U.S. v. Miller
| Decision Date | 25 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:02 cr 722.,3:02 cr 722. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Mark Steven MILLER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Betty J. Konen, James L. Morford, Lisa H. Johnson, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Ohio, Cleveland, OH, Damon C. Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Torts Branch, Civil Division, Washington, DC, Stephen Zachary, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Dallas, TX, Thomas A. Karol, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Ohio Four Seagate, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of the United States of America to dismiss Petitioner John M. McNally, Jr.' claims for survival damages and punitive damages. (Doc. No. 439). Petitioner has responded (Doc. No. 463), the Government has replied (Doc. No. 466), and Petitioner has filed a sur-reply (Doc. No. 468). For the following reasons, the Government's motion is granted.
On May 11, 2001, Maevelle P. McNally took a dinner cruise with her family, including her husband John McNally and her son, Petitioner John McNally, Jr., aboard the M/V Stardancer, a casino gaming vessel operating out of Little River, South Carolina, which was owned by Stardancer Casino, Inc. During the cruise, Mrs. McNally took ill and died of a heart attack. Petitioner became the administrator of her estate.
On April 11, 2002, this Court enjoined any person with an interest in the assets of Stardancer Casino, Inc., from encumbering any of its assets. On January 12, 2003, the United States government seized the M/V Stardancer and sold it. On July 8, 2003, the Court ordered the proceeds forfeited to the United States. On November 10, 18, and 26, 2003, the Government published notice of the Court's forfeiture order in USA Today, in certain markets, instructing anyone with interests in the forfeited property to file a petition within thirty days of the final notice's publication.
On February 2, 2004, Petitioner asserted a maritime tort lien against the proceeds of the M/V Stardancer. The petition sets forth both survivorship and wrongful death claims, and seeks punitive damages. The Government moves for summary judgment on the survivorship claim, calling it untimely, and on the claim for punitive damages, which are not available in a maritime tort claim such as this. The Government does not seek summary judgment on Petitioner's wrongful death claim.
The Government claims the ticket Mrs. McNally accepted prior to boarding the M/V Stardancer contained a contractual, one-year time limitation for filing certain types of actions, including Petitioner's survivorship claim, and that the provision applies here. Since the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the Government bears the burden of proof on that issue. The Court concludes that, on the record as it stands, no reasonable jury could find Petitioner's survivorship claim timely: the Government has presented uncontroverted evidence that the McNallys received the tickets with the limitation clause, and the clause applies here, Petitioner's many arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. Additionally, the Government is correct that punitive damages are not available in this maritime tort action.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the non-movant's claim. Id. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant meets this burden, the opposing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Harris v. General Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment must be entered against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Williams v. Belknap, 154 F.Supp.2d 1069 (E.D.Mich.2001) (citing 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987)). However, "`at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,'" Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 227 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505); therefore, "[t]he Court is not required or permitted to judge the evidence or make findings or fact." Williams, 154 F.Supp.2d at 1071. The purpose of summary judgment "is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried." Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 928, 930 (S.D.Ohio 1999). Ultimately, this Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Atchley v. RK Co., 224 F.3d 537, 539 (6th Cir.2000).
Finally, as the Sixth Circuit has explained:
Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 258-259 (6th Cir.1986) (quoting W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under The Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)).
The owner of a sea-going vessel may limit by contract the time for filing a claim based on bodily injury to one-year from the date of the injury. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(a). The Government claims the McNallys were given tickets when they boarded the M/V Stardancer that contained such a one-year limitation clause, that the clause is enforceable here, and that the McNallys filed their claim after the period of limitation. In response, the Petitioner raises a multitude of arguments. First, he claims the clause printed on the tickets is not enforceable because Stardancer Casino, Inc., did not do all it reasonably could to inform the McNallys of its attempt to limit the time for filing an action. Second, Petitioner claims the Government has insufficient evidence showing the McNallys actually received the tickets. Third, Petitioner claims the clause on its face does not limit the time in which to bring in rem claims like this one, only in personam claims against the Company. Fourth, Petitioner claims § 183b does not apply here, and therefore South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations applies. Fifth, Petitioner claims that even if the limitation clause does apply, his claim was timely. Finally, he takes issue with the Government's notification of potential claimants regarding the Stardancer forfeiture. The Government's evidence is sufficient to meet its burden, and all of Plaintiff's arguments fail. The Court concludes that the Government is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Contractual limitations printed on boarding tickets are enforceable when the carrier shows "that it did all that it reasonably could to warn the passengers of its limited liability." Barbachym v. Costa Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1983). The Barbachym court explained:
Generally, courts have held that a carrier has not made a "reasonable" effort to warn passengers of its liability limitations unless the face of the ticket contains conspicuous language directing the passenger's attention to the contractual terms contained in other material furnished by the carrier. In contrast, cases in which the carrier's liability limitations have been honored generally involve tickets...
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