Rowell v. State, CR-90-1669
Decision Date | 30 September 1993 |
Docket Number | CR-90-1669 |
Citation | 666 So.2d 825 |
Parties | Manuel Dee ROWELL, v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
The Alabama Supreme Court remanded this cause for this Court to consider the merits of Manuel Dee Rowell's argument that the trial judge erroneously admitted evidence of a telephone pager found on his person and $800 in cash found in a work boot in the trunk of an automobile that the appellant owned jointly with Shawn Gray in his trial for possession of a controlled substance, in violation of § 13A-12-212(a)(1), Code of Alabama 1975, Ex parte Rowell, 666 So.2d 823 (Ala.1992). The appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress the telephone pager and $800 in cash, because, he argues, this evidence was "irrelevant, immaterial and unduly prejudicial" and should not have been admitted into evidence in his trial for possession of a controlled substance.
The evidence presented by the State tended to show that, on January 31, 1991, police officers in the vice and narcotics division of the Opelika Police Department obtained a search warrant, authorizing a search of the appellant's residence and his car, as well as any individuals present at the time of the search. During the execution of that warrant, the police, with the aid of a drug-sniffing dog, discovered a matchbox that contained what appeared to be cocaine under the carpet of the floorboard of the driver's side of the appellant's car. The drug-sniffing dog also alerted to a work boot located in the trunk of the car. Although the boot contained no cocaine, it did contain $800 in cash. A search of the appellant's person revealed that he was carrying a telephone pager.
The appellant then presented the testimony of Mathew Gray, who testified that the appellant and Gray's brother, Shawn Gray, jointly owned the car in which the cocaine was found. He testified that his brother, Shawn, had died 10 days before the appellant's arrest and that his brother had had cocaine charges pending against him when he died. He testified that Shawn had driven the automobile in question. Additionally, Gray testified that he himself was also named as a suspect in the same search warrant authorizing the search of the appellant. He also testified that he had recently driven the car belonging to the appellant and his brother.
The appellant testified that he had no knowledge of the presence of the cocaine in his car. He also testified that the work boots, along with other items of clothing in the trunk, belonged to Shawn Gray. He stated that the money found in one of the boots did not belong to him.
In light of the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Rowell, that the appellant's objections to the admission of the pager and the money were stated with specificity, and thus were preserved for appellate review, we must determine whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning this evidence.
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 20.01 (4th ed. 1991). Regarding the test of relevancy employed in this state, it is well settled that evidence is relevant if it has any logical relationship to the purpose for which it is offered. "[U]nder this liberal test, a fact is admissible if it has any probative value, however slight, upon a matter in the case." See McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 21.01.
Applying the foregoing principles to this case, we hold that the evidence was not material. More particularly, a review of the record indicates that the State was ostensibly proceeding under a theory of "possession with intent to sell." Such a theory is not recognized in this State, and evidence related to that theory is certainly not material to the charge of possession. The only evidence that should have been considered by the jury is evidence related to the issue whether the appellant possessed a controlled substance, and whether that substance was, in fact, cocaine.
In Johnson v. State, 484 So.2d 1121 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), this Court answered in the affirmative the question of whether the "street value" of a prohibited substance is immaterial where the defendant was charged with "possession". In Johnson, because the evidence tending to establish the defendant's guilt was strong, this Court held that the admission of otherwise immaterial evidence was harmless. Rule 45, A.R.App.P. See also Hare v. State, 53 Ala.App. 596, 302 So.2d 569 (1974) ( ); Cf. Reed v. State, 401 So.2d 131, 136 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), writ denied, 401 So.2d 139 (Ala.1981) ( )
In this case, the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error. The trial court granted the appellant's motion to suppress his statements to police officers which he admitted that he had sold drugs in the past, but said that he had discontinued that practice. The trial court stated,
The facts indicate that the appellant was not shown to be in actual possession of the cocaine recovered by the police, in that the cocaine was found under a floorboard of a car which was jointly owned by the appellant and a recently deceased individual.
In Palmer v. State, 593 So.2d 143, 145 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) this Court stated:
Here, the only inculpable evidence against the appellant was that cocaine was found under the carpet of the floorboard of the jointly owned automobile, which he was driving at the time of the arrest. Because the State was unable to prove that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the vehicle in which the cocaine was discovered, it was incumbent upon the State to proffer additional evidence to support the inference that the appellant knew of the presence of the cocaine. See Rose v. State, 598 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Ala.Cr.App.1992) (). Thus, the evidence in question, while having...
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