Roundhouse Const. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1976
• Citation: 365 A.2d 393,170 Conn. 155
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ROUNDHOUSE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. TELESCO MASONS SUPPLIES COMPANY, INC., et al.

Page 393

365 A.2d 393

170 Conn. 155

ROUNDHOUSE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. TELESCO MASONS SUPPLIES COMPANY, INC., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Jan. 27, 1976.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 12, 1976. See 97 S.Ct. 246.

David S. Grossman, Brookfield, with whom, on the brief, was sidney Burger, Ridgefield, for appellant (plaintiff).

Herbert V. Camp, Jr., Ridgefield, for appellees (defendants Fischer).

William W. Sprague, Hartford, filed a brief as amicus curiae.

Before HOUSE, C.J., and COTTER, LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI and MacDONALD, JJ.

HOUSE, Chief Justice.

Our first opinion in this case is reported in 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778. We found no error in the judgment of the Superior Court for Fairfield County (Berdon, J.) which, in an action for the foreclosure of a merchanic's lien, rendered judgment for the defendants on a counterclaim and cross complaint which sought an invalidation of the plaintiff's lien and an injunction to restrain the imposition of the lien. In sustaining the judgment of the trial court, we commented: 'The court, filing a well-reasoned memorandum of decision, found the Connecticut mechanic's lien statutes ¹ unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States and article first, § 10, of the constitution of Connecticut and rendered judgment enjoining the plaintiff and the other four lienor defendants from maintaining their mechanics' liens on the Fischer property and declaring the liens to be invalid.'

Upon the issuance of our decision, the plaintiff petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and on that petition that court entered the following order: 'The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Connecticut to consider whether its judgment is based upon federal or state constitutional grounds, or both. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, 93 S.Ct. 32, 34 L.Ed.2d 45 (1972).' Roundhouse Construction Corporation v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 423 U.S. 809, 96 S.Ct. 20, 46 L.Ed.2d 29.

Our decision was based upon both due process clauses-that contained in the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and that contained in article first, § 10, of the constitution of Connecticut. As we stated in the opinion: 'The decisive issue on the appeal is whether the Connecticut statutory procedure governing mechanics' liens is unconstitutional because it does not comply with the due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. 'We have held that these provisions of the federal and state constitutions have the same meaning and impose similar constitutional limitations.' Cyphers v. Allyn, 142 Conn. 699, 703, 118 A.2d 318, 321; Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 537, 245 A.2d 579.' To the latter citations may be added the following, holding to the same effect: State v. Doe, 149 Conn. 216, 226, 178 A.2d 271; Proctor v. Sachner, 143 Conn. 9, 17, 118 A.2d 621; State ex rel. Brush v. Sixth Taxing District, 104 Conn. 192, 195, 132 A. 561.

As we further noted in the opinion: 'The appeal raises for the first time in this court a question as to the constitutionality of Connecticut's mechanic's lien procedure. The United States Supreme Court, however, has recently had occasion to consider the constitutionality of the attachment, garnishment, sequestration and mechanic's lien procedures in several states, and the decisions of that court guide and must control our decision.'

Since our court had had no prior occasion to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut mechanic's lien statutes in the light of the due process of law provisions of both the federal and state constitutions and since, as we have...