Roten v. City of Spring Hill, No. M2008-02087-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 8/26/2009)
| Decision Date | 26 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. M2008-02087-COA-R3-CV.,M2008-02087-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | ROB ROTEN AND JERROLD SWAFFORD v. THE CITY OF SPRING HILL, TENNESSEE, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS PLANNING COMMISSION, AND IS INVESTMENT, INC. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County; No. 08-092; Robert L. Jones, Chancellor.
Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed .
George A. Dean, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Rob Roten and Jerrold Swafford.
Heather C. Stewart and Douglas Berry, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, City of Spring Hill and IS Investment, Inc.
Richard H. Dinkins, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Patricia J. Cottrell, P.J., M.S., and Andy D. Bennett, J. joined.
Residents of the City of Spring Hill brought common law writ of certiorari challenging the City Planning Commission's authority to approve site development plans for proposed construction within the City. The Chancery Court upheld the action of the Planning Commission. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
This action stems from the City of Spring Hill Planning Commission's approval of a site development plan for the proposed construction of several apartment buildings ("the project") as part of a greater mixed-use development. The property on which the project is planned is zoned B-4 (Central Business District). The development of apartment buildings is permitted as of right within a B-4 district, but a site development plan must be submitted to and approved by the Planning Commission in accordance with the procedures and standards set forth in Article VI, § 5.8 of Spring Hill's Zoning Ordinance ("SHZO") before the building inspector will issue a permit allowing construction to begin.
Between December 2007 and March 2008, the Planning Commission held three public hearings to review the project's site plans and hear public comments. Petitioners, residents of Spring Hill who reside in the "immediate vicinity" of the project, participated in the public hearings and spoke against approval of the project's site development plan. Following the Planning Commission's approval of the project's "sketch plan" in December 2007, Petitioners filed a Writ of Certiorari on February 8, 2008, in the Chancery Court for Maury County asking the court to invalidate the action of the Planning Commission because, according to Petitioners, the Planning Commission lacks the authority to approve site development plans. Petitioners amended their petition on March 3, following the Planning Commission's approval of the "preliminary site development plan" on February 11. The Planning Commission approved the project's final site plan on March 10, and Petitioners subsequently filed a second amended petition on May 9.
The trial court upheld the action of the Planning Commission finding "the City has the authority under the Municipal Zoning Enabling Statutes to delegate to the Planning Commission the power to ensure compliance with its zoning ordinance through a site plan approval process" and, further, "the Planning Commission has the authority, express and implied, to approve site plans for projects such as the one at issue, and the Planning Commission is the appropriate panel to decide such issues." Petitioners appeal.
Judicial review of an action by an administrative body, such as the Spring Hill Planning Commission, is by way of the common law writ of certiorari. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101; see also Demonbreun v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 206 S.W.3d 42, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 639 (Tenn.1990). Under the common law writ of certiorari, review is limited to whether the administrative body exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101; Demonbreun, 206 S.W.3d at 46; Massey v. Shelby County Retirement Bd., 813 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Action that can be characterized as arbitrary or capricious or that is unsupported by material evidence also warrants reversal or modification. Demonbreun, 206 S.W.3d at 46; Massey v. Shelby County Retirement Bd., 813 S.W.2d at 464; McCallen, 786 S.W.2d at 642. Our scope of review is no broader than that of the trial court. Demonbreun, 206 S.W.3d at 46.
The Respondents,1 the City and project developer, ask this Court to dismiss the Petitioners' writ of certiorari for lack standing to bring this action. The Petitioners assert that the issue of standing was waived "because it was not raised at any point below," but that, in any event, they have standing to challenge the Planning Commission's authority to approve site development plans because they live in the immediate vicinity of the planned construction. While the trial court did not address the issue of standing in its judgment, the developer's counsel indicated during oral argument before this Court that they had raised the issue during the trial court's hearing. In the trial court, there were no pleadings submitted by the City or the developer and there is no transcript of the trial court's hearing. Since both parties briefed the issue on appeal, we will review the issue of whether Petitioners have standing to pursue the present action.
The doctrine of standing is employed by courts to determine whether a particular litigant has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to warrant the exercise of the court's power on its behalf. See American Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)); Metro. Air Research Testing Auth., Inc. v. The Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cty, 842 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). The doctrine, "grounded upon `concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society,'" precludes courts from adjudicating an action when a party's rights have not been invaded or infringed. See Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 498). In order to establish standing a plaintiff must show: (1) a distinct and palpable injury that is more than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) that the alleged injury is capable of redress by a favorable decision of a court. American Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d at 620.
The primary focus of a standing inquiry is on the party, not on the merits of the claim; however, whether a party has standing "often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." Metro. Air Research Testing Auth., Inc., 842 S.W.2d at 615. Thus, a "careful judicial examination of the complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted," is required. Id. When the claimed injury involves the violation of a statute, as here, the court must determine "whether the . . . statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 500). The inquiry, then, is whether the plaintiff's complaint falls within "the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).
In land use cases, the concept of "aggrievement" supplies the "distinct and palpable injury" required to have standing to maintain an action challenging a land use decision. City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) perm. appeal den. (Sept. 13, 2004). Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 authorizes persons who are "aggrieved" to appeal "any final order or judgment of any board or commission functioning under the laws of this state" to the courts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101; see also Roberts v. State Bd. of Equalization, 557 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn. 1977). This court has held that the extension of the authority to appeal and to seek judicial review to all persons who are `aggrieved' reflects a legislative intention to ease the strict application of the customary standing principles." City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d at 57 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 1783, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998). Consequently, Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 should be interpreted broadly rather than narrowly. While Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 does not expressly limit standing to residents or property owners of the area over which the local zoning board or planning commission has jurisdiction, to be "aggrieved" a party must at least be able to show "a special interest in the agency's final decision or that it is subject to a special injury not common to the public generally." Wood v. Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cty Gov't, 196 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Respondents contend that because Petitioners were not adversely affected by the procedural requirements of the Planning Commission they have failed to prove that they were "aggrieved" or suffered a distinct and palpable injury not common to the public generally. The Appellees contend that under the facts here only the developer, who was subject to the Planning Commission's review and approval of its site development plan, was in a position to be adversely affected by the Planning Commission's site plan review and approval process. We do not agree. Petitioners reside in the "immediate vicinity" of the project and participated in the Planning Commission's public hearings regarding the project's site development plan approval. Given their proximity to the project as well as the scale of the project and its economic and environmental impact on the neighboring area, Petitioners have a special interest in the project's...
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