Weld v. Southeastern Companies, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-674-CIV-T-17F.,98-674-CIV-T-17F.
• Citation: 10 F.Supp.2d 1318
• Parties: Myra WELD, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHEASTERN COMPANIES, INC., A Florida Corporation, George Connely, individually, Leslie Malone, individually, Laurie Winkles, individually, and Doug Simpson, individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

10 F.Supp.2d 1318

Myra WELD, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHEASTERN COMPANIES, INC., A Florida Corporation, George Connely, individually, Leslie Malone, individually, Laurie Winkles, individually, and Doug Simpson, individually, Defendants.

No. 98-674-CIV-T-17F.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

July 8, 1998.

J. Michael Shea, Shea & Associates, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff.

John P. McAdams, Youndy C. Cook, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT SOUTHEASTERN'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COUNTS III, V, VI, & VII, INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DEFENDANTS' ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES

KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Southeastern Companies, Inc.s ("Southeastern's") Motion to Dismiss Counts III, V, VI, and VII (Docket No. 12), Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 13), and Defendants' Motion to Strike Punitive Damages (Docket No. 14). Motions are based on Plaintiff's Complaint (Docket No. 1), and Plaintiff has responded to the motions via Plaintiff's Response (Docket No. 16).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

No count within the Plaintiff's complaint shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of such claim that would entitle her to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court is required to view that complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and accept all allegations as true. See Colodny v. Iverson, Yoakum, Papiano & Hatch, 838 F.Supp. 572, 573 (M.D.Fla.1993) (Citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). Such a standard will not preclude dismissal, however, when Plaintiff essentially fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Modzelewski v. Dugan, 627 F.Supp. 141, 142 (M.D.Fla.1985).

POSTURE OF THE CASE

This case is about employment discrimination based upon National Origin.¹ Plaintiff claims that because she is of Hispanic origin, she was abused by her superiors and ultimately fired. According to Plaintiff's complaint (Docket No. 1), the pertinent facts of the case begin on or about November 25, 1996, when she was hired as a Benefits Clerk performing data entry for $6.00 per hour. Plaintiff did not enter into a written contract.

Plaintiff alleges that she heard that Defendant George Connely had made a comment against ethnic people, saying he preferred the front desk be manned by non-ethnics. This comment, combined with an altercation in the office of Plaintiff's supervisor (Defendant Leslie Malone) which purportedly reduced Plaintiff to tears, are the substance of the claims challenged by Defendants. Plaintiff was thereafter fired on November 12, 1997.

Defendants deny the allegations substantiating all causes of action pled. Further, they assert that with respect to counts III, V, VI, and VII, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted² even supposing her allegations prove true. This Court now considers the position of each party, and assuming Plaintiff's facts are true, must test each disputed claim for validity.

DISCUSSION

I. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants, George Connely, Leslie Malone, Laurie Winkles, and Doug Simpson (hereinafter "Defendants" for purposes of this section), maintain that Plaintiff's allegations concern their respective positions as employees of Southeastern; therefore, they reason that they should be absolved of any personal liability for actions arising from acts committed in their capacity as employees. Defendants glean much case support for their position, particularly regarding counts I, II, and IV of Plaintiff's complaint.

Liability for discrimination under either the Florida Civil Rights Act or under federal Equal Employment Opportunity laws is reserved for the employer ultimately causing the harm (harm in hiring, firing, or hostile work environment).³ While both laws include the word "agent" in their definitions of employer, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted such inclusion only valid in reference to claims requiring respondeat superior liability. See Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir.1996).

Moreover, as Defendants correctly note, the Eleventh Circuit has squarely addressed the issue in the case sub judice — namely supervisor liability. In Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991), the Court noted, "[i]ndividual capacity suits under Title VII are inappropriate. The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act." Id. (Court's emphasis). Likewise in Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1995), the Court elaborated on the employee's very narrow scope of liability, noting:

Read literally, counts two and three seek the same relief against Lomax and Hightower in their individual capacities. The could not, however, be considered her employer; Fulton County is her employer. Accordingly, they cannot be held liable under the ADEA or Title VII. We therefore construe counts two and three as applying only to Fulton County. Id.

Other cases originating in the Eleventh Circuit have served only to clarify the Court's solid position against individual liability under counts comparable to Plaintiff's counts I and II.⁴ That court has even held that individuals working as public sector officials will NOT be held personally liable in such actions.⁵ Such analysis leaves this Court with no other option but to accordingly dismiss counts I and II with respect to their application to the Individual Defendants.

Regarding count IV, this breach of contract claim is so clearly one against Plaintiff's employer as to impede this Court to seriously consider its validity against these Defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, it too shall be dismissed with regard to Individual Defendants.

Discussion of the dismissal of counts III, V, VI, and VII as against the Individual Defendants' will be further addressed briefly in the conclusion, infra.

II. DEFENDANT SOUTHEASTERN'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS III, V, VI, & VII

A. Count III: Wrongful Termination

Plaintiff's third (3d) count alleges that Defendants wrongfully terminated her not only because of her national origin, but because she complained of such discrimination to her superiors. She claims support under Walsh v. Arrow Air. Inc., 629 So.2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)⁶; indeed, scholars have noted that a public policy exception could have a dramatically beneficial effect upon the economy of the nation as a whole, for it would bring security to employees of minority background and encourage their devotion to their jobs. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 Harv. L.Rev. 1931, 1951 (June 1983). The implementation of such a duty by employers to employees has, in practice, been much more daunting than Plaintiff suggests. See Id. at 1947. By necessity, the narrow application of the doctrine affords employees minimal protection in At-Will states. See Id.

Rather than choose to elaborate on an area best left to the legislature, this Court must decline implementation of a new and amorphous cause of action based on "public policy." In Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So.2d 763, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), a bartender brought an action against his employer for firing him (after the bartender refused to serve a grossly intoxicated individual). The Second DCA found that in an At-Will state such as Florida, the theories of protection from retaliatory discharge and at will employment were mutually exclusive concepts; as such, the court noted, "[w]e decline to act where the legislature has chosen not to ..." Id. at 763, 764. Therefore, this Court must dismiss Count III with regard to all Defendants, as Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted therein.

B. Count V: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing

Plaintiff's next challenged claim is based on a theory implied to all Florida employment relationships, as purportedly evidenced in Greenberg v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 629 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Greenberg involved two doctors who claimed that their relationship with their patients and colleagues was being challenged due to abusive conduct by a new doctor. See Id. at 253.⁷

A case which more clearly reflects Plaintiff's inability to sustain this cause of action is Future Tech Int'l, Inc. v. Tae Il Media, Ltd., 944 F.Supp. 1538, 1569 (S.D.Fla.1996), which elaborated on the elements required for this claim. The elements required for this claim include: "(1) the existence of a business relationship under which the claimant has rights,⁸ (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship, (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship, (4) by a third party, and (5) damage to the claimant caused by the interference." Id. at 1569, 1570. The essence of this claim rests with an identifiable and mutual binding agreement or employment contract, which Plaintiff lacks here. Indeed, the Tae Il court noted, "[a]s a general rule, an action for tortious interference with a business relationship [or breach of covenant of fair dealing] requires a business relationship evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would have been completed if the defendant had not interfered." Id. at 1570 (Emphasis added).

Only two states have enacted legislation that provides employees with a "nondisclaimable duty of good faith and fair dealing" for their protection: California and Massachusetts. See The Public Policy Exception, 96 Harv. L.Rev. at 1936. As an at-will employment state, the application of such a doctrine in Florida is tenuous at best...