Alta Loma School Dist. v. San Bernardino County Com. On School Dist. Reorganization

• Decision Date: 14 October 1981
• Citation: 177 Cal.Rptr. 506,124 Cal.App.3d 542
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ALTA LOMA SCHOOL DISTRICT, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL DISTRICT REORGANIZATION, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 21997.

Page 506

177 Cal.Rptr. 506

124 Cal.App.3d 542

ALTA LOMA SCHOOL DISTRICT, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL DISTRICT REORGANIZATION, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 21997.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 14, 1981.

Alan K. Marks, County Counsel, and Leonard D. Brinley, Deputy County Counsel, San Bernardino, for defendants and appellants

Parker & Covert, Clayton H. Parker and Spencer E. Covert, Jr., Santa Ana, for plaintiffs and appellants.

OPINION

TAMURA, Associate Justice.

The San Bernardino County Committee on School District Reorganization (county committee) formulated and recommended a reorganization plan for Chaffey Joint Union High School District (Chaffey District) which would divide the territory of the district into three separate unified school districts. Chaffey District and five of its component districts which would go out of existence upon effectuation of the reorganization plan sought a writ of mandate to set aside the county committee's action and to prohibit the county committee and the county superintendent of schools (defendants) from transmitting the plan to the State Board of Education for its approval.

The county committee began discussing and conducting hearings on a reorganization plan for Chaffey District as early as September 1978. On March 21, 1979, following public hearings, the county committee approved a reorganization plan which would divide the territory of Chaffey District into three unified school districts. Plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate assailed the validity of the plan for its alleged failure to meet the statutory criteria prescribed by Education Code section 4200, ¹ the county committee's failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), claimed procedural irregularities in the conduct of the public hearings, and an alleged lack of a majority vote of the members of the county committee. Plaintiffs alleged that at the final public hearing at which the plan was approved, interested persons were prevented from addressing the committee despite the fact that substantial changes in the plan were considered and made at that meeting. Plaintiffs also alleged that while six of the eleven member committee voted for approval of the plan, two of the six who voted for approval had not attended all of the public hearings on the plan.

Defendants demurred on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue; (2) the state was an indispensable party; and (3) plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Defendants also filed an answer raising substantially the same defenses.

The cause was submitted for decision on the pleadings and various declarations which were received in evidence by stipulation of counsel. In a memorandum of intended decision, the judge rejected the defenses of lack of standing and failure to join the state as an indispensable party. However, the court upheld the defense based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies except as to the cause of action grounded on the alleged failure to comply with CEQA. The judge ruled that the plan was a "project" within the meaning of CEQA, that the county committee was the "lead agency" with the primary responsibility for complying with CEQA, and that plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies on that issue. Accordingly, the court overruled the demurrer, directed the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate commanding defendants to vacate their approval of the reorganization plan "until they have complied with the requirements of (CEQA)," and ordered judgment for defendants on the remaining causes of action because of plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Defendants appeal from the judgment, contending (1) plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action; (2) the State Board of Education was an indispensable party; (3) CEQA does not apply to the formulation and approval of a reorganization plan by the county committee; and (4) the failure to exhaust administrative remedies was a valid defense to the entire action. Plaintiffs have cross-appealed contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude them from maintaining the instant action.

