Rouse v. Gulf Oil Corporation, Civ. A. No. 70-3259.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 70-3259.
• Citation: 350 F. Supp. 178
• Parties: Hamilton H. ROUSE v. GULF OIL CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

350 F. Supp. 178

Hamilton H. ROUSE v. GULF OIL CORPORATION.

Civ. A. No. 70-3259.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

October 13, 1972.

Jerome N. Kline, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Hoyt H. Harmon, Jr., A. L. Vangeli, Bala Cynwyd, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TROUTMAN, District Judge.

Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f), the plaintiff, Hamilton Rouse, commenced this action against the Gulf Oil Corporation, alleging that his discharge by Gulf constituted an unfair employment practice in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was discharged because of his race and because of his opposition to defendant's unlawful discrimination against black citizens in its employment practices. Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff failed to properly file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission EEOC prior to commencing this action.

Plaintiff was hired as a warehouseman for Gulf Oil on January 18, 1961. It was apparently plaintiff's practice to complain to Gulf supervisors and to others in authority regarding the underrepresentation of blacks in defendant's Philadelphia operations. This practice, plaintiff alleges, resulted in his suspension for two days in 1965 and in his ultimate termination on May 22, 1968. Seven days later, on May 29, 1968, plaintiff filed a written charge with the EEOC accusing defendant of unfair employment practices within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. the Act. Plaintiff's charge was deferred by the EEOC to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission on May 31, 1968. On August 13, 1968, eighty-two days after the commission of the alleged unfair employment practice and prior to the termination of the state proceedings, plaintiff's charge was automatically filed with the EEOC. Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the charge and referred it to the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, which, in turn, dismissed the charge as unsubstantiated. Thereafter, the EEOC conducted an investigation into plaintiff's charge and in a letter dated October 26, 1970, notified plaintiff of his right to sue within thirty days. Plaintiff commenced this action on November 25, 1970.

In order to file a suit seeking relief for an unfair employment practice under Title VII of the Act, a plaintiff must exhaust a series of somewhat complicated procedural prerequisites. Initially, where State or local law prohibits the unfair employment practices alleged and authorizes a State or local authority to grant relief, no charge may be filed with the EEOC prior to an attempt to exhaust such State and local remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Upon the expiration of sixty days after the State or local proceeding has been commenced or upon its earlier termination, a charge may then be filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Where State and local enforcement proceedings are available under Section 2000e-5(b), the charge must be filed by the aggrieved person with the EEOC within two hundred and ten days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local proceeding has terminated, whichever is earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). The EEOC may then investigate the charge and seek to obtain voluntary compliance by the employer. The aggrieved party is then authorized to commence a civil action in the District Court only upon his receipt of a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Stebbins v. Continental Insurance Co., 143 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 442 F.2d 843 (1971); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).

In summary, in order to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites to the commencement of a civil action under Title VII of the Act, an aggrieved person must attempt to exhaust the appropriate State and local remedies, where available; file a timely charge with the EEOC, and receive a right to sue notice.

The procedure followed in the instant case by the EEOC was the deferral of the charge to the State agency upon its receipt and the automatic filing of such charge upon the expiration of sixty days after the deferral by the EEOC. It is defendant's contention that plaintiff's letter of May 29 to the EEOC did not constitute a valid charge in that it was premature since no attempt was made to exhaust the State and local remedies. Since the initial charge was invalid ab initio, the EEOC could not automatically file it on its own initiative at a later date. Thus, since no valid charge was filed within two hundred and ten days from the date of the alleged unfair employment practice, the Court is without jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues...