Rowland School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1968
• Citation: 264 Cal.App.2d 589,70 Cal.Rptr. 504
• Parties: ROWLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, C.C. Trillingham, Benjamin Hite, Roscoe Hollinger, Hudson School District, Walnut School District, La Puente Union School District, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 31610.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 504

70 Cal.Rptr. 504

264 Cal.App.2d 589

ROWLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, C.C. Trillingham, Benjamin Hite, Roscoe Hollinger, Hudson School District, Walnut School District, La Puente Union School District, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 31610.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Aug. 1, 1968.

Smith, Netzley & Culkins, La Puente, and Rodney Robertson, Palo Alto, for plaintiff and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer and Richard L. Mayers, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and respondents State Board of Education.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, James W. Briggs and Raymond W. Schneider, Deputies County Counsel, for defendants and respondents Trillingham, Hite and Hollinger.

No appearance for other defendants.

BISHOP, Associate Justice. ^*

Our first task will be to unscramble the proceedings brought before us by plaintiff's notice that it appealed 'from that certain judgment entered on or about October 13, 1966, * * * which judgment dismisses the plaintiff's complaint for injunction, plaintiff's complaint for declaratory relief and plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate, and further, which judgment purports to enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and that said plaintiff does appeal from a whole of said judgment and/or judgments.'

Finding no document in the record brought to us that bore any resemblance to such a judgment or judgments, we obtained the original record from the trial court and there find the judicial actions from which we conclude plaintiff may be said to have appealed.

On October 17, 1966, an 'entry of dismissal was signed by the trial judge and filed, succinctly stating: 'Pursuant to the provisions of section 581d of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court having sustained the demurrer (sic) of the defendants herein to the Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend, the within action is dismissed.' It will be noted that this order does not even mention a summary judgment for or against anybody. It does, however, dismiss the within action and that is an appealable judgment, inviting examination.

We begin with the second amended complaint to get an understanding of the issues involved. That pleading, filed August 8, 1966, was drafted in three counts bearing, respectively, these titles: 'First Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief); Second Cause of Action (For Injunction); and Third Cause of Action (Petition for Writ of Mandamus.)' To this pleading the county defendants filed, on August 17, a document entitled 'Demurrer of C. C. Trillingham, Benjamin S. Hite, and Roscoe Hollinger to Second Amended Complaint. * * *' The first ground was: 'I. That the First Cause of Action of said Amended Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these defendants or any of them.' This was followed by a similar statement respecting counts II and III. On August 18 defendant State Board of Education filed its 'Return by Way of Demurrer of State Board of Education to Second Amended Complaint.' This pleading consisted of three general demurrers, one to each of the complaint's three causes of action.

Before these demurrers were ruled upon two notices were given of motions to be made. August 18, that of the State Board of Education warned of a motion to dismiss the complaint as to it and for a summary judgment in its favor, against the plaintiff. On August 22, a like motion was foretold by the three county defendants, for a summary judgment to be made in their favor.

The demurrers and motions came on for hearing September 14, and this notation appears in the court's minutes:

'Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his (sic) 3rd cause of action in the 2nd amended complaint is granted without prejudice. Motions by the County and State for summary judgment, and the demurrers by the County and State to the 1st and 2nd cause of action of the 2nd amended complaint stand submitted.'

And so they stood until September 20, when the minutes reveal the following dispositions of them. 'Demurrer of County defendants sustained on the grounds stated without leave to amend; demurrer of State defendant sustained on the grounds stated without leave to amend * * *. Because of the Court's ruling sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend, a ruling on the motions for summary judgment is unnecessary and are declared off calendar.'

With these facts furnishing the background, several problems beg for attention, the first two being these: Does either the first or second count of plaintiff's complaint state a cause of action against either the State Board of Education or the three county officers named as defendants? The third cause of action is no longer of interest on this appeal, and the two motions for summary judgments remain 'off calendar' and as no summary judgment ever came into being, the appeal with reference to them must be dismissed.

With the procedural issues clarified, we turn to consider what it is upon which the parties' attention centers. The appealing plaintiff, in the first cause of action in its second amended complaint, identifies its defendants, which are: State Board of Education; C. C. Trillingham, Superintendent of Schools of Los Angeles County, among whose duties is that of calling and giving notice of the reorganization of school districts within the county; Benjamin S. Hite, Registrar of Voters of the County; Roscoe Hollinger, the County Auditor; and the Hudson School District and Walnut School District, which districts, together with plaintiff, territorially make up the remaining defendant, the La Puente Union High School District.

Attention is called in plaintiff's pleading to the fact that 'In 1964, the Legislature * * * adopted the so-called Unruh School Act, which is commonly known as chapter 132, 1964 First Extra Session.' This act added fourteen sections, and three chapters to the Education Code; amended nineteen sections and the heading of an article in that code; and repealed one section. Among the sections added to the Education Code is section 3100, which reads in part: 'It is the intent and purpose of the Legislature that the procedures prescribed by the provisions of this chapter * * * be utilized primarily for the formation of unified school districts maintaining grades kindergarten or 1 through 12, and that this form of organization be ultimately adopted throughout the state. It is the further intent of the Legislature that in exercising the authority to approve master plans and plans and recommendations developed at the local level, the State Board of Education consider the boundaries of existing high school districts as the minimum geographical base for the organization of individual unified school districts, * * *'

Steps were taken to unify the school districts which are parties to this action. An election was called and held on June 17, 1966, the month following the filing of the action. The majority of voters voted 'no' but as another election will be held within two years, unless the Legislature changes the rules, plaintiff continues to be interested in the problems it sees. In its second amended complaint it puts its finger on two sections that it characterizes as unconstitutional, and it finds fault with some other things on other grounds, desiring judicial answers to its questions.

We are to be called upon to consider, therefore, plaintiff's cause of action for declaratory judgments and causes of action to enjoin further activity by the defendants, mainly based on its claim that two sections of the Education Code are unconstitutional. It is quite possible for the Legislature to authorize a school district, or any other agency or person concerned with the public welfare, to bring an action to obtain a judicial declaration that some piece of legislation is unconstitutional and to stay further steps the invalid legislation seems to authorize, even though the plaintiff has no interest in the question involved other than that of the public generally. For example, see section 17070 of the Business and Professions Code, authorizing '(a)ny person or trade association (to) bring an action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter.' It is possible, we have said, for the Legislature to have authorized this action, whether or not the plaintiff school district appears affected by the unconstitutionality it claims exists in the 'so-called Unruh School Act,' but it has not done so. In other words, plaintiff has not stated a cause of action...