Roundtree v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. C09-0102-LRR,No. CR06-0107-LRR,C09-0102-LRR,CR06-0107-LRR |
| Parties | LORENZO ROUNDTREE, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This case arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the instant matter, the court directed the parties to brief the issue that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration. Specifically, it directed the parties to consider the Supreme Court's January 27, 2014 decision in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014), that is, the rule that "a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unless [the victim's] use [of drugs distributed by the defendant] is a but-for cause of the death or injury." Further, the court directed the parties to brief: (1) whether a substantive challenge based on Burrage faces any "significant procedural hurdles to its consideration on the merits," Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1998), and (2) whether Burrage is retroactively applicable in this case. See July 21, 2015 Order (civil docket no 76).
As directed by the court, Lorenzo Roundtree ("the movant") filed a brief (civil docket no. 79) on August 11, 2015, and the government filed a responsive brief (civil docket no. 81) on September 3, 2015. Additionally, the movant filed a pro se supplemental brief (civil docket no. 98) on May 9, 2016 and a second pro se supplemental brief (civil docket no. 101) on May 20, 2016.1 For the following reasons, the court finds that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not available to the movant but concludes that a certificate of appealability should issue.
On August 15, 2006, a grand jury charged the movant with one count of distributing heroin resulting in the death of another person after having previously been convicted of a felony drug offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 21 U.S.C. § 851. The case proceeded to trial. On March 20, 2007, the jury found the movant guilty, that is, it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the movant distributed heroin and that Craig Handy died as a result of using the heroin that the movant distributed. A probation officer prepared a pre-sentence investigation report, and the court held a sentencing hearing on July 2, 2007. The court sentenced the movant to life imprisonment, that is, the mandatory term under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
After the court entered judgment, the movant appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The movant raised four issues: (1) the court erred when admitting evidence of his prior conviction; (2) the government improperly vouched for its witnesses; (3) the government failed to provide notice of a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851; and (4) the sentencing enhancement was based on an inaccurate prior felony. On July 24, 2008, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the movant's conviction and sentence. See United States v. Roundtree, 534 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2008). The movant sought rehearing, which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied on September 17, 2008. The movant did not seek a writ of certiorari.
On July 27, 2009, the movant filed his original motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his motion, the movant raised a number of grounds, including that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed toseek a cause of death jury instruction. On August 16, 2012, the court found that the movant's claims did not entitle him to relief, denied a certificate of appealability and entered judgment in favor of the government.
The movant appealed. On February 5, 2013, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of trial counsel's failure to advise the movant of the mandatory life sentence potential, and, on October 4, 2013, the Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether an evidentiary hearing was required. On May 30, 2014, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the movant's claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of the mandatory nature of the life sentence and instructed the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel advised the movant that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) mandated a life sentence in the movant's circumstances and, if not, whether the movant was prejudiced as a result of the omission. See Roundtree v. United States, 751 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2014). On the same date, judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals entered.
On July 10, 2014, the movant filed a petition for rehearing by the panel. In such petition, the movant asked the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to expand the certificate of appealability in light of Burrage, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 881, and Ragland v. United States, 756 F.3d 597 (8th Cir. 2014). On August 15, 2014, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the movant's petition for rehearing by the panel. On August 26, 2014, mandate issued.
On August 28, 2014, the court followed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' directive by setting an evidentiary hearing. Before the evidentiary hearing, the movant sought to expand the evidentiary hearing in an effort to have the court address the impact of Burrage, that is, whether the movant received an unlawful sentence because the jury did not find that the movant's distribution of heroin or Craig Handy's use of heroin supplied by the movant was the but-for cause of Craig Handy's death. When doing so, the movantargued that the evidence established that he did not give or sell the heroin to Craig Handy and that an intervening person gave or sold Craig Handy the heroin that led to his death. The government resisted the movant's request to expand the evidentiary hearing, maintaining that the evidence showed that: (1) Craig Handy had alcohol and heroin in his body; (2) Craig Handy's blood alcohol level would not have caused his death; and (3) the heroin in Craig Handy's body by itself could have caused Craig Handy's death. It also emphasized that the jury determined that the heroin that the movant distributed caused Craig Handy to die, the movant did not previously challenge the jury instructions or the burden of proof regarding cause of death, the movant never alleged that the heroin he distributed was not the but-for cause of Craig Handy's death and no legal authority supports the contention that an intervening distributor factors into the but-for causality analysis under Burrage. On September 25, 2014, the court denied the movant's request to expand the scope of the evidentiary hearing. On October 2, 2014, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the remanded claim. After finding the movant's assertion that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of the mandatory nature of the life sentence that he faced if the jury convicted him of the charge included in the indictment to be without merit and denying a certificate of appealability, the court directed the clerk's office to enter judgment in favor of the government, which it did on October 3, 2014.
The movant appealed. On April 22, 2015, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the movant's application for a certificate of appealability on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and granted the movant's application for a certificate of appealability on his Burrage claim. It also summarily remanded the case so that the court could consider the movant's Burrage claim.
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court is able to move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Toobtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner must establish: (1) "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States"; (2) "that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence"; (3) "that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law"; or (4) "[that the judgment or sentence] is otherwise subject to collateral attack." Id.; see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (same); Lee v. United States, 501 F.2d 494, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1974) (); Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings (specifying scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2255). If any one of the four grounds is established, the court is required "to vacate and set aside the judgment and [it is required to] discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
When enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Congress "intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus." Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Although it appears to be broad, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not provide a remedy for "all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing." Id. (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)). Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is intended to redress constitutional and jurisdictional errors and, apart from those errors, only "fundamental defect[s] which inherently [result] in a complete miscarriage of justice" and "omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; see also Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 704 (); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) ...
To continue reading
Request your trial