West Coast Hotel Co v. Parrish

• Decision Date: 29 March 1937
• Docket Number: No. 293,293
• Parties: WEST COAST HOTEL CO. v. PARRISH et ux
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

300 U.S. 379

57 S.Ct. 578

81 L.Ed. 703

WEST COAST HOTEL CO.

v PARRISH et ux.

No. 293.

Argued Dec. 16, 17, 1936.

Decided March 29, 1937.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.

Messrs. E. L. Skeel and John W. Roberts, both of Seattle, Wash., for appellant.

Messrs. W. A. Toner, of Olympia, Wash., and

[Argument of Counsel from page 380 intentionally omitted] Sam M. Driver, of Wenatchee, Wash., for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 381-386 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question of the constitutional validity of the minimum wage law of the state of Washington.

The act, entitled 'Minimum Wages for Women,' authorizes the fixing of minimum wages for women and minors. Laws 1913 (Washington) c. 174, p. 602, Remington's Rev.Stat.(1932) § 7623 et seq. It provides:

'Section 1. The welfare of the State of Washington demands that women and minors be protected from conditions of labor which have a pernicious effect on their health and norals. The State of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power declares that inadequate wages and unsanitary conditions of labor exert such pernicious effect.

'Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful to employ women or minors in any industry or occupation within the State of Washington under conditions of labor detrimental to their health or morals; and it shall be unlawful to employ women workers in any industry within the State of Washington at wages which are not adequate for their maintenance.

'Sec. 3. There is hereby created a commission to be known as the 'Industrial Welfare Commission' for the State of Washington, to establish such standards of wages and conditions of labor for women and minors employed within the State of Washington, as shall be held hereunder to be reasonable and not detrimental to health and morals, and which shall be sufficient for the decent maintenance of women.'

Further provisions required the commission to ascertain the wages and conditions of labor of women and minors within the state. Public hearings were to be held. If after investigation the commission found that in any occupation, trade, or industry the wages paid to women were 'inadequate to supply them necessary cost of living and to maintain the workers in health,' the commission was empowered to call a conference of representatives of employers and employees together with disinterested persons representing the public. The conference was to recommend to the commission, on its request, an estimate of a minimum wage adequate for the purpose above stated, and on the approval of such a recommendation it became the duty of the commission to issue an obligatory order fixing minimum wages. Any such order might be reopened and the question reconsidered with the aid of the former conference or a new one. Special licenses were authorized for the employment of women who were 'physically defective or crippled by age or otherwise,' and also for apprentices, at less than the prescribed minimum wage.

By a later act the Industrial Welfare Commission was abolished and its duties were assigned to the Industrial Welfare Committee consisting of the Director of Labor and Industries, the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance the Supervisor of Industrial Relations, theIndustrial Statistician, and the Supervisor of Women in Industry. Laws 1921 (Washington) c. 7, p. 12, Remington's Rev.Stat.(1932) §§ 10840, 10893.

The appellant conducts a hotel. The appellee Elsie Parrish was employed as a chambermaid and (with her husband) brought this suit to recover the difference between the wages paid her and the minimum wage fixed pursuant to the state law. The minimum wage was $14.50 per week of 48 hours. The appellant challenged the act as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of the state, reversing the trial court, sustained the statute and directed judgment for the plaintiffs. Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 55 P.(2d) 1083. The case is here on appeal.

The appellant relies upon the decision of this Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238, which held invalid the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act (40 Stat. 960) which was attacked under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. On the argument at bar, counsel for the appellees attempted to distinguish the Adkins Case upon the ground that the appellee was employed in a hotel and that the business of an innkeeper was affected with a public interest. That effort at distinction is obviously futile, as it appears that in one of the cases ruled by the Adkins opinion the employee was a woman employed as an elevator operator in a hotel. Adkins v. Lyons, 261 U.S. 525, at page 542, 43 S.Ct. 394, 395, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238.

