Rotondi v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd.

• Citation: 977 N.E.2d 1042,463 Mass. 644
• Decision Date: 29 October 2012
• Docket Number: SJC–11068.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: Michael J. ROTONDI v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another.

463 Mass. 644

977 N.E.2d 1042

Michael J. ROTONDI

v.CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another.¹

SJC–11068.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 5, 2012.

Decided Oct. 29, 2012.

Walter M. Foster, Boston, for the plaintiff.

Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for Contributory Retirement Appeal Board.

Michael Sacco for retirement board of Stoneham.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

CORDY, J.

This case comes before us on the plaintiff's application for direct appellate review of a decision of a judge in the Superior Court affirming a decision of the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB). It requires us to decide whether the $200 fixed annual compensation threshold set forth in G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) ( d ), applies to elected officials who are otherwise eligible to become members of the contributory retirementsystem for public employees and whether health insurance contributions and professional association dues paid on behalf of such an official are to be considered as “[fixed] annual compensation” for the purposes of this subsection. Because we conclude that the $200 threshold applies to “any person,” including an elected official, otherwise eligible for membership under G.L. c. 32, and the value of health insurance contributions and association dues does not qualify as “[fixed] annual compensation,” we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

1. Michael J. Rotondi was elected town moderator of the town of Stoneham (town) in April, 1993, and was regularly reelected to that position until April, 2011. From 1993 to 1999, he earned one hundred dollars per year as town moderator. In 1999, his salary increased to $200.² In addition to his salary, Rotondi received health insurance through the town.³

In July, 2001, Rotondi became a member of the State retirement system as a full-time employee of the Department of Environmental Protection. In December, 2001, he requested to join the town's contributory retirement system and purchase credit for his past eight years of service as an elected town moderator.⁴ On January 23, 2002, the retirement board of Stoneham (board) denied his request on the ground that he had not applied for membership within ninety days of his election as required by G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) ( a ) (vi). Accordingly, within ninety days of his reelection as town moderator in April, 2003, Rotondi reapplied for membership. At this time, the board deferred action on Rotondi's application and asked its counsel to consider the applicability of the “two hundred dollars or less” rule set forth in G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) ( d ), to elected officials like Rotondi. Around the same time, Rotondi sought the opinion of the public employee retirement administration commission (PERAC) regarding his eligibility to join the system as an elected official earning exactly $200 per year. In a letter to Rotondi and a memorandum to all retirement boards, PERAC asserted that it has “long opined” that G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) ( a ) (vi), provides that “a compensated elected official is entitled to membership in the appropriate retirement system regardless of the amount of his or her compensation,” and the “two hundred dollars or less” limitation in § 3(2) ( d ) was not intended to apply to elected officials. Nevertheless, relying on the advice of its own counsel, the board voted on July 29, 2003, to deny Rotondi's application on the ground that he did not earn more than $200 per year in his position as town moderator. Rotondi appealed from the decision to CRAB pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 16(4). CRAB referred the matter to the division of administrative law appeals for a hearing. On October 25, 2004, an administrative magistrate affirmed the board's decision. Rotondi appealed to CRAB, which affirmed the magistrate's decision. At this time, PERAC moved to intervene; both PERAC and Rotondi filed motions for reconsideration; and CRAB reaffirmed its original decision. Pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14, Rotondi sought judicial review of CRAB's decision in the Superior Court. PERAC filed a separate action seeking review of the same decision, and on the parties' joint motion the cases were consolidated.⁵ CRAB then filed a motion for remand to allow CRAB to examine the legislative history of § 3(2) ( d ) in more detail and reconsider its decision. A Superior Court judge allowed the motion, and after reevaluating its analysis, CRAB affirmed its original decision by a one-to-one vote.⁶ The case returned to the Superior Court, where Rotondi and the board filed cross motions for judgment on the pleadings. By memorandum of decision and order, the judge denied Rotondi's motion for judgment on the pleadings, allowed the board's motion, and affirmed CRAB's decision. Judgments entered on February 15, 2011.

Throughout the litigation and in this appeal, Rotondi makes two principal arguments: that as an elected official, he is exempt from the $200 threshold set forth in G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) ( d ); and even if subject to the threshold, his annual compensation regularly exceeded $200 based on the value of his health insurance benefits and his town-paid membership dues in the Massachusetts Moderators Association.

2. In reviewing CRAB's decision that G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) ( d ), applies to any person, including elected officials, who apply for membership in a public retirement system, we are required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7).⁷ See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 658–659, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006); Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 241–242, 850 N.E.2d 533 (2006); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 618–619, 682 N.E.2d 624 (1997). We set aside a CRAB decision only if it is legally erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence. See Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 333, 344, 974 N.E.2d 46 (2012); Retirement Bd. of Salem v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 453 Mass. 286, 289, 901 N.E.2d 131 (2009), and cases cited. Where the issue is ultimately one of statutory interpretation, however, we exercise de novo review as we do for all questions of law. See Pelonzi v. Retirement Bd. of Beverly, 451 Mass. 475, 478 n. 8, 886 N.E.2d 707 (2008); Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 657, 856 N.E.2d 799;Plymouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 426 Mass. 1, 5, 686 N.E.2d 188 (1997).

We begin with the language of the statute, “the principal source of insight into the legislative purpose.” Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977). “A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result.” Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001). “Courts must ascertain the intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates, and courts must interpret the statute so as to render the legislation effective, consonant with reason and common sense.” Cote–Whitacre v. Department of Pub. Health, 446 Mass. 350, 358, 844 N.E.2d 623 (2006) (Spina, J., concurring).

General Laws c. 32, § 3(2), which governs eligibility for membership in the contributory retirement system for public employees, provides, in relevant part:

“( a ) Membership in a system as a member in service ... shall comprise the following persons:

“...

“(vi) Any person hereafter elected by popular vote to a state, county or municipal office or position who files with the board on a prescribed form a written application for membership within ninety days after the date of assuming office; provided, that a member becoming an elected official shall retain his membership and an elected official who is a member shall remain a member upon his re-election or upon his election or appointment to any other position which would otherwise entitle him to membership.

“...

“( d ) In all cases involving part-time, provisional, temporary, temporary provisional, seasonal or intermittent employmentor service of any employee in any governmental unit, including such employment or service of any state official, the board shall have and exercise full jurisdiction to determine such employee's eligibility for membership; provided, that any person holding a position for which the annual compensation is fixed in an amount of two hundred dollars or less shall not be eligible for membership except by vote of the board ...” (emphasis added).

The main question is whether G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) ( d ), applies to elected officials. This debate necessarily turns on the meaning of the words “any person” in § 3(2) ( d ), and whether that condition is intended to apply only to the types of individuals listed in the antecedent clause—i.e., part-time, provisional, temporary provisional, or temporary employees—or whether it applies to literally “any person” in the retirement system under any of the membership categories set out in G.L. c. 32, § 3(2).⁸ Rotondi claims that § 3(2) ( d ) cannot and does not limit the membership rights of elected officials, because § 3(2) ( a ) (vi) automatically confers membership on elected officials. This is incorrect. General Laws c. 32, § 3(2) ( a ), establishes several categories of membership in a public retirement system. Elected officials are but one category of membership. Section 3(2) ( a ) merely establishes, as a threshold matter, categories of individuals who are generally eligible to participate in the public retirement system. It does not exempt elected officials, or any other category of membership, from limitations imposed by other provisions of G.L. c. 32, including the condition in § 3(2) ( d ) affecting “any person” whose “annual compensation is fixed in an...