Rowold v. State
| Decision Date | 08 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 02A05-9308-CR-277,02A05-9308-CR-277 |
| Citation | 629 N.E.2d 1285 |
| Parties | Richard L. ROWOLD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. 1 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Bruce S. Cowen, Fort Wayne, for appellant-defendant.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.
Today we decide two issues:
1. How must a trial court classify a federal felony conviction for habitual offender purposes?
2. If a trial court improperly sentences a defendant under the wrong habitual offender statute, how should the trial court correct its error?
Appellant-defendant Richard L. Rowold challenges his conviction and sentence for Criminal Recklessness, a Class D felony. 2 Rowold claims the trial court erred in refusing to give his tendered jury instruction and in enhancing his sentence by an additional ten years for being an habitual offender.
On July 11, 1991, Rowold fired a shotgun at a dog but instead shot his neighbor Janet Shoaff, who was outside in her backyard, in the shoulder. Rowold was charged with criminal recklessness and tried by a jury. At trial, the court refused Rowold's proposed instruction No. 3.
The jury found Rowold guilty of criminal recklessness and then found him to be an habitual offender based upon a 1980 federal felony conviction for mail fraud and a 1986 federal felony conviction for fraudulent use of an access device. The trial court sentenced Rowold to three years for criminal recklessness, enhanced by ten years for being an habitual offender.
Rowold first contends that the trial court's denial of his tendered instruction No. 3 denied him a fair trial. Because the State failed to address this issue in its brief, curiously choosing to argue the sufficiency of the evidence instead, Rowold need only make a prima facie showing of reversible error. See In the Matter of Paternity of R.C. (1992), Ind.App., 587 N.E.2d 153, 155 n. 3.
In considering whether the trial court erred in refusing a tendered instruction, we determine whether (1) the instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction, and (3) the substance of the instruction is covered by other given instructions. Baird v. State (1992), Ind., 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1178, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 255, 126 L.Ed.2d 208 (1993).
Rowold was charged with criminal recklessness under I.C. 35-42-2-2, which provides:
(b) A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally, performs:
(1) an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person;
commits criminal recklessness, a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is a:
(2) Class D felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon.
IND.CODE 35-41-2-2(c) provides that "a person engages in conduct 'recklessly' if he engages in conduct in plain, conscious, and Rowold's proposed instruction No. 3 reads:
unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct." Thus, to obtain a conviction here the State did not have to prove that Rowold intended to accomplish the result, but merely that he realized or should have realized there was a strong probability that the harm might occur. See Wallace v. State (1990), Ind.App., 558 N.E.2d 864, 865
To find the Defendant guilty, you [sic] must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew of the potential harm. If you find that the Defendant was unaware of the presence of the danger you must find that he could not be reckless with regard to a potential harm unknown to him. If the evidence failed to show the knowledge of any person being or in place of potential danger you must find for the Defendant. Wallace v. State (1990), Ind.App., 558 N.E.2d 864.
Record at 40. Rowold's instruction incorrectly states the law in that it requires the State to prove that he knew of the potential harm in order to convict him. A correct statement of the law is that a defendant may be convicted if he knew or should have known of the potential danger. Thus, the trial court properly rejected Rowold's instruction. Rowold failed to present a prima facie showing of reversible error. 3
Rowold next contends that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence by ten years for being an habitual offender under IND.CODE 35-50-2-8. The State concedes that the trial court erred in enhancing Rowold's sentence by ten years, but argues that because the trial court could have enhanced his sentence by eight years under the "little habitual offender" statute, IND.CODE 35-50-2-7.1, we should do so now.
Rowold was charged and found to be an habitual offender under I.C. 35-50-2-8. To be sentenced as a "big habitual offender" under I.C. 35-50-2-8, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either Rowold's 1980 conviction or his 1986 conviction was a class A, B, or C felony. See I.C. 35-50-2-8(h) (); see also Dickson v. State (1993), Ind.App., 624 N.E.2d 472, 473-74.
The State presented the judgments and commitment orders from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana showing that in 1980 Rowold was sentenced to four years for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341, and was sentenced to two years in 1986, for fraudulent use of an access device in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343. IND.CODE 35-50-2-1(a) provides:
As used in this chapter, "Class D felony conviction" means a conviction of a Class D felony in Indiana and a conviction, in any other jurisdiction at any time, with respect to which the convicted person might have been imprisoned for more than one (1) year. However, it does not include a conviction with respect to which the person has been pardoned, or a conviction of a Class A misdemeanor under section 7(b) of this chapter.
Under I.C. 35-50-2-1, both of Rowold's convictions are considered class D felonies for habitual offender purposes, because they are convictions from a court other than an Indiana court for which Rowold could have been sentenced to more than one year. See also Cain v. State (1992), Ind.App., 594 N.E.2d 835, 842-43. Because Rowold's two federal felony convictions are considered class D felonies for habitual offender purposes, the State did not prove Rowold was a "big habitual offender," and thus, the trial court improperly enhanced Rowold's sentence by ten years under I.C. 35-50-2-8.
However, an erroneously imposed sentence is not void; rather the trial court is As a general rule, the law in effect when the crime was committed controls sentencing. Willis v. State (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 1170, 1172, trans. denied. An exception to the general rule is that when the penalty for a crime is decreased by an ameliorative amendment enacted after the commission of the crime but prior to the defendant's sentencing, the defendant may take advantage of the ameliorative provisions. Terrell v. State (1979), 180 Ind.App. 634, 390 N.E.2d 208, 209.
required to correct it. Gipson v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 722, 723. Courts have a duty to correct an erroneously imposed sentence and the length of time between an original erroneous sentence and the correction thereof does not affect the court's power to correct a sentencing error. Watkins v. State (1992), Ind.App., 588 N.E.2d 1342, 1344. Here, the trial court should have enhanced Rowold's sentence under I.C. 35-50-2-7.1, the "little habitual" or class D felony offender statute, thus it must correct Rowold's sentence. See Broshears v. State (1992), Ind.App., 604 N.E.2d 639, 645 (once the jury determines the defendant is an habitual offender, it is for the trial court to determine whether defendant should receive a "big habitual offender" enhancement or a "little habitual offender" enhancement). 4
Although I.C. 35-50-2-7.1 was repealed in 1993 and since then all habitual offender enhancements have been covered by I.C. 35-50-2-8, under which Rowold would receive a shorter enhancement term than he will under I.C. 35-50-2-7.1, 5 the trial court must correct Rowold's sentence applying I.C. 35-50-2-7.1. The general rule and not the exception applies here because (1) on remand the trial court will be merely correcting or modifying an existing sentence rather than resentencing Rowold, (2) I.C. 35-50-2-7.1 was in effect in 1992 when Rowold was sentenced and in 1991 when he committed the instant...
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