Roszak v. Princess Cruises, Inc.
Decision Date | 30 August 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 64990,64990 |
Parties | ROSZAK et al., Appellants, v. PRINCESS CRUISES, INC., Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Pomerantz & Pomerantz Co., L.P.A., and David I. Pomerantz, Maple Heights, for appellants.
Douglas R. Denny, Cleveland, for appellee.
This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 25, the records from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and the briefs of counsel. Plaintiffs-appellants, Elizabeth and Casimer Roszak, timely appeal the decision of the lower court which granted the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant-appellee, Princess Cruises, Inc.
Appellants' amended complaint alleged that Mrs. Roszak, while a passenger on a vessel owned and/or operated by Princess Cruises, was injured, due to the negligence of Princess Cruises and/or its employees, when a fellow passenger fell on top of her. Princess Cruises duly answered and denied any allegations of negligence. As an affirmative defense, Princess Cruises asserted that the "plaintiff did not commence this action within one year as required by the passage contract which plaintiff entered into with defendant."
Princess Cruises moved for summary judgment on the ground that appellants' claim was time-barred by a clause in the passage contract limiting the time in which a passenger may file suit for injury against Princess Cruises to one year after the date of injury. Attached to Princess Cruises' motion is the affidavit of Mary Van Hyning, an employee of Princess Cruises. Van Hyning averred that:
The sample passage ticket is composed of seven full pages, including three front pages nominally titled, in red ink, "OFFICE COPY," "EMBARKATION COPY," and "PASSENGER COPY." Each of the front pages contains on the bottom left-hand corner the following notice, also in red ink:
The title to the passage ticket and the notice are the only provisions on the passage ticket in red ink.
On the last page of the passenger ticket is found the following time limitation for personal injury claims:
Appellants' brief in opposition to Princess Cruises' motion for summary judgment argued that appellants were not sufficiently placed on notice of the time limitation in the passenger ticket and that the terms of the passenger ticket do not apply to launch boats. Mrs. Roszak's affidavit was attached to her brief in opposition. Mrs. Roszak averred:
Princess Cruises filed a reply brief with a second affidavit of Mary Van Hyning attached thereto. Van Hyning averred that the launch upon which Mrs. Roszak claimed to have been injured was a launch owned and operated by Princess Cruises for the purpose of taking passengers to and from the ship. Van Hyning further averred that the passenger ticket issued to Mrs. Roszak covers her travel aboard the ship and its launches. Finally, all passengers were given cards for the purposes of identifying them as the ship's passengers, and such passengers were required to use these cards when boarding and debarking from the launches in order to prevent non-crew or non-passengers from gaining unauthorized access to the ship.
Appellants filed a motion to strike appellee's reply brief as being filed without seeking leave of court pursuant to Loc.R. 11 of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. Thereafter, appellee filed a motion for leave to file its reply brief.
Without ruling on appellants' motion to strike or appellee's motion for leave, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Princess Cruises. The next day, January 7, 1992, the trial court granted appellee's motion for leave and held appellants' motion to strike as moot. 1 Appellants timely appeal, raising the following sole assignment of error for our review:
"The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant-appellee because genuine issues of material fact exist, and defendant-appellee was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
In appellants' sole assignment of error, appellants argue the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellants contend that the time limitation in which to file against Princess Cruises as contained on the passage ticket is not "conspicuous" or "eye-catching" so as to put them on notice of such time limitation. Appellants also argue that the time limitation on the passage ticket does not apply to incidents occurring on a launch boat.
The validity and enforceability of such time limitation as contained on the instant passage ticket appears to be of first impression for Ohio courts. See, e.g., Petruzzi v. Casey (Apr. 26, 1990), Franklin App. No. 89AP-1508, unreported, 1990 WL 54266. However, the passage ticket in question is a maritime contract and, therefore, its interpretation is governed by maritime law. The Moses Taylor (1867), 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 18 L.Ed. 397; Lubick v. Travel Serv., Inc. (D.C.V.I.1983), 573 F.Supp. 904, 906. Section 183b(a), Title 46, U.S.Code 2 allows owners, operators, and agents of seagoing vessels to limit their liability for personal injury claims to suits in which notice has been given to the carrier within six months of the injury and where the suits have been commenced within one year. See Barbachym v. Costa Line, Inc. (C.A.6, 1983), 713 F.2d 216. However, federal courts decline to enforce a sea carrier's use of a contractual limitation period contained within a passage ticket unless the passage ticket contract sufficiently alerts the passengers to the restriction of their rights. Spataro v Kloster Cruise, Ltd. (C.A.2, 1990), 894 F.2d 44, 45. A "reasonable effort" must have been made to warn passengers of the restriction. Lousararian v. Royal Caribbean Corp. (C.A.1, 1991), 951 F.2d 7, 8; Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Anzioni Di Navigazione (C.A.2, 1968), 388 F.2d 11; DeNicola v. Cunard Line, Ltd. (C.A.1, 1981), 642 F.2d 5; and Barbachym, supra.
The specific inquiry into whether a sea carrier has met the standard of reasonableness is set forth in the following two-pronged test:
Lousararian, supra, 951 F.2d at 8-9.
The reasonableness of a passage ticket in particular circumstances is a question of law, the determination of which, barring a genuine issue of material fact, is appropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage. Id.; DeNicola,...
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