Royal v. City of Fr.

Decision Date17 September 2018
Docket NumberCAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-247-PRC
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
PartiesSHONDRA ROYAL, personal representative of the Wrongful Death Estate of LANCE EDWARD ROYAL, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FORT WAYNE, CAMERON NORRIS, JONATHAN BOWERS, KURT FRANCEUS, JUAN GUTIERREZ, and SHANE HEATH, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 29], filed by Defendants City of Fort Wayne, Cameron Norris, Jonathan Bowers, Kurt Franceus, Juan Gutierrez, and Shane Heath on June 5, 2018. Plaintiff Shondra Royal, personal representative of the Wrongful Death Estate of Lance Edward Royal, Jr., filed a response on June 24, 2018, and Defendants filed a reply on July 5, 2018. This matter is also before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Strike "Plaintiff's Appendix: I. Local Rule 56-1 Statement of Genuine Issues" [DE 34], filed by Defendants on July 5, 2018, and fully briefed as of July 10, 2018. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion for Summary Judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Shondra Royal, personal representative of the Wrongful Death Estate of Lance Edward Royal, Jr., filed a Complaint in this Court on June 15, 2017, against Defendants City of Fort Wayne, Detective Cameron Norris, Detective Sergeant Jonathan Bowers, Detective Kurt Franceus, Detective Juan Gutierrez, and Detective Shane Heath. (Compl. ¶¶ 5,6). The officers are named in their individual capacities, and Plaintiff alleges that they were acting under color of law for purposes of the constitutional claims and within the scope of their employment for purposes of the Indiana state law tort claims. (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants caused the death of Lance Edward Royal, Jr. through the denial of post-arrest medical care, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Indiana Wrongful Death Act, and Indiana state law for claims of assault and battery and of false imprisonment. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2). Defendants filed an Answer on July 11, 2017.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a motion for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Summary judgment is appropriate when no material fact is disputed and the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, meaning that no reasonable jury could find for the other party based on the evidence in the record." Carman v. Tinkes, 762 F.3d 565, 566 (7th Cir. 2014).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believesdemonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), (c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Spierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2015). When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Spierer, 798 F.3d at 507-08.

"Once the moving party puts forth evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute." Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). The non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e); Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762, 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants ask the Court to strike Plaintiff's Local Rule 56-1 Statement of Genuine Disputes, arguing that the Statement of Genuine Disputes as a whole is an impermissible extensionof Plaintiff's brief because it contains argument of counsel, analysis of exhibits, interpretations of video recordings, unfounded assertions, and citation to case law. Defendants also argue that the cited portions of Porshea Gentry's deposition testimony should be stricken because Ms. Gentry's testimony contradicts what is seen and heard on the video recordings. However, as noted by Plaintiff, Defendants have not identified any particular section, page, sentence, or word from Plaintiff's Statement of Genuine Disputes that they contend is improper.

The party opposing summary judgment—Plaintiff in this case—is required by local rule to file a "Statement of Genuine Disputes," either as part of the response brief or an appendix, that "identifies the material facts that the party contends are genuinely disputed so as to make a trial necessary." N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2). Plaintiff's Statement of Genuine Disputes does just that, identifying portions of Defendants' Affidavits, the four video recordings, and various other documents produced in discovery that Plaintiff contends demonstrate a material question of fact as to whether the defendant officers were on notice of Mr. Royal's serious medical need, whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers not to provide Mr. Royal with medical care, and whether the officers had been properly trained by the City of Fort Wayne.

As for Plaintiff's discussion of the video evidence, the Court has reviewed the video recordings and included in the facts below Plaintiff's description of the video recordings as supported by the cited portions of the video recordings. Defendants do not identify any inaccuracies in Plaintiff's descriptions or offer any alternate descriptions. It is not clear what other means Plaintiff has of identifying facts from a video for purposes of a Statement of Genuine Disputes. As for any argument, characterization, or citation to law that should have been included in the brief, the Court disregards those portions of the Statement of Genuine Issues.

Finally, the Court considers Defendants' request to strike Plaintiff's citation to Ms. Gentry's deposition on the basis that Ms. Gentry's testimony contradicts what is seen and heard on the video recordings. Defendants correctly note that, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (discussing videotape evidence). However, Defendants do not explain how Ms. Gentry's deposition testimony is contradicted by the video recordings, nor do they identify the contradictory portions of the video recordings.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies the Motion to Strike.

MATERIAL FACTS

At approximately 11:04 a.m. on June 25, 2015, a traffic stop was conducted that led to the arrest of Lance Royal by City of Fort Wayne detectives. Detective Gutierrez conducted the traffic stop of the vehicle Mr. Royal was driving to arrest the passenger, Porshea Gentry, for whom an active arrest warrant had been issued related to an on-going narcotics investigation. At the time he was removed from the car, Mr. Royal was chewing cocaine, which the detectives ordered him to spit out; an additional quantity of cocaine was recovered from the car. Ms. Gentry, the passenger, was transported to the hospital from the scene of the traffic stop. Mr. Royal was transported directly to an interview room at the Fort Wayne police operations center, arriving at approximately 11:48 a.m. After being found on the floor having what appeared to be a seizure, Mr. Royal was taken from the interview room at 12:32 p.m. to receive medical care but died from a cocaine overdose while in custody. The five defendant officers were involved to varying degrees in the traffic stop and Mr. Royal's arrest and detention.

1. Detective Juan Carlos Gutierrez

On December 15, 2003, Detective Juan Carlos Gutierrez became a police officer for the City of Fort Wayne. (ECF 29-1, ¶ 2). On May 21, 2018, the date of his Affidavit, Detective Gutierrez held the position of Detective Vice and Narcotics. Id. In his Affidavit, Detective Gutierrez provides the following information.

On June 25, 2015, Detective Gutierrez was on duty as a detective for the Fort Wayne Police Department, wearing a full police uniform and...

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