Marion v. Bd. of Edn. of Elgin, supra] the State Board of Education is not acting in a rule-making or quasi-legislative capacity when it considers an application for the transfer of school district territory. It also appears to us that the board is acting as an arbitrator of the claims of opposing parties in a quasi-judicial role. * * * "
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