I

Defendants' contention that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the instant proceeding is without merit. The standing argument is premised on the legal proposition that, subject only to constitutional restrictions, the power of the Legislature over school districts is plenary (Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 180-181, 302 P.2d 574), and it "may divide, change, or abolish them at pleasure." (Pass School Dist. v. Hollywood Dist., 156 Cal. 416, 418, 105 P. 122; Merrill etc. School Dist. v. Rapose, 125 Cal.App.2d 819, 820, 271 P.2d 522.) The foregoing legal proposition, however, only means that a school district has no vested right in its own continued existence and may not challenge the basic power of the Legislature over the creation, alteration, or abolition of a school district. (San Carlos Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Education, 258 Cal.App.2d 317, 322, 65 Cal.Rptr. 711.) It does not mean that a school district does not have standing to litigate the constitutionality of the means selected by the Legislature for the district's abolition (id., at p. 322, 65 Cal.Rptr. 711) or to have adjudicated the district's complaint that the procedures prescribed by the Legislature for the reorganization of a school district are not being observed by the administrative body empowered to conduct the proceedings. Plaintiffs are not questioning the power of the Legislature to provide for the reorganization of school districts. They are seeking to compel the county committee to follow the procedural and substantive rules prescribed by the Legislature for the formulation and recommendation of a reorganization plan. We are satisfied that the districts have standing to invoke the aid of the courts to compel compliance with the statutory procedures which may lead to their eventual abolition.

An application for a writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc., § 1086) or writ of review (Code Civ.Proc., § 1069) must be brought by "the party beneficially interested." Ordinarily, the writ will be granted only where necessary to protect a substantial right and when it is shown that some substantial damage will be suffered if the writ is denied. (Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal.2d 344, 351, 254 P.2d 6.) An exception is recognized, however, where the question is one of public right and the object of the writ is to procure performance of a public duty. (Green v. Obledo, 29 Cal.3d 126, 144, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206; Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351, 357, 196 P.2d 562; Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L.A., 27 Cal.2d 98, 100-101, 162 P.2d 627; Fuller v. San Bernardino Valley Mun. Wat. Dist., 242 Cal.App.2d 52, 57, 51 Cal.Rptr. 120.) In Jefferson Union Sch. Dist. v. City Council, 129 Cal.App.2d 264, 277 P.2d 104, a school district was held to have a sufficient beneficial interest to bring a mandamus proceeding to test the validity of a city's annexation of a part of the territory of a school district where annexation would result in the exclusion of the territory from the school district. The reviewing court observed that if the city council lacked jurisdiction to proceed, it was "very much to the interest of the school district to obtain an early determination to avoid the confusion and loss of revenue that otherwise might ensue." (Id., at p. 267, 277 P.2d 104.)

Defendants' reliance on Rowland School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education, 264 Cal.App.2d 589, 593, 70 Cal.Rptr. 504, is misplaced. In Rowland the school district sought declaratory relief to adjudicate the constitutionality of a possible future reorganization of a school district. The case was resolved not on the issue of standing, but on the ground that the only facts alleged concerned the constitutionality of possible future legislative and administrative actions.

II

Defendants' contention that the State of California or the State Board of Education was an indispensable party defendant is likewise lacking in merit.

Code of Civil Procedure section 389 was amended in 1971 to conform to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course, 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 364-365, 140 Cal.Rptr. 744; Law Revision Com. com. to Code Civ.Proc., § 389; 14 West's Ann.Cal.Code 221, 221-223.) The section provides that there shall be joinder of a party (1) if in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those who were already parties or (2) if he claims an interest in the subject matter of the action. In addition, although some courts held that under former Code of Civil Procedure section 389, absence of an indispensable party deprived the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter, under the section as amended, failure to join a party regarded as "indispensable" is "not a jurisdictional defect in the technical sense." (Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 368, 140 Cal.Rptr. 744.) Although the court has no jurisdiction over the absent party, the court has jurisdiction over the existing parties and has the power to render a judgment affecting their rights. (Id., p. 368, 140 Cal.Rptr 744; see 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (1981 Supp.) §§ 160B-160C, pp. 45-48.)

In the case at bench, the challenged administrative action is that of the county committee, not the State Board of Education. Nor is the state asserting an interest in the subject of this action. Assuming that the action is otherwise maintainable, there is no reason why complete relief could not be accorded among the parties before the court without joining the state. Accordingly, the contention that the court lacked jurisdiction because the state was not joined as a party defendant is without merit.

III

We turn to plaintiffs' cause of...