The recent case of Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 56 S.Ct. 918, 80 L.Ed. 1347, 103 A.L.R. 1445, came here on certiorari to the New York court which had held the New York minimum wage act for women to be invalid. A minority of this Court thought that the New York statute was distinguishable in a material feature from that involved in the Adkins Case and that for that and other reasons the New York statute should be sustained. But the Court of Appeals of New York had said that it found no material difference between the two statutes and this Court held that the 'meaning of the statute' as fixed by the decision of the state court 'must be accepted here as if the meaning had been specifically expressed in the enactment.' 298 U.S. 587, at page 609, 56 S.Ct. 918, 922, 80 L.Ed. 1347, 103 A.L.R. 1445. That view led to the affirmance by this Court of the judgment in the Morehead Case, as the Court considered that the only question before it was whether the Adkins Case was distinguishable and that reconsideration of that decision had not been sought. Upon that point the Court said: 'The petition for the writ sought review upon the ground that this case (Morehead) is distinguishable from that one (Adkins). No application has been made for reconsideration of the constitutional question there decided. The validity of the principles upon which that decision rests is not challenged. This court confines itself to the ground upon which the writ was asked or granted. * * * Here the review granted was no broader than sought by the petitioner. * * * He is not entitled and does not ask to be heard upon the question whether the Adkins Case should be overruled. He maintains that it may be distinguished on the ground that the statutes are vitally dissimilar.' 298 U.S. 587, at pp. 604, 605, 56 S.Ct. 918, 920, 80 L.Ed. 1347, 103 A.L.R. 1445.

We think that the question which was not deemed to be open in the Morehead Case is open and is necessarily presented here. The Supreme Court of Washington has upheld the minimum wage statute of that state. It has decided that the statute is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. In reaching that conclusion, the state court has invoked principles long established by this Court in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state court has refused to regard the decision in the Adkins Case as determinative and has pointed to our decisions both before and since that case as justifying its position. We are of the opinion that this ruling of the state court demands on our part a re-examination of the Adkins Case. The importance of the question, in which many states having similar laws are concerned, the close division by which the decision in the Adkins Case was reached, and the economic conditions which have supervened, and in the light of which the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of the state must be considered, make it not only appropriate, but we think imperative, that in deciding the present case the subject should receive fresh consideration.

The history of the litigation of this question may be briefly stated. The minimum wage statute of Washington was enacted over twenty-three years ago. Prior to the decision in the instant case, it had twice been held valid by the Supreme Court of the state. Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 P. 1037; Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 P. 595. The Washington statute is essentially the same as that enacted in Oregon in the same year. Laws 1913 (Oregon) c. 62, p. 92. The validity of the latter act was sustained by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743, L.R.A.1917C, 944, Ann.Cas.1916A, 217, and Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Or. 261, 141 P. 158. These cases, after reargument, were affirmed here by an equally divided court, in 1917. 243 U.S. 629, 37 S.Ct. 475, 61 L.Ed. 937. The law of Oregon thus continued in effect. The District of Columbia Minimum Wage Law (40 Stat. 960) was enacted in 1918. The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of the District in the Adkins Case. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals of the District first affirmed that ruling, but on rehearing reversed it and the case came before this Court in 1923. The judgment of the Court of Appeals holding the act invalid was affirmed, but with Chief Justice Taft, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Sanford dissenting, and Mr. Justice Brandeis taking no part. The dissenting opinions took the ground that the decision was at variance with the principles which this Court had frequently announced and applied. In 1925 and 1927, the similar ninimum wage statutes of Arizona and Arkansas were held invalid upon the authority of the Adkins Case. The Justices who had dissented in that case bowed to the ruling and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented. Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530, 46 S.Ct. 22, 70 L.Ed. 396; Donham v. West-Nelson Co., 273 U.S. 657, 47 S.Ct. 343, 71 L.Ed. 825. The question did not come before us again until the last term in the Morehead Case, as already...