Rothman v. Rothman

• Decision Date: 05 June 1974
• Citation: 320 A.2d 496,65 N.J. 219
• Parties: Irene ROTHMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. George Irving ROTHMAN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. . Re
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 219

65 N.J. 219

320 A.2d 496

Irene ROTHMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. George Irving ROTHMAN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Reargued Jan. 7, 1974.

Decided June 5, 1974.

Howard Stern, Paterson, for plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant (Shavick, Stern, Schotz, Steiger & Croland, Paterson, attorneys; Stern, of counsel; Samuel D. Bornstein, Paterson, and Donald S. Coburn, East Orange, on the brief).

Alfred C. Clapp, Newark, for defendant-appellant and cross-respondent (Schneider, Schneider & Behr, Teaneck, attorneys; Clapp, of counsel).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

MOUNTAIN, J.

The trial court granted plaintiff, Irene Rothman, a divorce on the ground of adultery. The counterclaim filed by defendant, George Rothman, seeking divorce on the no-fault ground of an 18 month separation with no prespect of reconciliation was dismissed. Thereafter the trial judge took testimony and heard argument on the issues of alimony and equitable distribution of marital assets. His conclusions were set forth in an oral, unreported opinion. Both parties appealed from the ensuing judgment and we granted certification on motion while the case was pending unheard in the Appellate Division. 63 N.J. 505, 308 A.2d 670 (1973).

On this appeal we are not asked to review the grant of a divorce to plaintiff or the denial of a divorce to defendant. Solely in issue here are the terms of the judgment below that relate to the allocation of marital assets.

The trial judge found that defendant had a minimum net worth of $4,600,000; plaintiff's assets were valued at $400,000. Defendant's net income after taxes was found to be $190,000. The judgment of the court directed defendant to pay plaintiff $45,000 a year by way of alimony and to turn over to her as an equitable share of the marital assets the sum of $700,000. Of this amount, $100,000 was to take the form of a conveyance of defendant's undivided one-half interest in what had been the marital home in Englewood. Prior to divorce the parties had held title to this real estate as tenants by the entirety and it was determined that the property had a value of $200,000. ¹ Defendant was given one year within which to tender to the plaintiff assets worth $600,000. The delay was occasioned by the unliquid nature of most of defendant's holdings. Plaintiff was given a security lien upon all of his real estate pending satisfaction of the obligation.

Two issues are presented for disposition. First it is argued by defendant that the grant of power to effect an equitable distribution of marital assets between husband and wife should be interpreted as having prospective application only. ² Correlatively it is urged that if the statute is interpreted retrospectively, as applying to any property interest acquired before that date, it must be stricken as unconstitutional because it would then deprive the defendant of property without due process of law. Plaintiff opposes these contentions, taking the position that the Legislature intended the statute to apply to all eligible property owned by a husband or wife at the time of the initiation of a divorce action, provided the case was tried on or after September 13, 1971. As so construed, plaintiff urges, the enactment suffers from no constitutional infirmity.

Secondly, both parties vigorously object to the conclusions reached by the trial court as to the net worth of each, and as to the allocation of assets between them as determined by the court.

We consider first the meaning of the statute. It seems clear that the construction urged by plaintiff more accurately reflects legislative intent and certainly would, in practice, be preferable to that for which defendant contends. Momentarily ignoring constitutional compulsions, and viewing the issue simply as one of statutory construction, we find ourselves unable to believe that the Legislature intended its grant of power to undertake an equitable distribution of marital assets to apply solely to property acquired on or after the effective date of the act. Were this construction to be adopted, it would, in each case, become necessary to determine the date of acquisition of each asset acquired during marriage, often a difficult if not impossible task. A further question would arise should the particular property interest under consideration, though acquired after the effective date of the act, have been purchased with, or received in exchange for money or other property owned before that date. Moreover, if defendant's contention were adopted, it has been estimated, apparently without exaggeration, that the full effect of the statute would not be felt for at least a generation. ³

In support of his position defendant points to a number of cases in this State which stand for the proposition that in construing a statute its terms will not be given retroactive effect 'unless they are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intent of the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied.' Kopczynski v. County of Camden, 2 N.J. 419, 424, 66 A.2d 882, 884 (1949). See also, LaParre v. Y.M.C.A. of the Oranges, 30 N.J. 225, 229, 152 A.2d 340 (1959); In re Glen Rock, 25 N.J. 241, 249, 135 A.2d 506 (1957); Nichols v. Board of Education, Jersey City, 9 N.J. 241, 248, 87 A.2d 894 (1952). We continue to believe that these statements express a sound rule of statutory interpretation. But it is no more than a rule of statutory interpretation, and all such rules have a single purpose--to aid the court in its quest for legislative intent. Where, as we find here to be the case, supervening considerations clearly compel a contrary determination, this, like all other rules of statutory construction must give way. We find it impossible to credit the Legislature with the intent urged by defendant. Rather we hold that the statutory provision is intended to apply with respect to all property acquired during the marriage, whether before or after the effective date of enactment.

As so interpreted, is the legislation unconstitutional Admittedly the effect of the statute, as so construed, is to make eligible for distribution, property which, prior to the act, could not have been subjected to such treatment. Does this amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Art. 1, par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution? ⁴

Of course, not all retrospective statutes are unconstitutional. A traditional formulation of the applicable rule states that retroactive legislation is constitutionally offensive only to the extent that it modifies or abrogates 'vested rights.' But, as has been noted,

the term 'vested right' is conclusory--a right is vested when it has been so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by statute. (Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 692, 696 (1960))

A state may, in the exercise of the police power, enact a statute to promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Such a statute, because of retroactive application or otherwise, may diminish in value or totally destroy an individual's right, whether in property as such or arising our of contract, provided that the public interest to be promoted sufficiently outweighs in importance the private right which is impaired. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 72 S.Ct. 405, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). In these cases, as in many others as well, the court has, after examining the importance of the public interest served by the statute and comparing it with and balancing it against the quality and value of the right affected by the retroactive legislation, reached the conclusion that the state statute in question represented a valid exercise of the police power, despite the fact that in each case there was some clear incursion upon individual private rights. See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, Supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 697 et seq.; Tennis, Retroactive Application of California Community Property Statutes, 18 Stan.L.Rev. 514, 518--519 (1966); Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Northwestern Univ.L.Rev. 540, 561 (1956).

The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.

The reports of our decisions abound with cases in which the citizen, individual or corporate, has vainly invoked the Fourteenth Amendment in resistance to necessary and appropriate exertion of the police power. (Nebbia v. New York, Supra, 291 U.S. at 525, 54 S.Ct. at 510--511, 78 L.Ed. at 950 (1933))

This Court has repeatedly sought to indicate the expansive thrust of the police power of the State when appropriately exercised. In Reingold v. Harper, 6 N.J. 182, 78 A.2d 54 (1951) Justice Heher described this power in eloquent and comprehensive terms.

The range of the State's discretion in promoting the security and well-being of the public 'accords with the subject of its exercise.' Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53...