Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakely

• Decision Date: 03 March 1977
• Citation: 360 N.E.2d 864,372 Mass. 86
• Parties: ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. Donald E. BLAKELY et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 864

360 N.E.2d 864

372 Mass. 86

ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. Donald E. BLAKELY et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 4, 1977.

Decided March 3, 1977.

Norman J. Fine, Brookline, for defendants.

Robert A. Curley, Boston, for plaintiff.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, KAPLAN, WILKINS and LIACOS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The defendant Donald E. Blakely, Jr. (Blakely), was struck and injured by an uninsured (hit-and-run) motor vehicle in March, 1973, while riding in a Plymouth automobile owned by his father and insured by Royal Indemnity Company (Royal). At that time Blakely lived with his parents, each of whom owned one other motor vehicle which was insured by Royal under a separate standard motor vehicle policy. Blakely claims that he is entitled to collect under the uninsured motor vehicle insurance coverage on each of the three motor vehicle insurance policies issued by Royal. Royal has conceded liability under the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to the vehicle occupied by Blakely but has denied liability under the other two policies. The judge below ordered judgment for Royal as to the other policies, ruling that (1) Royal was not bound by an arbitrator's award which imposed liability on all three policies ² and (2) the language of the standard motor vehicle policies denied uninsured motorist coverage except under the policy covering the vehicle occupied by Blakely. The Blakelys no longer press the issues argued below. They now argue that the limitations in the uninsured motorist coverage as expressed in their policies are in conflict with the requirements of the statute mandating uninsured motorist coverage and, hence, are void. We affirm the judgments. ³

We agree with Royal's assertion that the Blakelys are not entitled to a decision on this newly raised issue. It seems clear that the legality of the purported policy exclusion was not presented below. The Blakelys' pleadings do not indicate that they were contending that the policy exclusion must be disregarded as a matter of public policy. Such an assertion in their pleadings would be particularly appropriate in a proceeding for declaratory relief. The judge's thorough findings and conclusions make no reference to any such claim. Our cases hold consistently that a nonjurisdictional issue not presented at the trial level need not be considered on appeal. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Hillside Park 'N Shop, Inc., --- Mass. ---, ---, ^a 346 N.E.2d 887 (1976); Green v. Board of Appeal of Norwood, 358 Mass. 253, 257, 263 N.E.2d 423 (1970); Henchey v. Cox, 348 Mass. 742, 747, 205 N.E.2d 715 (1965); Foster v. Everett, 334 Mass. 14, 18, 133 N.E.2d 480 (1956). Such a rule has particular force where the other party may be prejudiced by the failure to raise the point below. See Milton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 365 Mass. 368, 379, 312 N.E.2d 188 (1974); Donahue v. Dal, Inc., 314 Mass. 460 463, 50 N.E.2d 207 (1943). ⁴ Thus, in the normal course, we would not consider this clearly independent issue raised here for the first time. However, because the question presented has application to other persons in the Commonwealth and the result we reach is not changed by our consideration of the point, we shall state our views on the issue.

Section 113L of G.L. c. 175, applicable to the 1973 standard motor vehicle policies issued to the Blakelys (see St.1968, c. 643, § 5), required that every such policy must provide 'coverage in amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a liability policy under this chapter, under provisions approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . . and hit-and-run motor vehicles . . . because of bodily injury . . ..' The Legislature explicitly delegated to the Commissioner of Insurance the function of approving the scope of uninsured motorist coverage. He has approved a policy which says in effect that where there is more than one motor vehicle in a household and an insured in injured by an uninsured motor vehicle while occupying one of those vehicles, uninsured motorist coverage will be available under only one policy. The legislative purpose that uninsured motorist coverage must be available to a limit of at least $5,000 a person and $10,000 an accident is achieved by the policy language approved by the Commissioner. ⁵ We see no legislative mandate that a family owning more than one vehicle must be entitled to 'stack' its uninsured motorist coverage so as to obtain additional protection against personal injury sustained through the fault of the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. ⁶

The Blakelys rely on our decision in Johnson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 359 Mass. 525, 269 N.E.2d 700 (1971), which, under statutory provisions no longer in effect (see G.L. c. 90, § 34L, inserted by St.1966, c. 260, repealed by St.1968, c. 643, § 6), held an 'other insurance' clause to be invalid which purported to limit total liability to $5,000 under three applicable policies providing uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiffs were permitted to recover under each policy with respect to insured pedestrians who were struck by an uninsured motor vehicle. That former statute, relating to uninsured motorist coverage, gave no role to the Commissioner of Insurance in approving the relevant policy provisions, and it required that the coverage under each policy be no less than $5,000. In adopting G.L. c. 175, § 113L, in its present form, the Legislature gave the Commissioner authority to interpret the scope of § 113L to limit recovery to $5,000 where there were multiple policies in one household. If all the Blakely vehicles had been insured under a single policy, recovery would have been limited to $5,000, and we see no reason why the result should be different because Royal issued three separate policies.

Because of the peculiarities of the Massachusetts system of motor vehicle insurance, decisions in other jurisdictions often are not apt to furnish meaningful guidance. The view we take has been adopted elsewhere under a similar statute. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ealy, 221 Pa.Super. 138, 140--141, 289 A.2d 113 (1972). Cf. Murray v. Remuck, 108 R.I. 179, 184--185, 273 A.2d 491 (1971). Cases relied on by the Blakelys where no uninsured motorist coverage was available under a policy covering the vehicle of an insured involved in an accident with another uninsured vehicle are not in point. ⁷ Such a situation should not arise in Massachusetts because each vehicle owned in a Massachusetts household must have uninsured motorist coverage. G.L. c. 175, § 113L.

Judgments affirmed.

1 The other two defendants are Anna T. Blakely, the wife of Donald E. Blakely, and their son Donald E. Blakely, Jr.

2 The judge was correct in concluding that the arbitration required by the...