Roy v. Cnty. of L. A.
| Decision Date | 09 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 12–09012 BRO (FFMx) |
| Citation | 114 F.Supp.3d 1030 |
| Parties | Duncan Roy et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Jennifer L. Pasquarella, Katherine M. Traverso, Peter Bibring, Peter J. Eliasberg, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Chris Newman, Jessica Karp Bansal, National Day Labor Organizing Network, Los Angeles, CA, Barrett S. Litt, Lindsay Battles, Kaye McLane Bednarski and Litt LLP, Pasadena, CA, Cecillia D. Wang, Katherine K. Desormeau, Rodkangyil Orion Danjuma, ACLU Foundation Immigrants Rights Project, San Francisco, CA, Omar C. Jadwat, ACLU Foundation Immigrants Rights Project, New York, NY, for Duncan Roy et al.
PC, Glendale, CA, for County of Los Angeles et al.
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants County of Los Angeles (the "County") and Sheriff Leroy D. Baca.1 (Dkt. No. 71.) Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs' third through eighth claims for relief, all of which arise under state law. After considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the instant motion, the Court deems this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument of counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7–15. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiffs are a group of individuals who were or are currently in the custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (the "Sheriff's Department") and who were denied either bail or release on the basis of an immigration hold. Duncan Roy ("Mr. Roy") is a British citizen who was allegedly detained for eighty-nine days pursuant to an immigration hold and Defendants' subsequent refusal to allow him to post bail. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Alain Martinez–Perez ("Mr. Martinez–Perez") is a Mexican citizen who was detained for six days after Defendants denied him bail and the district attorney declined to file criminal charges. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Annika Alliksoo ("Ms. Alliksoo") is an Estonian citizen who was detained for a total of eighteen days and held for three days after a state court judge ordered her release. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Clemente De La Cerda ("Mr. De La Cerda") is a Mexican citizen and a lawful permanent resident. (Compl. ¶ 12.) As of the date of filing, Mr. De La Cerda was still currently in the Sheriff's Department's custody pursuant to an immigration hold. (Compl. ¶ 12.)2
Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.3 Collectively, Plaintiffs challenge the legality of the Sheriff's Department's practice of detaining individuals solely on the basis of immigration holds placed by the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agency. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Immigration holds essentially advise local law enforcement agencies that the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") seeks to arrest or detain an alien in the agency's custody. (Compl. ¶¶ 21–22.) According to Plaintiffs, immigration holds are voluntary administrative requests that are not accompanied by the same procedural protections as a criminal detainer or hold. (Compl. ¶¶ 33–34.) Lor example, ICE agents may assign an immigration hold without probable cause to believe that a person is removable and without a warrant or court order authorizing a person's deportation. (Compl. ¶¶ 26–27.) Plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff's Department's practice of honoring immigration holds has resulted in numerous and widespread unlawful detentions, as the issuance of an immigration hold "does not ensure that ICE will assume custody over the detainee or that ICE will take any action against the detainee." (Compl. ¶ 37.)
Plaintiffs challenge two of the Sheriff's Department practices related to immigration holds. First, Plaintiffs assert that the Sheriff's Department has engaged in a pattern and practice of unlawfully denying bail to inmates subject to an immigration hold, thereby preventing these individuals from securing their release pending resolution of the charges against them. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 38–47.) Pursuant to this practice, the Sheriff's Department allegedly codes the record of every individual subject to a hold with a "no bail" notation, regardless of the individual's bail eligibility under state law. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff's Department has "routinely turned away and refused to accept lawfully-tendered bail bonds from bail bondsmen, family members and others when they attempt to lawfully post bail for an inmate." (Compl. ¶ 41.)
Plaintiffs also contest the Sheriff's Department's practice of detaining individuals solely on the basis of an immigration hold and beyond the time or authority permitted under state law to hold an inmate in custody. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 48–50.) To that end, Plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff's Department continues to detain inmates subject to immigration holds even when no charges have been filed against them, they have served their sentence, they have posted bail, they are ordered released on their own recognizance, or a jury has acquitted them. (Compl. ¶ 49.) According to Plaintiffs, ICE does not permit local law enforcement agencies to hold an alien for more than forty-eight hours beyond the time he or she would otherwise be released from custody. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff's Department nevertheless "regularly" detains individuals beyond this forty-eight hour time frame. (Compl. ¶ 49.)
Plaintiffs initiated this action on October 19, 2012, alleging that these two practices violate federal and California state law. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs' first and second claims allege Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The instant motion does not challenge these claims. Rather, Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs' third through eighth claims, all of which arise under California state law. (Dkt. No. 71.) Plaintiffs' third and fourth claims allege violations of the California Constitution; the fifth and seventh claims allege false imprisonment and negligence per se; and Plaintiffs' sixth and eighth claims allege violations of the California Government Code and California Civil Code.4 Plaintiffs have opposed Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Dkt. No. 80), and Defendants timely replied, (Dkt. No. 83).
After the pleadings are closed but early enough not to delay trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "A dismissal on the pleadings for failure to state a claim is proper only if ‘the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir.1984) ). The standard applied to Rule 12(c) motions is fundamentally similar to that applied to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. "All allegations of fact by the party opposing the motion are accepted as true," and the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. "[C]onclusory allegations without more" are insufficient to defeat a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id.
As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, a district court generally may not consider material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). Nevertheless, the court may consider "material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint." Id. The court may also consider documents not physically attached to the complaint so long as their authenticity is not contested and the complaint relies on them. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.2001). Finally, the court "may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.’ " Id. at 688–89 (quoting Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.1986) ). Because the court may consider these materials, it need not accept as true "allegations that are contradicted by facts that can be judicially noticed or by other allegations or exhibits attached to or incorporated in the pleading." 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1363 (3d ed. 2004).
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' third through eighth claims must be dismissed to the extent they are brought by Mr. Martinez–Perez and Mr. De La Cerda. According to Defendants, these individuals' failure to allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act ("Claims Act") bars their claims under state law. (Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 3–4.) The Court begins with a brief overview of the Claims Act's relevant provisions. The Court then addresses whether the Act precludes Mr. Martinez–Perez or Mr. De La Cerda from proceeding in this case.
Government Code section 911.2 conditions the right to sue a public entity on the timely presentation of a claim. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2(a) (); see also Golden Day Sch., Inc. v. Pirillo, 118 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1047 (C.D.Cal.2000). "The Ninth Circuit has held that [s]ection 911.2 does not create mere procedural requirements, but instead provides elements of and conditions precedent to a plaintiff's state claims." Golden Day Sch., 118 F.Supp.2d at 1047 (...
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